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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines how Cicero characterizes the populus Romanus, its 
power, and its place in the Republic in speeches between 70 and 63 B.C. Cicero's 
rhetoric was inevitably a function of his persuasive aims and contemporary political 
ideology. Through close reading of relevant speeches and consideration of the 
circumstances surrounding their delivery, the present work aims to shed light on what 
Cicero and his Roman audience believed about the nature of the People's power and to 
show how an orator could manipulate those beliefs to achieve his rhetorical ends. 
For the period in question, Cicero consistently identifies the populus as the 
ultimate source of power and its interest as the end for which the res publica exists. The 
first chapter examines Cicero's first contional speech, pro Lege Manilia, in which the 
orator emphasizes the People's moral and political authority in an effort to persuade them 
to intervene in foreign affairs, a traditional purview of the Senate. The second chapter 
considers the first actio of the Verrines, specifically how Cicero puts pressure on the 
senatorial jury by appealing to the corona as "the People," thereby reminding the jurors 
that their conduct and, ultimately, their verdict are subject to public scrutiny. The third 
IV 
chapter treats the second actio of the Verrines and the fragmentary pro Cornelio, in 
which Cicero defends the legitimacy of collective violence in defense of the People's 
Iibert as. The fourth chapter looks at appeals to consensus in four consular speeches - the 
second de Lege Agraria, the pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo, and the first and fourth 
Catilinarians. In each speech, Cicero points to reactions from various crowds as 
evidence of unanimous support for otherwise "unpopular" positions, including the 
abrogation of civil liberties under the senatus consul tum ultimum. 
Though he never insisted that the senatus abdicate its leadership of the res 
publica, Cicero continued to appeal to the populus Romanus as a remedy for the 
nobility's failures even after his election as consul. The prevalence of this theme in his 
pre-consular and consular rhetoric suggests that Cicero saw it as a solution to the divide 
between optimates and populares. 
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In his discussion of the Roman Republic's constitution, Polybius observes of the 
People that they alone have the authority to bestow honor and punishment (K6pto<; Ttf..t:fj<; 
Kat TtflCOpta<;), and that it is by these things alone that both oligarchies and republics (Kat 
cSuvacrrdat Kat n:oA.ndat), in short, humans' entire way oflife (n:ac; 6 -r&v av8pron:cov 
~to<;), are held together. 1 The present dissertation will demonstrate how Cicero's rhetoric 
related to the populus Romanus in various speeches from 70 through 63 accords with this 
view. Two objectives concern us: first, to examine through a combination of close 
reading and consideration of historical context how and why Cicero refers to the Roman 
People; and second, to consider what these references reveal about how Cicero and his 
audiences conceived of the nature of the People's power in the final decades of the 
Republic. Whatever the form of their power, be it election, the construction of honor and 
shame, violence, or consensus, Cicero's rhetoric tends to confirm the conclusion reached 
by Polybius, that the power of the Roman People lay not so much in formulating or 
executing policy as in selecting leaders and holding them accountable. 
The present state of scholarship on the role of the populus Romanus during the 
Iibera res publica owes much to the work of Fergus Millar. Though not the first to 
recognize the limits ofprosopography,2 Millar went further than anyone in setting forth a 
1 Polyb. 6.14.4 - n11ii~ yap E<rn mi. nwopia~ Ev •ft noA.m:i<;£ 116vo~ 6 15fi!lo~ IC6pw~, oT~ cruvtxovTat 116vot~ 
Kai 15uva<n€tat Kai noA.ndat Kai cruA.A.i]~8T]V nil~ 6 1:&v 6.v9pronwv ~io~. 
2 Indeed, Hi:ilkeskamp 2010: 5-11 points out that even Gelzer and Gruen expressed misgivings about the 
model. North 1990: 7 coined the term "frozen waste" theory to describe the prosopographical model, the 
view of a narrow oligarchy who used personal relationships to control Roman politics and that "voting 
2 
new model, one that located the People- or, more precisely, the crowd in the Forum- at 
the center of civic life.3 Partly in response to his work and in part because of broader 
academic trends, the last thirty years has witnessed a growing interest among philologists, 
historians, and art historians in Rome's political culture. The study of political culture 
includes consideration not only of the actors, programs, institutions, and procedures of a 
society, but also its norms and values and the ways in which those norms and values are 
conveyed and negotiated.4 Among Roman historians, the study of political culture has 
entailed a shift away from the study of events, individuals, institutions, laws, and 
prosopography as such, in favor of a more holistic approach, one that also accounts for 
the roles played by religion, family, emotions, symbols, memory, art, and topography in 
shaping culture. At the same time, an interest in reading texts in relation to the 
circumstances of their production, has established itself as one of the dominant 
approaches to the study of literature, and rhetoric in particular.5 
This dissertation stands at the intersection of these trends. Rhetoric inevitably 
draws upon and shapes ideology, and ideology- the system of beliefs held in common by 
members of a society - reflects and influences political practice. Thus, the study of 
Cicero's oratory can shed light on the People's role in the Republic and vice-versa. 
Evidence of Roman ideology (or ideologies) as it relates to the populus Romanus can be 
behavior in the assemblies could be regarded as totally divorced from the opinions, interests, and prejudices 
of the voters themselves." 
3 Millar 1998: 210 even went so far as to label the Republic a democracy: "The exclusive right of the 
assemblies to pass legislation is by far the strongest reason why, in purely formal terms, the Roman res 
publica has to be characterized as a democracy." See also: pp. 11 , 197-226; Millar 1995, 1986. 
4 For discussion of "political culture" as a concept and a survey of scholarship: Htilkeskamp 2010: 53-75, 
esp. 53n. 2. 
5 In terms of Cicero's works: Prag 2007; Dugan 2005; Steel2001; Habinek 1998; Cape 1995; Vasaly 1993 ; 
Classen 1985 . The interest in the circumstances surrounding the production of a text can be seen as part of 
a wider trend in literary studies that began with the rehabilitation of historicism by Greenblatt 1980. 
3 
found by examining the statements and assumptions of relevant speeches in light of their 
context. Contextual considerations prove essential for adumbrating Cicero's rhetorical 
aims in a given situation. These affect his choice of strategy, including how he refers to 
the People. Such things as the physical setting, the events surrounding a speech, the 
people involved, the constituency of the audience(s), the pertinent laws, and institutional 
practice must be considered in order to appreciate fully Cicero's treatment of the People. 
For his part, Fergus Millar took institutional practice as a starting point: the 
People were sovereign, since they alone had the power to legislate. From there, he set 
out to explain Roman politics in terms of"an orator addressing a crowd in the Forum; a 
picture of someone using the arts of rhetoric to persuade an anonymous crowd about 
something."6 Encouraged (or, in some cases, goaded) by Millar's interpretation, 
historians and Latinists have in recent years turned their attention to aspects of the contio 
-a public, non-legislative meeting in the course of which one or more magistrates 
delivered speeches to an assembled crowd.7 Here, political speech mediated between the 
Senatus Populusque Romanus- that is, between the governing class on the one hand and 
the notional voting public on the other. In her work on Roman rhetorical theory, Joy 
Connolly focuses on the orator, or more precisely, how the Romans and especially Cicero 
conceived of the orator as a purveyor of civic virtue and identity.8 Connolly notes that an 
orator's speech acts as a unifying agent, producing a collective consciousness, a 
community that is, in reality, a "state of speech." I share Connolly's view ofthe 
6 Millar 1986: 1. 
7 On the contio: Jehne 2011 ; Tan 2008; Morstein-Marx 2004; Mouritsen 2001: esp. 38-62; Pina Polo 1996, 
1995 ; Flaig 1995 ; Holkeskamp 1995. See also: Chapter 1; Taylor 1966: 15-33; Botsford 1909: 139-51. 
8 Connolly 2007. 
4 
mediating role played by speech, but instead take Robert Morstein-Marx's work on 
contional oratory and popular decision-making as a model.9 Rather than a focus on the 
theoretical orator, Morstein-Marx concerns himselfwith the dynamics of the relationship 
between orator and audience in contione. Drawing on evidence from archaeology, 
history, and especially Cicero's speeches, Morstein-Marx concludes that the People 
enjoyed an ideological monopoly over contional discourse: orators had to appear 
popularis, regardless of their ends. What is more, those who summoned a contio were 
generally well received, since they often stacked the crowd with their own supporters. 
Thus, contiones tended to be more akin to political rallies than opportunities for open and 
honest debate. 
As we will see, the fact that orators would address those attending voting 
assemblies and contiones as the populus Romanus did not in and of itself make these 
gatherings unique. What distinguished them was their association with voting, the formal 
means by which the People exercised power vis-a-vis the governing class. This lent 
voting assemblies and the contiones that preceded them special ideological significance. 
For this reason, contiones deserve the attention that scholars have given them, and 
indeed, it is where we shall begin our study. Yet all ofthe attention given to the contio 
has led some to exaggerate its importance, particularly in Anglo-American scholarship. 
So Morstein-Marx writes, "there was no serious alternative source ofpolitical 
information to the Roman citizen other than what he heard in the contio ."10 As I intend to 
argue in the second chapter, the public courts (iudicia publica) served as a place where 
9 Morstein-Marx 2004. 
10 Morstein-Marx 2004: 20. His broader point about the elite's domination of the media remains valid. 
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the Roman People, though they did not cast ballots, could obtain information, pass 
judgment on those involved, and make their collective voice heard. 11 Historians have 
long recognized that the People exercised power in a variety of different places and 
ways. 12 The current project aims to expand our conception ofthe People's reach by 
revealing the ways in which Cicero exploited that power for his rhetorical ends. The 
People's capacity to surveil, engage in violence, and employ acclamatio complemented 
their institutional powers of legislation and election. The study of Cicero's early 
speeches suggests what Polybius had concluded decades earlier, that the Romans 
believed the People to be the ultimate source of power and moral authority. 
Historical Context 
Cicero spent his youth in the political orbit of C. Marius, albeit at some distance. 13 
Both hailed from Arpinum. Cicero's father, perhaps through his brother, became an 
associate ofM. Antonius- consul in 95, grandfather of the future triumvir, and husband 
to one ofMarius' sisters. The young Marcus Cicero would have become acquainted with 
Antonius when his father brought him to Rome, probably around the age often. The 
elder Cicero entrusted both his sons' education to another consular and associate of 
Marius, L. Licinius Crass us, whose daughter wed Marius' son. The death of Crassus 
roughly coincided with Cicero's coming of age, his donning ofthe toga virilis. At that 
11 Riggsby 1999, on the public comts and "community", overlooks the corona entirely. As a counterpoint, 
see Vasaly 2009. 
12 For example: Kaster 2005 ; Be112004, 1997; Dobler 1999; Lintott Violence 1999; Laser 1997; Will1991; 
Vanderbroeck 1987; Brunt 1966. 
13 Mitchell1979: 2-41. 
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point, Cicero's father arranged for him to study law with the father-in-law of the now-
deceased Crassus- Q. Mucius Scaevola Augur. When Scaevola himself died two years 
later, Cicero and his friend T. Pomponius Atticus continued their studies with his younger 
cousin, Q. Mucius Scaevola, who was then Pontifex Maximus and had been the consular 
colleague of Crassus. 
Despite his links to Marius, Cicero did not support the Cinnan dominatio, whose 
origins may be traced toP. Sulpicius, tribune in 88. Through a combination of violence 
and intimidation, Sulpicius passed legislation, removing L. Cornelius Sulla from his 
command in the war against Mithridates and replacing him with C. Marius.14 As was 
customary, the Senate had appointed Sulla as proconsul, but Sulpicius had used the 
People's legislative authority to overturn the Senate's arrangements. Sulla did not abide 
by the People's decision and marched on Rome at the head of six legions. Sulpicius and 
Marius fled; the former was killed. Sulla overturned their arrangements and may have 
instituted certain reforms intended to prevent a similar incident from recurring. When 
Sulla finally departed Italy for the East, Marius marched on Rome with L. Cornelius 
Cinna. Their forces took the city, and a reign of terror ensued. Years later, Cicero would 
claim to have opposed Marius and Cinna as well as their successors- C. Papirius Carbo 
and the younger Marius. 15 His political inactivity in these years testifies to his sincerity. 
The regime claimed the lives of two men he had come to admire.16 Within the first year, 
M. Antonius was murdered. Shortly afterward, Mucius Scaevola narrowly survived an 
14 Keaveney 2005: 48-55. Sources: MRR 2.41 , esp. App. B. Civ. 1.55-9; Diod. 37.29.2; Liv. Per. 77; Plut. 
Mar. 34-5; Sull. 8-9; Val. Max. 9.7 ext. 1; VeiL Pat. 2.18.5-19.1. 
15 Brut. 308-12; Rose. Amer. 135-42. 
16 Brut. 311; de Drat. 3.10; Rose. Amer. 33 . 
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attempt on his life, only to be killed four years later by the younger Marius. Cicero 
undoubtedly counted both men among the clarissimi homines, whose cruel deaths he 
would later claim Sulla had returned from the East to avenge. 17 
Sulla's victory at the Colline Gate in 82 settled matters. When he became 
dictator, Sulla set about proscribing his enemies and instituting a series of reforms aimed 
at strengthening the hand ofthe Senate at the expense of the People's institutions. 18 
According to Appian, the dictator required that all legislation passed in the assemblies 
receive the Senate's prior approval-likely the auctoritas patrum- an ancient practice 
that had largely fallen into disuse. 19 Additionally, he apparently transferred all legislative 
activity from the comitia tributa to the more hierarchical comitia centuriata where, as the 
historian comments, voting would be controlled "by the wealthy and sober-minded rather 
than the poor and the very reckless. "20 At the same time, he curbed the powers of the 
tribunate. Among other things, Sulla deprived tribunes of the right to introduce 
legislation, he placed restrictions on the circumstances in which they could exercise a 
veto, and he forbade tribunes from holding any further political office?1 This last 
provision seems to have ensured that the office would attract only those lacking in 
17 Phil. 8.7- Ceteris enim be/lis, maximeque civilibus, contentionem rei publicae causafaciebat .. . cum 
Mario et Carbone Sulla, ne dominarentur indigni, et ut clarissimorum hominum crude/iss imam poeniretur 
necem. 
18 On the Sullan reforms: Flower 2010: 117-34; Keaveney 2005: 56-7; 140-51; Seager 1992: 172, 200-3; 
Hantos 1988; Meier 1966: 255-66. 
19 App. B. Civ. 1.59. On auctoritas patrum: Graeber 2001: esp. 213-5, 220-1; Biscardi 1987: esp. 130, 194-
7. 
20 App. B. Civ. 1.59: ... oihE 1:ac; XElpowviac; tv wl:c; nevrtcn Kai. 8pammhmc; av1:i. nnv tv nEpwucri~;t Kai. 
Eu~ouA.i~;t ytyYOJ.lEVac; ... Either Appian is misinformed, the transfer of legislative activity to the co milia 
centuriata did not last long, or it was in some way limited since Sulla's lex de XX Quaestoribus was 
subsequently passed in the comitia tributa. See the prescript toRS 1, no. 14. 
21 App. B. Civ. 1.100; Asc. 67.1-4C, 78 .23-5C, 81.3-5C; Caes. Civ. 1.7; Cic. Leg. 3.22; Verr. 2.1.155; Liv. 
Per. 89; Yell. Pat. 2.30.4. 
8 
ambition and less apt to upset the status quo. Other reforms included the empanelling of 
jurors drawn exclusively from the senatorial class, the abolition of the grain dole, and the 
repeal of the lex Domitia, which had instituted a form of popular election to the four 
major priesthoods.Z2 Hence, Sulla could claim by the end of his dictatorship that, through 
his reforms and a regimen of bloodletting, he had restored the body politic. 
In this environment, Cicero launched his career as an advocate and entered the 
Republic's political economy. Pleading in court allowed him to cultivate personal 
relationships and fashion a public image, both of which would be critical to his 
subsequent political success.23 Writing over fifteen years later, Cicero's brother would 
remark in his Commentariolum Petition is that Cicero's advocacy in the courts had 
allowed him to cultivate friendships for his political advantage.24 Since they could not 
receive money for their services, advocates became "friends" (amici) of those they 
represented: they gained the "favor" (gratia) of their clients and, with it, an expectation 
that their service would in some way be reciprocated.25 For an aspiring politician like 
Cicero, amici and gratia served as forms of political capital. Given the range of 
friendships and their dynamic nature, Peter Brunt wisely cautions, "the appearance of an 
22 Transfer of courts: Cic. Verr. 1.37; Tac. Ann. 11.22. Grain dole: Sal. Hist. 1.55.11 M. Selection of 
priests: Dio 37.37.1. 
23 Comment. Pet. 16. See also: Att. 2.22.3; Yakobson 1999: 82-3; Morstein-Marx 1998: 262-3; Meier 
1966: 7-10. 
24 Comment. Pet. 20 - Et omnino, quoniam eo genere amicitiarum petitio tua maxime munita est quod ex 
causarum defensionibus adeptus es, fac ut plane iis omnibus quos devinctos tenes discriptum ac dispositum 
suum cuique munus sit. 
25 Brunt 1988 : 372-3- "Gratia signifies not only a favor done to others, and especially a favor done in 
return for those received, and the gratitude evinced in such a requital, but also the influence that accrues to 
men with a claim on the gratitude of others. Its ambivalence reflects the reciprocity of services and 
obligations which was characteristic of Roman society. This reciprocity is, of course, illustrated in the 
relationships between patrons and clients, and between friends .. . " See also: Yakobson 1999: 83; Gelzer 
1969: 74-5. 
9 
orator as counsel for the defense is no clear proof of his political affiliations."26 But we 
should not dismiss the possibility out of hand either: Cicero and his client might have 
become "friends" precisely because they moved in the same circles and shared the same 
political interests. 
Moreover, appearances mattered in the Republic. The location of the courts in the 
Forum meant both the quality and content of a forensic performance lay open to public 
scrutiny.27 For an aspiring politician, choices about whether or not to take a particular 
case, what rhetorical strategy to pursue, and whether or not to publish a speech all had 
political implications. An advocate might have chosen to take a particular case not only 
out of personal affection, but also because it allowed him to make a particular argument 
and/or to appear on behalf of a certain individual.28 
Indeed, part of an orator's decision about whether or not to take a case may well 
have hinged on whom he would be seen with. The visual association of an advocate with 
his client was not unlike that of a candidate canvassing with members of his entourage. 
Both amounted to a form of nonverbal rhetoric, whereby one's appearance signaled an 
endorsement of the other. Like other spectacles, the setting for these displays was 
26 Brunt 1988: 376. 
27 Thus, Comment. Pet. 2, where Quintus reminds his brother to come to court prepared, adding quicquid es 
ex hoc es. 
28 A shortcoming of "persuasive process criticism," which subordinates the political aspects of forensic 
rhetoric, placing them in the service of the immediate objective- securing a conviction or an acquittal. As 
I have suggested, this approach suffers from reductionism, for surely the mistake is not in thinking that 
Cicero used his speeches to advance his political views at the expense of winning his cases (as Alexander 
2007: 1 02), but in thinking that he could not do both simultaneously. The advocate's decision to take a 
particular case assumes that wim1ing was a priority, but the exposure of a public trial also provided him 
with an opportunity to shape his long-term public persona. On "persuasive process criticism": Powell and 
Patterson 2004: 1-9; Craig 2002: 517-20; Leffl998: 65-70. Examples: Claasen 1985; Leeman 1982; Stroh 
1975; Neumeister 1964. 
10 
Rome's public spaces and the Forum specifically.29 In the Commentariolum, Quintus 
touches on the importance of being publicly associated with certain individuals. He 
advises his brother to have a certain number of distinguished friends for show (ad 
speciem, homines illustres honore ac nomine), and though they may not actively solicit 
votes, their mere presence lends the candidate dignitas (adferunt petitiori aliquid 
dignitatis). 30 At the same time, Quintus encourages Cicero to have a great crowd about 
him and, among the crowd, those he has defended for they will bring him great praise and 
th d . . 31 e utmost zgmtas. 
Cicero would have been mindful of such appearances when, in his first criminal 
case, he chose to defend a municipalis, Sextus Roscius of Ameria, against a charge of 
parricide. His speech on that occasion (which he subsequently chose to publish) gives 
some idea of his public persona at the time and suggests that from early on he pursued a 
cautious political strategy. In general, he avoided risk-taking unless there was a high 
probability of success. The trial of Roscius offers a case in point. In response to the 
prosecution's claim that the defendant had killed his father, Cicero countered that two 
kinsmen were in fact responsible and that they had enlisted the aid of a certain freedman 
of Sulla- Chrysogonus?2 The latter allegedly gained possession of the victim's property 
by registering his name posthumously on the lists of the proscribed. To guard against an 
appeal from the son, the conspirators arranged to have Roscius charged with the murder 
29 Comment. Pet. 43. 
3° Comment. Pet. 18. Morstein-Marx 1998: 274-6. 
31 Comment. Pet. 38 - praeterea magnam adferet laudem et summam dignitatem si ii tecum erunt qui ate 
defensi et qui per te servati ac iudiciis Iiberati sunt. 
32 Rose. Amer. 15-32. 
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of his father. The involvement of Chrysogonus, his alleged abuse of power and 
manipulation of the proscription lists raised issues fraught with peril. 
From the beginning of the pro Roscio Amerino, Cicero confronts his audience 
with the actual effects of Sulla's program to "restore" the Republic. Cicero explains that, 
because of the injustice of the times (propter iniquitatem temporwn ), the defense of 
Roscius has fallen to him rather than a more distinguished advocate; if anyone of some 
stature had spoken and said one word about the Republic, he would be thought to have 
said much more than he actually said (multo plura dixisse, quam dixisset, putaretur). In 
other words, his remarks would be interpreted as critical. By contrast, Cicero claims, "If 
I say something too freely, either it can be swept under the rug because I have not yet 
entered politics, or it can be pardoned on account of my youth."33 Thus, the political 
situation plays an integral part in Cicero 's ethical strategy, allowing him at once to insist 
that the case is important while at the same time conveying a sense of modesty about his 
own youth and inexperience. Given the times, he casts himself as the only one able to 
take the case. 34 
But Cicero is surely exaggerating, not only about his youth, but also the danger 
surrounding the case. To be sure, he had probably argued his first cases the previous 
year, but at the age of twenty-five, Cicero had embarked on his forensic career rather 
late. 35 Hortensius, for example, had argued his first case at the age of nineteen. The fact 
33 Rose. Amer. 3 - ego si quid liberius dixero, vel occultum esse, p ropterea quod nondum ad rem publicam 
accessi, vel ignosci adulescentiae poterit. 
34 Thus, Rose. A mer. 9 - His de rebus tamque atrocibus neque sa tis me commode dicere neque sa tis 
graviter conqueri neque satis libere vociferari p osse intellego. Nam commoditati ingenium, gravitati aetas, 
libertati tempora sunt impedimenta. 
35 Vasaly 2002: 72-3 ; Brut. 229. 
12 
that Cicero spent the tumultuous years of the Cinnan dominatio on the sidelines, 
developing the skills necessary to be an effective orator suggests both that he was well 
equipped for the case and that any real danger had passed. The historical record suggests 
as much. Sulla had earlier resigned the dictatorship, and though he continued to hold 
imperium as consul in the year of the trial, he surely intended his abdication of supreme 
power to signal a return to normalcy?6 Moreover, Cicero himself claims (perhaps, 
again, with some exaggeration) that Chrysogonus entered the name of the elder Roscius 
on the proscription lists, "when there was no longer any mention of proscription, when 
even those who had been afraid beforehand returned and now thought they were out of 
danger."37 Even so, he takes pains to insulate Sulla from criticism. He reiterates his 
support for Sulla and rejoices at his restoration of the Republic.38 While attacking his 
freedman Chrysogonus, Cicero compares Sulla to the master of a household and, later, to 
Jupiter himself, saying that the former dictator could be forgiven if "on account of the 
magnitude of the undertaking, many men did many things with Sulla partly unaware and 
partly disapproving. "39 
In sum, Cicero manages to appeal to all sides: he shows support for the Sullan 
program while criticizing aspects of its implementation, and he explains its abuses (in this 
case, by Chrysogonus) by arguing that Sulla was not aware of what was going on. When 
these aspects of the pro Roscio Amerino are read in light of his political inactivity during 
36 Seager 1992: 205 . See also: Badian 1970: 8-12; MRR 3.74-6. 
37 Rose. A mer. 21 -cum nulla iam proscriptionis mentio fieret, cum etiam qui an tea metuerant redirent ac 
iam defimctos sese periculis arbitrarentur. 
38 Rose. Amer. 136. 
39 Rose. Amer. 130 - nemo est enim qui nesciat propter magnitudinem rerum multa multos partim 
improbante partim imprudente L. Sulla commisisse. See also: §§21-2, 131 , 138. On Cicero's strategy: 
Vasaly 2002: 80-2. 
13 
the Cinnan dominatio, it suggests that moderation and a lack of partisanship characterized 
Cicero's early political career. In this, his approach resembles that of his close friend, 
Atticus. Though a relative of P. Sulpicius and friend of the younger Marius, Atticus did 
not support the Cinnani and left Rome sometime after they took power. Cornelius Nepos 
writes that the division between the followers of Sulla and those of Cinna left Atticus 
unable to lead a public life at Rome (neque sibi dari facultatem pro dignitate vivendi), 
since he found that he would inevitably offend one side or the other. For this reason, he 
judged that it was the right time to pursue his studies at Athens.40 While Atticus would 
more or less hew to this line for the rest of his life, ambition precluded Cicero from doing 
the same. 
Still, his conduct in these years suggests that he was critical of the Sullan order. 
The year after his defense of Roscius, Cicero argued a case in the decem viral court 
defending the libertas of a woman from Arretium.41 The town had been one of several 
whose inhabitants had opposed Sulla and were consequently deprived of their rights as 
Roman citizens.42 In his suit against the woman, the plaintiff C. Aurelius Cotta argued 
that she had no standing since the people of Arretium had been stripped of their 
citizenship (non posse nostrum sacramentum iustum iudicari, quod Arretinis adempta 
civitas esset) . Cicero responded that citizenship could not be taken away, and in the end, 
40 N ep. Att. 2.2 - Ita que interfecto Sulpicio, posteaquam vidit Cinnano tumultu civitatem esse perturbatam 
neque sibi darifacultatem pro dignitate vivendi, quin altenttram partem offenderet, dissociatis animis 
civium, cum alii Sullanis, alii Cinnanis faverent p artibus, idoneum tempus ratus studiis obsequendi suis, 
Athenas se contulit. See also: §§4.2, 6.1, 8.4. 
4 1 Crawford 1984: 33-4. On the procedure and the decemviral court: Greenidge 1901 : 40-3, 52-5. 
42 MRR 2.75, esp. Cic. Caec. 95-102; Dam. 79. See also: Sal. Hist. 1.77.6, 14M. 
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he prevailed.43 Cicero departed Rome shortly after his victory, ostensibly in order to 
further his rhetorical training in the East. In the Brutus, he recounts how his vehement 
style of speaking (contentio nimia vocis) had caused his health to fail, and so he devoted 
the next two years to refining his technique at such places as Athens, Asia Minor, and 
Rhodes.44 But there is surely more to the story: his departure in the middle of 79 
coincided with the election ofM. Aemilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius Catulus to the 
consulship. Lepidus would take up arms the following year on behalf of those 
dispossessed and disenfranchised by Sulla. In the cases of Roscius of Ameria and the 
woman from Arretium, Cicero had aired many of the same grievances against the Sullan 
dominatio that Lepidus would subsequently use to justify his rebellion. Perhaps sensing 
that things were again heating up, Cicero decided to resume his studies. He wished to 
make it clear that he was no revolutionary.45 
After a two-year hiatus from Rome, Cicero returned to public life. He 
successfully stood for the quaestorship in 76 and served in Sicily the following year. 
During his time there, Plutarch relates that he gained a reputation for diligence, justice, 
and mildness.46 He made friends among both the business class and the Sicilians; more 
43 Caec. 97 - Cum Arretinae mulieris libertatem defenderem et Cotta Xviris religionem iniecisset non posse 
nostrum sacramentum iustum iudicari, quod An·etinis adempta civitas esset, et ego vehementius 
contendissem civitatem adimi non posse, Xviri prima actione non iudicaverunt. 
44 Brut. 313-6. 
45 App. B. Civ. 1.105.1 suggests that Lepidus campaigned by attacking the Sullan order: 'A.pn o' 
O.nocr-ravwc; auwii [sc. :EuUa], 'ProJ.Latm cp6vou Kai wpawiooc; O.naUaytv-rEc; ftcruxft n6.A.tv €ni cr-racrEtc; 
UnEppmisovro £-rtpac;. Kai una-rm au-rotc; Ka9imavmt K6tv-r6c; TE Ka-rA.oc; &.no TWV :EuUEirov Kai Atmooc; 
AiJ.LiA.toc; &.no TWV €vav-rirov, tx9i<JT(J) TE O.A.A.TjA.otv Kat rneuc; O.p~UJlEv(.() Otacp£pw9at. See also: Gruen 1974: 
13-7. This would explain both the suggestion at Plut. Cic. 3.6-4.4 that Cicero was apprehensive ofSulla, 
and why he did not publish his speech in defense of the woman from Arretium. 
46 Plut. Cic. 6. See also: Mitchelll979: 99-100; Cic. Div. Caec. 2, 6; Plane. 64-6. 
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than anything else, it would be his conduct as quaestor that would lead the Sicilians to 
petition him five years later to prosecute C. Verres. 
The year of Cicero's quaestorship coincided with the first move toward restoring 
the powers of the tribunate. None other than C. Aurelius Cotta- an ally of the former 
dictator, now consul - secured passage of a law overturning the ban on tribunes seeking 
higher office. He likely acted under pressure.47 The previous year, one of the tribunes, 
Cn. Sicinius, had railed against the consuls and the limits imposed on the tribunate by 
Sulla. As tribune the next year, Q. Opimius assailed the oligarchy and attempted to 
interpose a veto contrary to (the Sullan) law. Cotta probably proposed the lex Aurelia of 
75 as a sop to critics. If so, it only seems to have made matters worse. After Opimius, L. 
Quinctius used his position as tribune to attack the senatorial class over corruption in the 
courts. The following year, C. Licinius Macer assumed the mantle of tribune-reformer 
and agitated for the full restoration of tribunicia potestas.48 It would not be until the end 
of the decade and the joint-consulship ofM. Licinius Crassus and Pompey that the full 
powers of the tribunate would be restored.49 In the same year, the Senate would lose its 
monopoly over the courts. 5° 
Cicero returned to Rome in 74, when the controversies surrounding the tribunate 
were at their height. He might have stood for the plebeian office at that time, but chose 
47 Asc. 78 .17-25C; Cic. Corn . 1.52Cr = 52P; Sal. Hist. 3.48.8M. See also: Chapter 3. 
48 Marshall and Beness 1987; Gruen 1974: 24-8. On Cn. (or L.) Sicinius, trib. 76: MRR. 2.93 , esp. Sal. 
Hist. 3.48.8-10M. On Q. Opimius, trib . 75 : Cic. Verr. 2.1.155. On L. Quinctius, trib. 74: MRR 2.103, esp. 
Cic. Clu. 77, 110, 136. On C. Licinius Macer, trib . 73 : Sal. Hist. 3.48M. 
49 MRR 2.126, esp. App. B. Civ. 2.29; Asc. 76.5-12C; Cic. Leg. 3.22, 26; Verr. 1.44-5; Dio 36.38.2; Liv. 
Per. 97; Plut. Pomp. 22.3 ; Sal. Cat. 38.1. 
50 In particular, the revival of the tribunes ' right to introduce legislation would allow for the promulgation 
of the lex Gabinia three years later and that ofManilius shortly thereafter. See Chapter 1; MRR 2.127, esp. 
Asc. 17.4-10, 67 .11-3C; Cic. Cluent. 130; Liv. Per. 97; Plut. Pomp. 22.3 ; Schol. Bob. 91 , 94, 97, 189St.; 
VeiL Pat. 2.32.3. 
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not to. Instead, he bided his time. He resumed pleading cases until such time as he could 
stand for the plebeian aedileship, to which he would be elected in 70. In the same year, 
the tribunate was restored and Cicero himself undertook the prosecution of V erres. His 
activity in the intervening years suggests that Cicero had set out after his return from 
Sicily to ply the political waters while leaving little wake. In terms of political activity, 
his decision to steer clear of the tribunate meant that he would not have to engage in or be 
associated with the frequently raucous and exclusively popularis character of the 
contio.51 Rather, he devoted himself to pleading cases with few political implications. 
Only a single, published speech from these years - the second pro Tullio - survives in 
anything approaching a complete state. We know comparatively little about the other 
cases in which Cicero was involved. 52 What we do know is that Cicero spoke exclusively 
for the defense and mainly on behalf of equestrian provincials. His decision not to 
undertake a prosecution until 70 again suggests that he was treading carefully. 
Prosecutions were inherently risky, since the one bringing the case inevitably made an 
enemy of the accused.53 
Unlike the pro Roscio Amerino and (one suspects) his speech on behalf of the 
woman from Arretium, what remains of the second action of the pro Tullio contains little 
in the way ofpolitical comment. While the nature of the case and the plaintiff's 
rhetmical strategy (which entailed a status de definitione) can account for this, it does not 
explain Cicero's decision to publish it. Indeed, the speech itself seems rather 
51 On contional ideology: Chapter 1; Morstein-Marx 2004: esp. 204-40. 
52 Crawford 1984: 39-50. 
53 Bnmt 1988: 372-6. See also: Brut. 130; Off 2.49-51. 
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unremarkable but for its tediousness. 54 Likewise, politics is virtually absent from the pro 
Roscio Comoedo, which Cicero delivered upon his return from the East in 77 and 
subsequently published. Of the four speeches we know Cicero to have published in the 
years between his return from the East and his prosecution ofVerres, none seems to have 
engaged the political controversies of the day. 55 
This would soon change. As Quintus reminds his brother in the 
Commentariolum, a successful campaign entailed devoting energy not only to winning 
the support of friends (studia amicorum ), but also to gaining popular favor (popular is 
voluntas).56 Cicero's conduct in the decade leading up to his election as aedile suggests 
that he was focused on the former. Though political engagement had the potential to 
alienate friends, winning popular favor meant that candidates had to address issues of 
concern to the entire community. One had to account for the Roman People as they were 
the ones to decide who would lead them. 
The Speeches as Evidence 
As persuasive pieces, the speeches to be considered engage the values and beliefs 
of their respective audiences and, as such, offer evidence of the late Republic's political 
54 This prompts M. Aper at Tac. Dial. 20.1 to ask whether a modem audience could stand the speech - quis 
de exceptatione et formula p erpetietur ilia immensa volumina, quae pro M Tullio aut Aula Caecina 
legimus? 
55 pro Roscio Comoedo (77) , pro L. Vareno (77?), cum Quaestor Lilybaeo decederet (74),pro Marco Tullio 
I, II (71). Crawford 1994: 7-22. 
56 Comment. Pet. 16 - et petitio magistratuum divisa est in duarum rationum diligentiam, quarum altera in 
amicorum studiis, altera inpopulari voluntateponenda est. See also: Att. 2.22.3; Yakobson 1999: 82-3; 
Morstein-Marx 1998: 262-3; Meier 1966: 7-10. 
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and ideological ferment. But what precisely the speeches can tell us, particularly about 
the People's role in politics, inevitably depends on what the written speeches themselves 
represent. The issue is not insignificant. It matters a great deal who Cicero's primary 
audience was and whether the speeches more-or-less reflect what the orator actually said 
on a given occasion or whether the surviving texts bear little or no resemblance to it. For 
we cannot escape the fact that, in so far as the speeches lack authenticity, their value as 
evidence of how Cicero's rhetoric actually functioned diminishes. 
At first glance, the speeches appear to be scripts (or transcripts) ofachml orations. 
So they would have appeared to their original, first-century readership. The facts argue 
against this, however. For one, the Romans ofthe Republic rarely transcribed speeches 
as they were being delivered; for another, Cicero seldom spoke from a prepared script (ex 
scripto).57 To Quintilian, writing over a century later, it seemed that Cicero had written 
out the most essential parts of a speech in advance, including the beginning, and 
committed those parts to memory; as for the rest of the speech, he surmised that Cicero 
would have thought through his arguments in advance and delivered them 
extemporaneously.58 In part, Quintilian based his conclusions on the existence of 
57 On delivering speeches ex scripta : Lintott 2008: 9; Mur. 27; Plane. 74; Phil. 1 0.5. Transcripts of certain 
senatorial proceedings related to the Catilinarian conspiracy seem to have been produced, but this was 
almost certainly the exception rather than the rule. Alexander 2002: 17-8; Cic. Sui. 42; Plut. Cat. Mi. 23. 
58 
Quint. Inst. 10.7.30 - Plerumque aut em multa agentibus accidit, ut maxime necessaria et utique initia 
scribant, cetera quae domo adferunt cogitatione complectantur, subitis ex tempore occur rant; quod f ecisse 
M Tullium commentariis ips ius apparel. While everything not written down was delivered 
extemporaneously, Quintilian distinguishes between those parts that were thought through in advance (quae 
domo adferunt cogitatione complectantur) and those that were improvised in order to address 
"emergencies" (subitis ex tempore occurant). See also: Asc. 87.12C; Cic. Brut. 164. 
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Cicero's own notebooks (commentarii), which Tiro- Cicero's freedman -likely 
published after his former master's death. 59 
If Cicero generally wrote only a commentarium and the most important parts of a 
speech prior to delivery, then he was left to compose (or recompose) the final, published 
version after the fact. 60 Without the benefit of exceptional wealth or a distinguished 
pedigree, Cicero traded on his skills as an orator, and the publication of his speeches 
allowed him to reach a wider audience. Cicero selectively published his speeches and 
among his initial criteria for publication seems to have been whether or not he prevailed 
in a given case. This suggests that he intended his published speeches, more than 
anything else, to serve as monuments (monumenta) to his political and forensic success.61 
But whereas the crowds who attended his speeches in the Forum were typically made up 
of individuals from a range of different classes and backgrounds, Cicero's readers were 
almost exclusively elite.62 This difference between a speech's original audience and its 
readership raises the possibility that the orator substantially revised his speeches and, 
significantly for our purposes, that he tailored their ideological content to make them (and 
himself) more appealing to an elite audience. 
But the ancient testimonia suggest this was not so. Jerome relates that Cornelius 
Nepos had written in his now lost biography of Cicero that he himself was present at the 
trial of C. Cornelius de maiestate and that Cicero had argued in almost the same words 
59 On Cicero's commentarii: Asc. 87.11-2C; Quint. Inst. 4.1.69, 10.7.30-1. 
6° Cic. Brut. 91-3; Tusc. 4.55. 
61 Lintott 2008: 24; Riggsby 1999: 181 ; Cic. Brut. 92; Phil. 2.20; Quint. Inst. 12.10.51. 
62 Harris 1989: 222-8, 248-84. 
20 
(iisdem paene verbis) as those preserved in the pro Cornelio.
63 
Such close 
correspondence between oral and written versions may well have been the exception 
(hence, prompting the biographer's comment), but other evidence suggests that Cicero, 
when revising for publication, generally limited himself to clarifying details, making 
stylistic improvements, correcting points of fact, and amplifying emotional appeals. 
64 
The substance of his arguments remained largely unchanged. That Cicero himself treats 
the published speeches of others as representing what they actually said on a given 
occasion suggests this was common practice.65 Moreover, the presence of tituli 
designating where arguments from a speech had been excised further testifies to the 
limited nature of the revisions and the orator's fidelity to the original oration.
66 
The balance of evidence has led most scholars to conclude that the published 
speeches represent idealized versions of the original orations, a view that owes much to 
the work ofWilfried Stroh. In his work on Ciceronian dispositio, Stroh maintained that 
orators published their speeches for mainly pedagogical reasons, to serve as models 
(exempla) of how one could successfully argue in specific circumstances.67 Regardless 
of why Cicero ultimately published his speeches, it remains that students of rhetoric did 
scrutinize written speeches for purposes of imitation. Indeed, the congruence between 
the dispositiones of the written speeches and the guidelines prescribed in the rhetorical 
handbooks suggests that, at a minimum, the text of a Ciceronian speech "is a plausible 
63 HRRel. 2 p. 34, frag. 2- Refert enim Cornelius Nepos se praesente iisdem paene verbis, quibus edita est, 
~.fm pro Cornelio seditioso tribuna, def ensionem p eroratam. Alexander 2002: 20; Riggs by 1999: 180. 
65 
Morste~n-Marx 2004: 26; Riggsby 1999: 179. Sources: A tt. 1.1 3.5; 13.20.2; 13.44.3; 15.1a.2. 
Morstem-Marx 2004: 26-7n. 97. See also : Quint. Inst. 12.10.49-54. 
:~Examples: Mur. 57; Font. 20; Cael. 19(?). Alexander 2002: 24-5; Riggsby 1999: 180. 
Stroh 1985: esp. 52-4; Fantham 1978. See also, contra: Lintott 2008: 15-32; Humbert 1925. 
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recreation of the sort of speech that he gave (or would have given) on a particular 
occasion."68 This applies not just to the form of a published speech, but also to its 
rhetorical strategy, which had to be suited to the ostensible circumstances. The fact that 
Cicero published "parallel" speeches - speeches on the same subject addressed to 
different audiences (usually the Senate and People)- implies some variation across texts, 
and a cursory reading of the speeches bears this out.69 Though Cicero might have "toned 
down" strident, popularis rhetoric for publication, he does not appear to have 
significantly adjusted his original ideological perspective in order to appeal to elite 
readers. Nobles could be populares too, after all. 
Even in cases like the pro Milone or the second actio of the V errines, where we 
know the texts do not reflect what (if anything) was actually said on a given occasion, 
still the readers' apparent expectation that the published speeches reflect actual practice 
leads us to conclude that they represent the sort of thing Cicero would (liked to) have 
said. This obviously limits their value in terms of reconstructing the speech-as-event, but 
their value as sources of ideology and political culture remains undiminished. 
This brings us to the question of what precisely we mean by "ideology." Clifford 
Geertz sets forth the problem: "It is one of the minor ironies of modem intellectual 
history that the term 'ideology' has itself become thoroughly ideologized."70 
Responsibility for this lay primarily with Marx and Engels, who both considered 
ideology to be the product of historical circumstances, "as expressed in the language of 
68 Vasaly 1993: 10. 
69 Morstein-Marx 2004: 28-9. 
70 Geertz 1973 : 194 continues, "A concept that once meant but a collection of political proposals . . . has now 
become, to quote Webster's, 'the integrated assertions, theories, and aims constituting a socio-political 
program, often with the implication of factitious propagandizing ... '" 
politics, la~s, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc." and by which "men say, imagine, 
[and] conceive" everything.71 By itself, this definition would have been unremarkable, 
but for the fact that the pair went on to argue that the ruling class in every age holds a 
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monopoly over the production of ideology: by ascribing a universal quality to their 
historically contingent ideas, the ruling class garners the consent of the governed through 
deception. For Marx and Engels, themselves products of a revolutionary age, a small 
segment of society was responsible for the production of ideology, in fact, "a false 
consciousness."72 In what follows, I employ the term in a neutral, pre-Marxist, "pre-
ideologized" sense: the term here denotes a system of beliefs held in common by 
members of a society or group. 
Ideology contributes to the construction of identity, since it serves to unite 
individuals around certain principles. As it relates to Rome, this has been amply 
demonstrated in recent work on the role of consensus in the Republic. 73 In light of its 
highly competitive elite culture, Karl-Joachim Holkeskamp has argued that the survival 
of the nobility and the stability of the Republic required a broad consensus about 
fundamental principles and rules. 
74 
When this consensus ideology began to erode at the 
end of the second century, the res publica followed. This is not to suggest that Rome 's 
consensus ideology remained constant throughout the life of the Republic. Less than 
twenty years after the expulsion of the kings, tradition has it that the plebs staged the first 
71 
Marx and Engels 1970: 47, 64-5. 
72 
Letter of Engels to F. Mehring, 14 July 1893 - Die Ideologie ist ein Prozess, der zwar mit Bewusstsein 
vom so genannten Denker vollzogen wird, aber mit einem f alschen Bewusstsein. 
~: F~_r example: Holkeskamp 2010: 98-106; 1993; Krasser 2006; Flaig 1995. See also: Meier 1966· 24-63 
Holkeskamp 2010: 98-106. See also: Norih 1981:204-5. · · 
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secessio by withdrawing from the city and electing their own magistrates.75 Intermittent 
conflict between the ruling class and other segments of the population continued 
throughout the republican period, and reconciliation was often achieved, if not with the 
establishment of a new res publica, then with changes to the consensus ideology. 76 
Sallust famously attributes the fmal dissolution of consensus to the defeat of 
Carthage and Rome's consequent relief from fear (metus hostilis). The historian 
describes how the Senate and People had earlier managed the Republic peacefully and 
with moderation, but that the defeat of Rome's longtime enemy had ushered in 
licentiousness (lascivia), arrogance (superbia), and a struggle among citizens for glory 
and power (gloriae ... dominationis certamen inter civis).77 Thirteen years after the 
destruction of Carthage, a competing ideology (re )surfaced in the tribunate of Ti. 
Sempronius Gracchus. In reality, this popularis ideology represented just the latest 
version of a popular protest ideology that had been around since at least the Conflict of 
the Orders, one that had developed out of the Republic's consensus ideology in response 
to the perceived defects of the latter. As opposed to the deference customarily afforded 
the Senate, antagonism characterized popularis ideology and rhetoric, and unlike 
previous challenges to the Republic's so-called consensus, this ideological brand would 
not be conciliated (or "synthesized" in the Hegelian sense). The resulting conflict of 
75 Liv. 2.32-3; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.45.1-90.3. See also: Chapter 3. 
76 Ungem-Stemberg 1986. Flower 2010 suggests that the monolithic Republic should instead be thought of 
as a series of"Roman Republics." 
77 Sal. Jug. 41 .2-3 - Nam ante Carthaginem deletam populus et senatus Rom anus placide modesteque inter 
se rem publicam tractabant, neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen inter civis erat: metus hostilis in 
bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. Sed ubi ilia formido mentibus decessit, scilicet ea quae res secundae 
amant, lascivia atque superbia incessere. 
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ideas, inflamed by the ambition and ruthlessness of politicians on both sides, would 
ultimately bring down the Republic. 
The beginning of the end came with the election of Ti. Gracchus as tribune in 
134.78 During his tenure, Gracchus promulgated an agrarian reform bill without the 
Senate's approval, deposed an obstructionist tribune by popular vote, usurped the 
prerogative of the Senate by passing a law appropriating the bequest of Attalus III, and 
sought reelection as tribune for a second consecutive term. His violent death at the hands 
of an angry mob marked the end of his tenure, though it did not end up deterring his 
younger (and even more headstrong) brother, Gaius, from following in his footsteps. 
Together, the brothers' programs and tactics provided a template for future populares like 
L. Appuleius Saturninus, C. Marius, M. Livius Drusus, P. Sulpicius Rufus, and L. 
Quinctius. In general, their strategy consisted of leveraging the power of the Republic's 
popular institutions - contiones, comitiae, and the tribunate - against those of the Senate 
in order to enhance their own power and that of the People. Characteristic legislation 
included grain bills, agrarian reforms, and judicial reforms. In general, they sought to 
extend individual rights, to preserve (and, after Sulla, restore) the tribunate from which 
they typically launched their initiatives, and otherwise to expand the power of the People 
at the expense of the Senate.79 
78 App. B. Civ. 1.2; Cic. Rep. 1.31. On Ti . Gracchus: Stockton 1979: 23-86; Badian 1972; App. B. Civ. 1.9-
17; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 
79 Wiseman 2002; Mackie 1992; pace Morstein-Marx 2004: 230-40 (w. bibliography n. 8), who concludes 
that the contio, at least, was characterized by ideological monotony and that "the popular is critique was not 
based on contrasting political ideals but on contrary claims about the political facts of the present" (p. 231 , 
author's emphasis). See, also, the treatment of the Leg. Ag. 2 in Chapter 4 below. 
25 
Speeches aimed at persuading fellow citizens proved integral to these efforts, and 
the arguments expressed, even if they were not products of a formal party platform, 
nonetheless reflected and shaped the popularis ideology. Fundamentally at issue in the 
conflict of ideas between populares and their conservative counterparts, optimates, were 
the respective roles of the People and Senate under the Republic. Sallust might have 
been right when he writes in the Bellum Catilinae that "each politician pretended to be 
contending for the public good but were actually contending for their own power, some 
as if they were defending the rights of the People, others to enhance the authority of the 
Senate," but that is certainly not how it would have looked to those with a "plebs-eye 
view" of the situation. 80 Rhetoric and ideology do have the potential to obscure motives, 
but they are effective only in so far as an audience perceives them as credible. Thus, the 
speeches to be considered here provide evidence, not necessarily about what Cicero 
himself believed, but about what his audiences believed about the People's role in politics 
and about how an ambitious orator could manipulate those beliefs to achieve his 
rhetorical ends. 
80 Morstein-Marx 2004: 207-8. Sal. Cat. 38.3 - Namque, uti paucis verum absolvam, post illa tempora 
quicumque rem publicam agitavere hones tis nominibus, alii sicuti populi iura defenderent, pars quo 
senatus auctoritas maxuma fa ret, bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant. So 
Syme 2002: 11 - "The political life of the Roman Republic was stamped and swayed, not by parties and 
programmes of a modem and parliamentary character, not by ostensible opposition between Senate and 
People, Optimates and Populares , nobiles and novi homines, but the strife for power, wealth, and glory." 
See also: Cic. Sest. 96. 
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Plan ofthe Work 
For this dissertation, I have selected speeches whose content has the most bearing 
on the question of the People's role in political life. Each chapter considers a particular 
aspect of the People's power through close readings of relevant passages. The project's 
dual focus on how Cicero's rhetoric functions in context and what the speeches 
themselves reveal about Roman political values and practice means that special attention 
will be paid to the circumstances surrounding each speech. Contextual considerations 
accompany rhetorical analysis. With a single exception, the speeches will be treated in 
chronological order. 
The first chapter examines Cicero's first contional speech of his career, the pro 
Lege Manilia (66 B.c.). Though not the earliest speech to be considered here, the fact 
that Cicero addresses the notional populus Romanus as praetor makes it a good point of 
departure for this study as it offers special insight into the relationship between the 
Roman People and their elected officials. Of particular interest is how and to what end 
Cicero characterizes the People's role in government, the administration of empire, and 
the construction of communal values of respect (auctoritas), shame (pudor), and honor 
(dignitas). The second chapter considers the People's role in the public courts (iudicia 
publica) through a close reading of the first actio ofthe Verrines (70 B.C.). Though Sulla 
for the most part eliminated the People's formal role in the administration of justice, the 
public nature of V erres' trial and the presence of an attendant crowd allowed Cicero to 
apply pressure to the senatorial jury by insisting that the People were watching and that 
they would hold the jurors accountable for their verdict. The third chapter looks at 
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Cicero's portrayal of popular violence and its prospect in both the second actio of the 
Verrines (70 B.C.) and the fragmentary pro Cornelio (65 B.c.). Though the Romans 
established institutions to obviate violence that threatened social order, the rhetoric of 
these speeches reveals that violence could still serve as a legitimate remedy for the abuse 
of citizens by a magistrate. The final chapter considers four of Cicero's consular 
speeches- the second de Lege Agraria, the pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo, and the first 
and fourth Catilinarians (63 B.c.). At a time when the Roman consensus ideology was 
failing, Cicero sought to foster consensus by portraying himself as a "tribune-consul" and 
by insisting that a consensus actually obtained on controversial issues like the use of the 
senatus consultum ultimum. By creating an impression of consensus among the People, 
the consul hoped to win those who were uncommitted while silencing his critics. 
CHAPTER ONE 
The People as the Source of Political Power 
pro Lege Manilia (66 B.C.) 
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In the year of his praetorship, Cicero took to the Rostra for the first time in his 
career. His subject was a proposal by the tribune C. Manilius to award a special 
command to Cn. Pompeius in the war against Mithridates. The stakes were high, for in 
the years leading up to his term in 66, Cicero had deliberately avoided the contio, a 
venue where the People would gather to attend their leaders and make their own 
collective voice heard. At the same time, Cicero had chosen not to stand for the 
tribunate, instead successfully campaigning for the plebeian aedileship. Though his 
political strategy was intended mainly to appeal to conservatives in the Senate, his 
actions could also be perceived as signaling an aversion to the People. In anticipation of 
his consular candidacy, Cicero needed to convince the Roman People that, even if he 
was not altogether their kind of politician, he was not their enemy either. 
Speaking in contione, Cicero's rhetoric in the pro Lege Man ilia identifies the 
populus Romanus as the primary source of political power in the Republic. Not only do 
the People invest magistrates with imperium and potestas through election, they also act 
as the community's moral arbiter. As such, they play an integral role in the construction 
of qualities typically associated with the senatorial elite, specifically auctoritas (a 
function of respect) and dignitas (honor). Cicero suggests in the speech that the People's 
meting out of power and privilege is conditional. Failure by the governing class to 
perform its duties occasions pudor (shame). As it relates to the current debate, Cicero 
argues that the Senate's failure to conduct foreign affairs effectively justifies popular 
involvement and the appointment of Pompey to an extraordinary command. 
Historical Background 
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The lex Man ilia resembled the lex Gabinia of the previous year. In 67, the 
tribune A. Gabinius had similarly proposed that Pompey be given a special command to 
deal with the ongoing threat of piracy in the Mediterranean. In both cases, the 
commands did not receive the formal approval of the Senate. Instead, Gabinius and 
Manilius won approval for their respective measures directly from the populus Romanus. 
The similarities between the two proposals and Pompey's demonstrated success against 
the pirates in the interim meant that, in the course of the pro Lege Man ilia, Cicero makes 
repeated reference to the earlier lex Gabinia. For this reason, it is important to consider 
the historical circumstances surrounding the two laws, especially as they relate to the 
growth of the People's power and the gradual overturning of the reforms enacted by 
Sulla a decade and a half earlier. 
Along with the similarities mentioned above, the leading opponents of both laws 
were the same. When Gabinius made his proposal, he met with fierce opposition from a 
majority of senators, led by the consular Q. Lutatius Catulus. In speaking against the 
measure, Catulus emphasized the risks involved in placing such extraordinary power in 
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the hands of an individual. 1 Despite Catulus' rhetoric, the ancient sources are virtually 
unanimous in seeing the Senate's deep-seated jealousy of Pompey as the real reason for 
its antagonism. Indeed, Pompey's command against the pirates was not unprecedented, 
neither in terms of the individuaf nor the command itself. Seven years earlier, the 
Senate had awarded a similar command against the pirates to the praetor M. Antonius 
"Creticus". Though the evidence is fragmentary, it seems that Antonius, like Pompey, 
received a command for some three years and was given virtually free reign throughout 
the Mediterranean for both himself and his numerous deputies . 3 
When it came to Manilius' proposal to grant a second extraordinary command to 
Pompey, the second in two years, the level of opposition from the Senate was less 
intense. Catulus again led the opposition, and he was joined by a group of optimates, 
including his son-in-law Q. Hortenius. Like the earlier lex Gabinia, they seem to have 
been opposed not so much to the command itself as to the prospective commander. As 
intimates of L. Licinius Lucullus, Catulus and Hortensius had almost certainly supported 
Lucullus' bid for a similar command against Mithridates seven years earlier.4 Lucullus 
initially shared power with his consular colleague M. Aurelius Cotta, who despite his 
1 Consider Catulus ' speech (Dio 36.31.3 -36.4) as well as the fact that, when forced to remain silent by the 
angry assembly, the tribune Roscius held up two fingers to indicate that the command ought to be given to 
two individuals (Dio 36.30.3). The provisions of the law did in fact grant Pompey broad, sweeping 
powers. He received consular imperium for a period of three years along with essentially unlimited funds . 
Moreover, he and his legati were authorized to operate anywhere on the Mediterranean and inland to a 
distance of fifty miles. Sources: Cic. Leg. Man. 52, 60; Dio 36.24-37.3; Plut. Pomp. 25 .2-4, 6; Val. Max. 
8.15.9; Yell. Pat. 2.31.2-4. 
2 This becomes one of Cicero's main arguments in the speech, the fact that the Senate itself had previously 
granted special commands to Pompey against Cn. Papirius Carbo, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Q. 
Sertorius, among others. See below on Leg. Man . 61-3. 
3 Brennan 2000:406-7, 426-7; Sources: Cic. Verr. 2.2.8, 2.3.213; ps-Asc. pp. 202, 239, 259St.; Schol. 
Bob. 96St.; Yell. Pat. 2.31.3. 
4 Keaveney 1992: 47-8. On the relationship between the three: Plut. Luc. 1.5. See also: Cic. Arch. 6. 
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formal equality with Lucullus, was in fact a junior partner. 5 While Cotta returned to 
Rome in 71, Lucullus stayed on in the East and continued to oversee Roman operations 
until his replacement by M'. Acilius Glabrio in 67, a year before Pompey assumed 
command under the terms of the lex Manilia. 
Catulus and the others who opposed the Gabinian and Manilian laws had almost 
certainly voted to approve the respective commands ofLucullus and M. Antonius. In 
light of this, Catulus' warnings of the danger in placing too much power in the hands of 
an individual ring hollow. At least in part, Velleius Paterculus must be correct in 
assigning personal motives to the opposition.6 Pompey's military success and resulting 
popularity bred resentment among his senatorial colleagues, and his lack of discretion 
only made matters worse. Pompey had a record of playing by his own rules,7 and it is 
not unreasonable to think that Catulus and the others saw such conduct as a threat to the 
Senate's supremacy. In the debate over the lex Gabinia, too much power in an 
individual's hands could indeed be dangerous, especially if the individual happened to 
be Pompey. 
5 Brennan 2000: 560-4; Keaveney 1992: 64-74; Sherwin-White 1976: 11. Lucullus was initially allotted 
the province of Cisalpine Gaul, but with the death of L. Octavius - then proconsul of Cilicia - and the 
threat posed by Mitluidates, the Senate assigned the provinces of Cilicia and Asia to Lucullus from which 
to launch an offensive, while it relegated Bithynia to Cotta for defensive purposes. Sources: App. Mith. 
72; Cic. Flac. 85; Mur. 33; Plut. Luc. 6.4-5; Yell. Pat. 2.33.1. 
6 Yell. Pat. 2.31 .1-4. In addition to the animosity of many optimates toward Pompey, Catulus and 
Hortensius were fond of Lucullus, and this likely motivated their opposition to the Manilian proposal to 
some extent. Though Lucullus had already been formally replaced by Acilius Glabrio when the lex 
Man ilia came before the People, Plutarch reports that those who opposed the measure believed that 
Pompey's command would diminish the glory due Lucullus: Luc. 35.7 and Pomp. 30.3 with the comments 
ofKeaveney 1992: 121-2. 
7 For example, Pompey seems to have strained his relationship with Catulus during their joint effort 
against M. Aemilius Lepidus in 77. After the defeat ofLepidus, the senior Catulus reportedly ordered 
Pompey to disband his troops. Pompey refused and, by remaining under arms, presented himself as the 
inevitable choice to be sent to Spain to reinforce Metellus Pius in the war against Sertorius. Earlier, 
Pompey had refused a similar order from Sulla to lay down his arms following his victory over Cn. 
Domitius Ahenobarbus. Keaveney 1992: 48; Seager 1979: 11-7; Plut. Pomp. 13, 17 .1. 
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But there was a constitutional issue at stake as well, and it involved the 
respective roles of the Senate and People in managing the empire. Over the course of 
the previous decade, the Senate alone had administered grants of extraordinary 
imperium,8 but following the restoration of the tribunate in 70, the People became 
increasingly involved in overseas administration. The People had, of course, always 
been within their rights to grant extraordinary commands, and in previous periods, the 
populus Romanus had exercised its right to appoint such commanders, at times even 
overturning prior arrangements made by the Senate. 9 
The career of C. Marius provides two cases in point. Before Marius was elected 
consul, Q. Caecilius Metellus had been prosecuting the war against Jugurtha since his 
own consulship in 109. The following year, Metellus retained his command by 
prorogatio and continued as governor ofNumidia,10 and the Senate seems to have 
extended his command again for 107. But following Marius' election to the consulship, 
one of the tribunes- T. Manlius Mancinus- introduced a measure to transfer the 
province ofNumidia, and hence command of the war against Jugurtha, from Metellus to 
Marius. Manlius' proposal subsequently became law, and Marius assumed command of 
8 The term 'extraordinary command' (imperium extraordinarium) resists definition, let alone a concise 
one. Originally, it may have refened to grants of imperium outside the regular provinciae- i.e. extra 
ordinem provinciarum. At times, the Senate discerned the need for a special command and a commander 
was appointed ad hoc to address the problem in much the same way as a quaestio extraordinaria. In most 
cases, the Senate ananged extraordinary commands without reference to the People, since by the late 
Republic, it had acquired the power to assign provinces (which ordinarily occUlTed through sortition) and 
to prorogue magistrates. In some cases however, popular approval was necessary, particularly in instances 
where imperium was granted to aprivatus . In such cases, the People passed a lex de imperio following the 
adoption of a senatus consul tum, but it remains U11clear to what extent this procedure was followed in the 
late Republic. See Brennan 2000: esp. 154-63 , 184-90, 382 (though compare his comments here with Sal. 
Hist. 2.98.4 M); Gruen 1974: 534-41. 
9 Gruen 1974: esp. 539-41. 
10 Sal. Jug. 62 .10. 
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the war effort. Given the People's sovereignty, the Senate had no choice but to 
acquiesce. 11 Almost twenty years later, the People again sought to set aside the Senate's 
prior arrangements and this time to grant Marius an extraordinary command against a 
resurgent Mithridates. 12 P. Cornelius Sulla, one of the consuls for the year, had already 
been allotted the province of Asia and given command in the upcoming conflict. 
Apparently using violence and intimidation, a certain demagogic tribune - P. Sulpicius -
was able to secure passage of a law transferring command of the war from Sulla to 
Marius, then an agingprivatus. But unlike Metellus earlier, Sulla would not abide the 
People's decision. At the head of six legions, he marched on Rome and forced Sulpicius 
and Marius to flee. Both were declared public enemies. Sulpicius was killed and his 
legislation overturned. 
Over the next decade, Sulla enacted a series of reforms limiting the tribunes' 
powers and strengthening those of the Senate. 13 These measures proved short-lived, 
however. By the time of the debate over the lex Man ilia fifteen years later, the powers 
of the tribunate had been restored, and Manilius - the measure's tribunician sponsor -
was not only initiating legislation, but like Gabinius earlier, he was doing so without the 
Senate's approval. Moreover, the four-year period between the restoration of tribunicia 
potestas and the passage of the lex Manilia witnessed the People playing an increasingly 
prominent role in foreign affairs. Since the Sullan dominatio, the administration of the 
empire had fallen almost exclusively within the Senate's purview, but in 68, the People 
11 With the People's approval ofManlius' proposal, Sallustwrites ofthe Senate's arrangements, 'sed 
paulo ante senatus Metello Numidiam decreverat; ea resfrustrajitit.' Jug. 73.7; also 82.2, 84.1 , 85.10. 
12 Keaveney 2005: 48-55. Sources: MRR 2.41, esp. App. B. Civ. 1.55-9; Diod. 37.29.2; Liv. Per. 77; Plut. 
Mar. 34-5; Sull. 8-9; Val. Max. 9.7 ext. 1; Yell. Pat. 2.18.5-19.1. 
13 For details, see Introduction. 
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enacted at least three laws pertaining to the region of Asia Minor- Lucullus' theater of 
operations. 14 Two of them removed provinces from the proconsul's command: the 
People returned the province of Asia to praetorian jurisdiction, and they assigned Cilicia 
to the consul Q. Marcius Rex. Before proposing a special command be given to Pompey 
against the pirates, Gabinius as tribune won passage of a law the following year 
reassigning the province ofBithynia-Pontus from Lucullus to the consul M'. Acilius 
Glabrio. 15 Looking at the legislation from these two years, it is hard not to conclude that 
Lucullus' extraordinary command provided the impetus for the People's reengagement 
in matters of imperial administration. Their cumulative effect was to termintate his 
command in the East. 
The equestrianpublicani were almost certainly behind this effort. In the wake of 
his conquest of Pontus, Lucullus had implemented certain reforms intended to relieve the 
crushing burden of debt in Asia. One measure limited the amount of interest that 
moneylenders could charge, and as a result, many publicani saw their profits decline. 16 
In tum, the publicani approached some of the tribunes at Rome and bribed them to 
agitate on their behalf. It was probably not until 68 that their efforts gained any 
traction. 17 After the battle of Tigranocerta in the autumn of 69, Lucullus failed to pursue 
14 Laws to replace Lucullus in Asia and Cilicia: Dio 36.2.1-2; Plut. Luc. 33.5; Sal. Hist. 4.71M. Lex 
Antonia de Termessibus: RS 1, no. 19. Though Dio (36.43 .2) makes reference to a so-called Lex de 
legalis decem mittendis, which supposedly authorizes ten legati to be sent to organize the province of 
Pontus in 69, he later contradicts himself and says that the Senate was responsible for sending the 
delegation (36.46.1; see also Cic. Att. 13.6.4) . Both the delegation' s constituency and prior practice 
suggest that the Senate was in fact responsible. See Brennan 2000: 152, 180,224,234,404,501,539, 
564. 
15 Cic. Leg. Man . 26; Dio 36.14.4; Plut. Luc. 35.3; Sal. His!. 5.13M. 
16 Plut. Luc. 20.1-5. 
17 While most date Lucullus' replacement in Asia to 69, I follow Keaveney in dating it to 68 for the 
following reasons: it follows the Battle ofTigranocerta in late 69 inDio 's narrative; he would have been 
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Tigranes, leaving the proconsul open to a charge of unnecessarily prolonging the war. 
That some of his troops turned mutinous only compounded his problems. Undoubtedly 
with the support of certain Lucullan inimici like the praetor L. Quinctius, the People 
passed legislation to dismantle his command. What is noteworthy is that the populus 
initially followed senatorial practice when replacing Lucullus: Asia reverted to 
administration by an annual succession of praetors, and Cilicia and Bithynia-Pontus 
were assigned to consuls by way of prorogatio. In other words, there was nothing 
"extraordinary" about the People's arrangements, only that they themselves had taken 
the initiative rather than the Senate. 
Likewise, the provisions of the lex Gabinia, which granted Pompey an 
extraordinary command against the pirates, closely resembled the Senate's earlier 
appointment ofM. Antonius "Creticus."18 A number of high-profile attacks appear to 
have prompted Gabinius' controversial measure: pirates had reportedly sunk a consul's 
fleet at Ostia, they had kidnapped the sister of Antonius "Creticus" and even captured 
two praetors along with their lictors. 19 Given the threat of piracy to commerce, it is 
likely that the publicani were behind this measure as well, bolstered by a growing 
perception of senatorial incompetence. The previous year, the publicani had taken the 
initiative and used the assemblies to replace Lucullus in Asia and Cilicia. Following the 
more politically vulnerable after the winter of 69/68; L. Quinctius (pr. 68) is the only name associated with 
the push to replace Lucullus before 67. See Brennan 2000: 561-4; Keaveney 1992: 111-20. Sources: Dio 
36.2.1-2; Plut. Luc. 30.3-33.5; Sal. Hist. 4.71M. 
18 Brennan 2000: 426- "Antonius' command ... was a clear source for the pirate commission the privatus 
Pompey received in 67 under the tribunician lex Gabinia." 
19 App. Mith. 93; Cic. Leg. Man. 32-3, 53; Plut. Pomp. 24.6. 
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disaster at Zela in 67,20 they removed him from command entirely and were now 
prepared to grant an extraordinary command to Pompey to deal with piracy. It is 
difficult to know what the Senate ' s position was leading up to the controversial Gabinian 
promulgation. In the absence of any evidence of senatorial opposition, we may conclude 
that the Senate did not object, even if it did not support the initial legislation of 68 to 
replace Lucullus.21 Certain leaders - namely, Marcius Rex and Acilius Glabrio- stood 
to benefit, after all. 
But later in 67, when Gabinius proposed his law granting a special command to 
Pompey, the Senate registered its disapproval in no uncertain terms. At that point, 
however, it was too late. Developments in Asia Minor and the Mediterranean had 
diminished the public's respect for the Senate and, thus, its auctoritas- a central theme 
of Cicero's pro Lege Manilia. With comparatively little actual power of its own, the 
Senate was unable to dissuade the People from appointing Pompey, and its credibility 
suffered a further blow when Pompey successfully cleared the Mediterranean of pirates 
in only a few short months. By the time Manilius proposed his own law the following 
year, Pompey's success had vindicated the People's decision to defy the Senate and to 
set its own course. 
20 App. Mith. 89; Cic. Leg. Man. 25-6; Dio 36.12-13; Plut. Luc. 35.1. 
2 1 Compare the presctipt to the Lex Antonia de Termessibus (RS 1, no. 19), which records that the law was 
passed de s(enatus) s(ententia) . 
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The Contional Setting 
In accordance with the provisions of the lex Caecilia Didia, Manilius would have 
formally introduced his proposal to grant Pompey an extraordinary command against 
Mithridates at least seventeen days before it was voted upon.22 The venue for his 
proposal was almost certainly a contio- a public, non-legislative meeting in the course 
of which one or more magistrates delivered speeches to an assembled crowd.23 The 
authority to convene these meetings was an exclusive right of magistrates, including 
tribunes. The magistrate responsible for calling a particular contio presided over the 
meeting, and in that capacity, he was able to summon whomever else he wished to 
speak. With the power to speak and to select other speakers, the presiding magistrate 
held a virtual monopoly over the contional discourse. Even when he summoned an 
opponent to speak, it was hardly an open exchange of ideas. The presiding magistrate 
set the ground rules, and because it was almost always stocked with his supporters, the 
audience was often hostile. In fact, it has been suggested that the "production" of one's 
opponent in a contio was intended, more than anything else, to intimidate him into 
changing his position?4 
Between a bill's promulgation and when it was voted upon, supporters and 
opponents of the measure had the opportunity to hold their own contiones in an effort to 
rally support and shape public opinion. Not surprisingly, populares tended to call such 
22 Schol. Bob. 140St. The actual length of a trinundinum -the time required by law between promulgation 
and voting - is unclear, probably ranging anywhere from 17 to 25 days. Pina Polo 1995: 208n. 
23 Gell. NA 13 .16.13; Festus 34L. On contiones: Tan 2008 ; Morstein-Marx 2004; Mouritsen 2001: esp. 38-
62; Pina Polo 1996, 1995; Taylor 1966: 15-33; Botsford 1909: 139-51. 
24 Morstein-Marx 2004: 160-203. See also: Mouritsen 2001: 53-4; Pina Polo 1996: 48-52. 
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meetings more frequently than optimates?5 The supporters and opponents of a measure 
could gauge public opinion and so decide whether to persist in their efforts by observing 
the attendance and enthusiasm of the crowds. Since the defeat of a bill in the comitia 
could be embarrassing politically and since a contio afforded an opportunity to build and 
measure public support, it seems unlikely that a sponsor would have allowed his 
proposal to come to a vote without being reasonably confident of success. Indeed, this 
would help to explain why assemblies only rarely seem to have rejected the proposals 
put before them.26 
These are important issues to keep in mind when considering the circumstances 
of the pro Lege Manilia. It is unclear precisely when the contio at which Cicero spoke 
was held, but the speech's internal evidence (our best historical source) suggests that it 
was the final contio before the popular vote.27 By that time, Manilius must have been 
confident of success. While it seems to have been common for a bill's sponsor to 
summon an opponent to a contio, custom dictated that Manitius invite one or more 
opponents to address the final pre-comitial contio.28 In this case, the sponsor did not 
hold a monopoly over the discourse, and the crowd was not necessarily full of 
enthusiastic supporters. Instead, it was made up of those intent on voting. Opponents 
could conceivably marshal their own supporters, but the evidence suggests this rarely 
occurred. 
25 Tan 2008. See also : Mouritsen 2001: 70-l. 
26 Mouritsen 2001: 64-7. See also: Flaig 1995 : esp. 80-1; Eder 1991 : 179; Burckhardt 1990: 91-2; Nippel 
1988: 55. 
27 Leg. Man. esp. 51-2, 68-71; Dio 36.43 .2; Plut. Pomp. 30.4. 
28 Morstein-Marx 2004 : 162-3; Taylor 1966: 18. See also: PinaPolo 1995:208. 
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The tribune Manilius presided over the contio in which Cicero delivered the pro 
Lege Manilia, and Cicero addresses him directly at the end of the speech.29 Cicero also 
addresses Hortensius/0 who was almost certainly summoned because ofhis opposition 
to the bill. It is also clear that Hortensius spoke before Cicero, though not necessarily 
the day prior.31 Catulus also seems to have spoken before Cicero, though it is unclear 
whether or not he was still present when the praetor spoke. Unlike his treatment of 
Hortensius, Cicero does not address Catulus directly, and the evidence from Plutarch 
suggests that Catulus might have departed immediately after speaking?2 Also present 
were the four consulars in support of the Manilian rogatio. Cicero calls attention to 
them specifically as a counterweight to the earlier speeches of Hortensius and Catulus: 
Quare videte, horumne auctoritatibus illorum orationi, qui dissentiunt, respondere posse 
videamur?3 As privati, Hortensius, Catulus, the four consulars, and Caesar would have 
spoken before Cicero, who was a magistrate. 34 
Morstein-Marx, in particular, has suggested that Cicero's pledge at the end of the 
speech to use- among other things -his devotion, energy, and praetorian potestas to 
achieve passage of the law indicates that the contio at which Cicero spoke was not, in 
29 Leg. Man . 69: Quae cum ita sint, C. Manili,prirnum islam tuam et legem et voluntatem et sententiam 
laudo vehementissimeque cornprobo . .. 
30 Leg. Man. 52-3 , 56. For example: Nam tu idem, Q. Hortensi, rnulta pro tua summa copia ac singulari 
facultate dicendi et in senatu contra virum fort em, A. Gabinium, graviter ornateque dixisti ... (§52). 
31 Morstein-Marx 2004: 182-3 suggests that Hortensius and Catulus voiced their opposition on an earlier 
day. The evidence indicates only that they argued sometime before Cicero. See also: Tan 2008: 185, 189. 
32 Leg. Man. 59-63 . Plut. Pomp. 30.4 makes no reference to Hortensius but relates that Catulus was the 
only one to speak against the law and that, when the crowd would not listen, he urged the Senate to flee as 
their ancestors had done, to a mountaintop to preserve their freedom. In a similar manner, Bibulus also 
made a dramatic exit when he abandoned Caesar's contio after speaking in opposition to the latter's 
agrarian law: Dio 38.4.3. 
33 Leg. Man. 68: P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79), C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76), C. Cassius Longinus 
(cos. 73), and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus (cos. 71). Lintott 2008: 428. 
34 On the rule requiringprivati to address a (final) contio before magistrates: Dio 39.35.1; Morstein-Marx 
2004: 163. On Caesar's speech in support of the lex Manilia: Dio 36.43.2-4. 
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fact, the final pre-comitial contio but an earlier one.35 But Cicero ' s subsequent 
comments on the size of the gathering and his claim that they are again gathered to 
appoint Pompey (cum tantam multitudinem cum tanto studio adesse videamus, quantam 
iterum nunc in eadem homine praeficiendo videmus) implies that they are about to 
vote. 36 This, combined with the evidence for the other speakers outlined above, strongly 
suggests that the speech was delivered during the final pre-comitial contio. 
For Manilius, Cicero would have been an obvious choice to deliver a speech. 
Not only was he a praetor, who would bring with him the trappings of his office, Cicero 
was one of Rome's leading orators, after having successfully prosecuted Verres four 
years earlier. For Cicero, on the other hand, if he did not have misgivings about the 
actual proposal, he did about its sponsor. At the end of 67, Manitius sought to revive a 
law that had been enacted previously by Sulpicius and subsequently annulled by Sulla, 
allowing freedmen to vote in the tribes of their patrons rather than being relegated to the 
four urban tribes.37 To gain passage of the proposal, the tribune resorted to rioting and a 
blockade ofthe Capitol, but when faced with opposition from the Senate and plebs, he 
abandoned his efforts and fled to Pompey. In exchange for safety, Manitius promised 
the general that he would receive an extraordinary command against Mithridates.38 
Although Cicero would later promise to defend Manitius on an extortion charge, his 
35 Morstein-Marx 2004: 183 with n. 97. 
36 Leg. Man. 69 - deinde, cum tantam multitudinem cum tanto studio adesse videamus, quantam iterum 
nunc in eadem homine praeficiendo videmus, quid est, quod aut de re aut de praeficiendi facultate 
dubitemus? 
37 Asc. 45 .11-5, 65.10-8C; Dio 36.42.2. On Sulpicius' law: Asc. 64C 17-23; Liv. Per. 77. See also: 
Lintott 1999: 52; Treggiari 1969:49-50, 165 . 
38 Asc. 45 .11-9C; Dio 36.42.3-4. 
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relationship with the tribune was limited and strictly one of convenience.39 Anticipating 
his candidacy for the consulship, Cicero could not afford to be closely associated with so 
controversial a figure. 
Accordingly, his motivation in backing the lex Manilia had far more to do with 
Pompey and his own standing among the equestrian publicani than it did with his 
support ofManilius. Fortunately for Cicero, the fact that influential consulars supported 
the proposal provided the ambitious praetor with political cover. Nonetheless, Cicero's 
praise ofManilius is thoroughly backhanded. Although Manilius was the bill's sponsor, 
Cicero does not even refer to him until the peroration,40 and even then, the legislation 
itself receives most of his attention. The only compliment paid to Manilius personally is 
when Cicero judges the tribune to have sufficient heart and perseverance: in te satis esse 
animi perseverantiaeque arbitror. This is faint praise. In light of the tribune's earlier 
failure to persevere in his proposal related to freedmen, Cicero's use of arbitror and the 
ambiguity of animus suggests that the orator's tone is sardonic.41 
39 Cicero only agreed to defend Manilius after he had attempted to railroad the former tribune, as praetor 
of the extortion court. Facing a popular backlash, Cicero claimed that he had been trying to help Manilius. 
He argued that he wanted to be sure that he would preside over the case in the final days of his praetorship 
rather than allowing the case to be heard by his successor. Only after agreeing to represent Manilius in his 
upcoming trial did Cicero appease the tribune's supporters. Crawford 1994: 33-8; Mitche111979: 158; 
Phillips 1970. Sources: Asc. 65.6-7C; Dio 36.44.1-2; Plut. Cic. 9. 
40 Steel2001: 176-7. 
41 Leg. Man. 69. Consider the previous line as well- maneas in sententia neve cuiusquam vim aut minas 
pertimescas. Given both the tribune's record and the tepid nature of the opposition, it's difficult to take 
this seriously; if anyone was going to resort to vis aut minae, it was the rabble-rousing Manilius. 
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The Role of the People in the Construction of Auctoritas 
Both the brevity and ambivalence of his comments about Manilius stand in 
marked contrast to his extended praise of Pompey. Cicero devotes the middle third of 
the pro Lege Manilia to recapitulating the virtues of the prospective commander.42 In 
terms ofhis argument, the catalogue of Pompey's virtues contributes to establishing the 
general's fitness for command and, at the same time, provides Cicero with an 
opportunity to secure his gratia. In the final part of the speech, however, Cicero 
explicitly denies this motivation. Indeed, he calls on the gods to witness that he is not 
seeking the favor of Pompey or anyone else. Instead, he claims that, for his protection 
and political advancement (praesidia periculis aut adiumenta honoribus), he will rely on 
his innocence (innocentia), a life devoted to hard work (illa nostra laboriosissima 
ratione vitae), and popular favor (vestra voluntas).43 
Cicero thus draws a contrast between the two dominant styles of late Republican 
politics. He professes to reject, on the one hand, the oligarchic style of politics, whereby 
a candidate seeks the support of the politically prominent, who in turn exercise their 
influence on his behalf. Instead, Cicero claims that the decision about whether or not 
advances politically will ultimately depend on his own conduct and the popular will. 
42 Leg. Man . 27-49. 
43 Leg. Man. 70 - Testorque omnes deos, et eos maxime, qui huic loco temploque praesident, qui omnium 
mentes eorum qui ad rem publicam adeunt, maxime perspiciunt, me hoc neque rogatufacere cuiusquam, 
neque quo Cn. Pompei gratiam mihi per hanc causam conciliari putem, neque quo mihi ex cuiusquam 
amplitudine aut praesidia periculis aut adiumenta honoribus quaeram, propterea quod pericula facile, ut 
hominem praestare oportet, innocentia tecti repel/emus, honorem aut em, neque ab uno neque ex hoc loco, 
sed eadem i/la nostra laboriosissima ratione vitae, si vestra voluntasferet, consequemur. The dramatic 
invocation and the emphatic placement of this passage at the end of the speech ironically give the 
impression that Cicero is in fact guilty of what he so strenuously denies. At a minimum, it betrays a 
preoccupation with being perceived as a hack. 
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In the pro Lege Man ilia, Cicero identifies the People as the ultimate source of 
power in the Republic, even of those qualities and privileges traditionally associated 
with the senatorial class. In the traditional consensus ideology of the Republic, the 
People's role was to evaluate candidates for office and, through election, bestow power 
and prestige on those they deemed worthy.44 Election implied a commitment by the 
People to those they elected. Predictably, this theme receives little emphasis in the 
speech: by reminding the People of their obligations to the nobility, a speaker risked 
alienating the audience. Far safer to remain on the other side of the ledger, to dwell on 
the popular expectation that elected leaders ought to exercise their power in the public 
interest. For his part, Cicero concludes the speech with a pledge to seek, among other 
things, the interests of his audience rather than his own: 
Sed ego me hoc honore praeditum, tantis vestris beneficiis adfectum statui, Quirites, 
vestram voluntatem et rei publicae dignitatem et salutem provinciarum atque sociorum 
meis omnibus commodis et rationibus praeferre oportere. 
But having been endowed with this office and furnished with so many tokens of your 
favor, fellow Romans, I have decided that I ought to place your will, the honor of the 
Republic, and the safety of our provinces and allies ahead of all my own interests and 
considerations.45 
These lines reveal the ethical implications ofthe Republic's ideology of reciprocity. 
Cicero attributes his political success to the People's bestowing of tanta beneficia. In 
return, he recognizes that he has an obligation to pursue their collective voluntas rather 
44 On the ideology of the Republic: Introduction; Chapter 4; Polyb. 6.14.9; Robb 2010; Holkeskamp 2010: 
44-52; Lintott 1999: 86-7; Laser 1997: 31-43 ; Meier 1966: 45-63. Morstein-Marx 2004: 206-7, 230-40 
variously refers to this ideology as popularis , "popular", and "contional." 
45 Leg. Man. 71. Compare with post Red. Pop. 24, where there is no mention of other constituencies. 
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than his own interests, though he tempers his devotion by acknowledging the existence 
of other competing interests. While Cicero lists vestra voluntas first- an indication of 
the People's relative importance- it is not his exclusive concern. He must also consider 
the Republic's dignitas, a concept closely associated with the hierarchy of the Senate,46 
as well as the salus provinciarum atque sociorum, which includes non-citizens.47 
Cicero's discussion of the nature and ethical implications ofhis relationship with 
the People at the end of the speech echoes his rhetoric at the beginning, where he aims to 
secure the audience's favor.48 This was typically accomplished by means of an ethical 
proof, which portrays the orator as someone who shares the values and assumptions of 
his audience. When properly deployed, the ethical proof constructs a kind of emotional 
bridge between the orator and his listeners: ideally, they come to perceive him as a 
"good man" who is worthy of their trust, in turn making them more docile. 
Ethical considerations were always important, but they were paramount for 
Cicero in the debate over the Manilian proposal. By the time of the contio in question, 
the People's adoption of the measure was all but assured. As mentioned earlier, the 
evidence from the late Republic reveals that assemblies rarely voted down the proposals 
put before them, and so it stands to reason that when Cicero spoke, a solid majority of 
those attending the pre-comitial contio were already supportive of the measure. They 
did not need to be persuaded of the proposal's merits. Relieved more or less of this 
46 Dignitas was exclusive of the elite, the measme of one 's prestige, which was customarily gained 
through tenure of office. Wirszubski 1950: 14, 16, 36, 44, 46; Adcock 1959: 13, 23 ; Balsdon 1960:54. 
47 Brunt 1978: 185-90; Gruen 1984: 275. Somces: Cic. Off 2.26-7; Q. Fr. 1.1.27, 34; Rep. 3.35-7; Tac. 
Hist. 4.74; Verg. Aen. 6.851-3 . 
48 The role ofthe exordium in seeming the audience's favor : Lausberg 1998: §§257.2, 263, 273-9. See 
esp. Mart. Cap. 21 ; Cic. Jnv. 1.22; Rhet. Herr. 1.8; Quint. Inst. 6.2.8, 12.10.59. 
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rhetorical burden, the speech offered the praetor an opportunity to focus on advertising 
himself to the body politic. For this, he needed a suitable ethos. 
His need was all the more urgent since it was the first time he was to deliver a 
speech to the People in contione. The fact that at this point in his career he had not yet 
addressed a contio testifies to the cautiousness of his political strategy .49 In the years 
leading up to his praetorship, he seems to have deliberately avoided controversy and 
largely refrained from participating in popular political activities. He was a non-factor, 
for example, in the volatile debate over the lex Gabinia of the previous year. Earlier, 
amid the controversy over the tribunate in the late 70s, he eschewed that office which 
was tasked with summoning contiones, presiding over the meetings of the plebeian 
assembly, issuing vetoes, and generally advocating on behalf (and in front) of the 
populus Romanus. Instead, he stood successfully for the plebeian aedileship, which did 
not require regular contional participation. 5° While this strategy certainly appealed to 
more conservative elements in the Senate, his avoidance of the contio meant that Cicero 
lacked "face time" with the so-called plebs contionalis, those who tended to make up the 
populus Romanus in the assembly. True, he pled cases in the Forum, many of which 
were in support of popularis causes and/or individuals. Still, he had never come to the 
contio and demonstrated his popular bona fides by dancing to the People's ideological 
49 Mitchell1979: 149-53. 
50 
See Introduction. Any magistrate of quaestorian rank or higher was able to summon a contio, but the 
evidence suggests that the contio was more integral to the conduct of tribunician politics. Tribunes not 
only summoned a majority of contiones in the late Republic, of the ninety known speakers, fifty were 
tribunes, thirty were consuls, and only ten praetors. Pina Polo 1996: 52. On Cicero ' s aedileship: Dio 
36.43.5; Cic. Off 2.57-8. 
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tu 
51 Worse his avoidance of the contio and decision not to seek the tribunate ne. , 
signaled, if not an aversion, then at least an unwillingness to be associated with popular 
institutions. 
As one looking forward to a consular candidacy, he needed to convince the 
People that, even ifhe was not altogether their kind of politician, he at least was not 
hostile. He begins the speech by explaining why he has not previously addressed the 
People: 
Quamquam mihi semper frequens conspectus vester multo iucundissimus, hie autem 
locus ad agendum amplissimus, ad dicendum omatissimus est visus, Quirites, tamen hoc 
aditu laudis, qui semper optima cuique maxime patuit, non mea me voluntas adhuc, sed 
vitae meae rationes ab ineunte aetate susceptae prohibuerunt. Nam cum antea nondum 
huius auctoritatem loci attingere auderem statueremque nihil hue nisi perfectum ingenio, 
elaboratum industria adferri oportere, omne meum tempus amicorum temporibus 
transmittendum putavi. Ita neque hie locus vacuus umquam fuit ab iis, qui vestram 
causam defenderent, et meus labor in privatorum periculis caste integreque versatus ex 
vestro iudicio fructum est amplissimum consecutus. 
Although the sight of your gathering has always been by far the most pleasing to me, 
and while this place has seemed the most distinguished for action and the most honored 
for speech, nevertheless fellow citizens, it was not my desire that barred me rmtil now 
from this venue for praise, one that has always been open especially to leading men, but 
the plan I adopted for my career from the outset. For since I previously did not yet dare 
to associate myself with the auctoritas of this place and since I decided that it was 
proper to bring nothing but the mature product of my talent brought about by hard work, 
I thought that all my time ought to be spent on my friends in peril. And so this place has 
never lacked those who would defend your cause, and my effort in private suits, carried 
out honestly and with integrity, has derived from your verdict a most distinguished 
reward. 52 
:~Speakers in the contio regularly assumed apopularis persona. Morstein-Marx 2004: 206-7, 258-78. 
Leg. Man. 1-2. 
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At the outset, Cicero conveys a sense ofmodesty,53 attributing his earlier unwillingness 
to appear before the populus to a lack of skill and standing rather than an aversion to the 
contio. Indeed, he magnifies the venue. In the first clause, he praises the assembled 
populus, but quickly shifts his attention to the locus, a word that appears three times-
hie autem locus ad agendum amplissimus, ad dicendum ornatissimus est visus. His 
references to the site as a place ad agendum and ad dicendum indicate that he is 
speaking specifically about the Rostra. From this stage, magistrates could address 
contiones (dicere) or formally bring a measure to a vote (agere cum populo).
54 
His 
characterization of the space as amplissimus, ornatissimus, a means for gaining laus 
(aditus laudis), and one open especially to optimus quisque further implies the Rostra, an 
elite venue that until now he dared not approach. In the political rhetoric of the late 
Republic, these superlatives - amplissimus, ornatissimus, and optimus quisque - were 
catchwords associated with the Senate's upper echelon.55 With his election to a curule 
magistracy the previous year- his amplissimus fructus- Cicero suggests that he has 
finally obtained the requisite huius auctoritas loci. 56 
In the Republic, auctoritas was customarily an attribute of the senatorial elite; it 
was a distinguishing feature of the governing class and implied that they, through some 
combination of wisdom, position, character, achievements, wealth, and family, were 
53 0 "d" n avm mg arrogance: Jehne 2011: 115-7; Lausberg 1998: §275(3. 
54 0 n agere cum populo: TLL 1.1393.5-26 esp. Gell. NA 13.16.3; Paul. Fest. 50. 14M; Macrob. Sat. 
1.16.29. 
:: Achar~ 1981: 21.' 282, ~69-70, 385-6, 488; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 229-31,463-4,495-500. 
. On hum~ auctontas loc1, see also: Steel 2001: 175-6; contra Morstein-Marx 2004: 53-4, who interprets 
1t as applymg more generally to the assembly of the People. 
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entitled to rule. 57 It was, therefore, a prerequisite for anyone ascending the Rostra. For 
the most part, auctoritas - unlike potestas- did not signify legal authority but the 
influence one carried with others. 58 As such, Roman auctoritas tracks closely with 
modem theories of respect, and in particular, with what the philosopher Stephen Darwall 
has termed "recognition-respect."59 In general, respect can be either an emotion or a 
type of behavior, but in either case, it is responsive and implies a rational subject and an 
object. Darwall defines recognition-respect as "a disposition to weigh appropriately in 
one's deliberations some feature of the thing in question and to act accordingly."60 He 
includes in this category respect for law, the various forces of nature, the feelings of 
others, and social institutions. In more general terms, a subject displays recognition-
respect when he regards an object as something to be weighed, reckoned, or considered 
appropriately, including things that have the capacity to endanger. Darwall distinguishes 
this kind of respect from what he terms "appraisal-respect."61 Appraisal-respect 
involves a positive estimation of an object's character, and as such, is necessarily 
directed toward a person as a moral agent. Appraisal-respect is unconditional in the 
sense that it does not apply only under certain circumstances: rather, the subject holds a 
57 
Hellegouarc'h 1972: esp. 299-306; Adcock 1959: 14, 47. See also: Balsdon 1960: esp. 43-4; Mommsen 
1888: 3.1034. Cicero later writes that the ideal constitution exists cum potestas in populo, auctoritas in 
senatu sit (Leg. 3.28). 
58 
The exception was that, until the third century or so, any measure adopted by a popular assembly 
required the formal approval of the Senate, known as 'auctoritas pat rum' or 'auctoritas senatus'. By the 
late Republic, senatorial approval became largely a formality until Sulla briefly revived the old practice: 
before a measure was presented in the assembly, the Senate was required to give its approval- auctoritas 
senatus - and with it, the senators were said 'to become sponsors of the measure' - auctores fieri. Graeber 
2001: esp. 213-5, 220-1; Biscardi 1987: esp. 130, 194-7. 
59 
Darwa111977: 38-40. Hudson 1980 identifies four types of respect, three ofwhich correspond with 
Darwall 's recognition-respect: directive, institutional and obstacle. 
~ ' Darwall1977: 38. 
61 
Darwall1977: 42-4. Hudson 1980 refers to this as "evaluative-respect." 
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categorical attitude toward an object's enduring (excellent) characteristics. Noteworthy 
in both cases is the role of the object in generating respect. Respect is not entirely 
subject-driven, but to some degree, depends on the ability of the object to command it. 
In applying Darwall's framework to the consensus ideology of the late Republic, 
auctoritas is the influence of one who enjoys the community' s recognition-respect, 
which at least in theory, has been earned by gaining its collective appraisal-respect. In 
the opening passage and in what follows, Cicero attributes his election and attainment of 
auctoritas to the appraisal-respect that he has earned in the courts, where he was caste 
integreque versatus. He also displayed ingenium and industria, a variation of virtus et 
industria, which novi homines since at least Cato the Elder had appealed to in the 
absence of a distinguished ancestry.62 Moreover, his devotion to amici in periculis 
illustrates his loyalty and generosity. Overall, his rhetoric emphasizes moral excellence 
over a record of service to the populus, no surprise in light of his earlier avoidance of the 
contio and tribunate. His comments reveal that the ideology of republican politics was 
based not only on the mutual exchange of benefits between elites and populus, but also 
on gaining appraisal-respect, which served as an indication of the would-be magistrate' s 
potential excellence in carrying out his public duties.63 Whatever his record, Cicero's 
election placed him in the People's collective debt, and the following passage reveals his 
moral obligation: 
62 Hellegouarc 'h 1972: 476-8; Wiseman 1971 : 109-11 ; Earll967: 44-6. Examples: ORF 51 (Cato fr. 
128); Sal. Jug. 4.7, 63.2, 85; Cic. Rose. Amer. 16, 136; Cluent. 111-2; Fam. 3.7.5; Leg. Man. 70; Mur. 16; 
Sull. 23; Verr. 2.4.81, 2.5.31 ; Comment. Pet. 7, 9. 
63 Comment. Pet. 20-1. 
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Nunc cum et auctoritatis in me tantum sit, quantum vos honoribus mandandis esse 
voluistis, et ad agendum facultatis tantum, quantum homini vigilanti ex forensi usu 
prope cotidiana dicendi exercitatio potuit adferre, certe et, si quid auctoritatis in me est, 
apud eos utar, qui earn mihi dederunt, et si quid in dicendo consequi possum, iis 
ostendam potissimum, qui ei quoque rei fructum suo iudicio tribuendum esse duxerunt. 
Since now I possess as much auctoritas as you wished to give by entrusting elective 
office, and as much capacity for action as an almost daily regimen of speaking in the 
courts has been able to afford a conscientious man, and certainly if I possess any 
auctoritas, I will use it before those who bestowed it on me, and ifl am able to 
accomplish anything by speaking, I will display it above all to those who determined by 
their own verdict that oratory ought to be rewarded as well.64 
The fact that the Senate possessed auctoritas bestowed by the People illustrates 
the important role of the community in its formation. For Cicero, the People granted it 
(dederunt) through election (honoribus mandandis) on the basis of his performance in 
the courts. This, in turn, helps to explain his use of forensic vocabulary throughout the 
speech: it serves to remind the audience of the basis for his auctoritas. Catherine Steel 
has noted how Cicero uses causa throughout the speech, particularly in the opening 
passage above where he describes the speaker's task in a contio as vestram causam 
defendere. 65 She suggests that this usage recalls the relationship between a cliens and 
his patron who represents his dependent in court. Applied to the assembly, Steel 
observes that such usage implies a conservative model of popular participation with the 
client dependent upon the resources of his social superior. But his use of forensic 
vocabulary elsewhere emphasizes the People's sovereignty and the orator's 
64 Leg. Man . 2. 
65 Lintott 2008 : 428; Steel2001: 176. 
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subordination. In particular, iudicium conveys, not just the idea of an election, but the 
"verdict" pronounced by the People on those seeking office.
66 
Just as Cicero credits the People for his own auctoritas in the exordium, he also 
credits them with enhancing Pompey's. In the middle of the speech, he focuses on the 
role played by the lex Gabinia in cultivating respect among foreign nations toward 
Pompey, who succeeded in ridding the Mediterranean of pirates. We have already seen 
how auctoritas operated in Roman society, but Cicero contends that its effects can 
transcend geopolitical boundaries. As a function of recognition-respect, auctoritas 
applies to objects with the potential to harm if they are not adequately accounted for,
67 
and so in foreign affairs, a commander's auctoritas- a product of his recognition-
respect among foreigners - can serve as a deterrent to those who would otherwise 
threaten Roman hegemony. The following passage outlines how the negotiation of 
auctoritas between Pompey and the People affected the conduct of Roman foreign 
policy: 
Et quoniam auctoritas quoque in bellis administrandis multum atque in imperio militari 
valet, certe nemini dubium est, quin ea re idem ille imperator plurimum possit. 
Vehementer autem pertinere ad bella administranda, quid hastes, quid socii de 
imperatoribus nostris existiment, quis ignorat, cum sciamus homines in tantis rebus, ut 
aut conternnant aut metuant aut oderint aut ament, opinione non minus et fama quam 
aliqua ratione certa commoveri? Quod igitur nomen umquam in orbe terrarum clarius 
fuit? cuius res gestae pares? de quo homine vas, id quod maxime facit auctoritatem, 
tanta tam praeclara iudicia fecistis? An vera ullam usquam esse oram tam desertam 
putatis, quo non illius diei fama pervaserit, cum universus populus Romanus referto foro 
completisque omnibus templis, ex quibus hie locus conspici potest, unum sibi ad 
commune omnium gentium bellum Cn. Pompeium imperatorem depoposcit? ... qui quo 
die a vobis maritima bello praepositus est imperator, tanta repente vilitas annonae ex 
66 Cicero here similarly uses res to refer to his abilities as a (forensic) orator. 
67 Darwalll977: 40. See also: Hudson 1980: 74, who refers to this as "obstacle-respect." 
summa inopia et caritate rei frumentariae consecuta est unius hominis spe ac nomine, 
quantam vix ex summa ubertate agrorum diutuma pax efficere potuisset. 
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And since auctoritas is also very important in the conduct of wars and in the holding of 
a military command, certainly no one doubts that that same commander [sc. Pompey] is 
most capable in this respect too. Who does not know how extremely important what 
enemies and allies think of our commanders are to waging wars, since we know that men 
in such extreme circumstances by rumor and repute no less than any actual reason are 
led either to despise or fear, hate or love? What name, therefore, has ever been more 
famous in the whole world? Whose accomplishments equal? On what man have you so 
bestowed that which above all confers auctoritas, so many remarkable offices? Or do 
you think that there is anywhere a coast so deserted that no report reached it of that day 
when the Forum was packed and all the temples from which one could see this place 
were filled, and the Roman People demanded Pompey alone be given the command to 
wage a world war on its behalf? . .. On that day when he was appointed by you as 
commander in the naval war, the name of that one man and the hope surrounding him 
caused a sudden drop in the price of grain following its worst shortage and highest 
prices, falling almost as much as if there had been a long period of peace with the 
greatest abundance. 68 
Following his estimation of Pompey's auctoritas and its importance to the conduct of 
war, Cicero launches into a lengthy rhetorical question asserting the strategic value of 
world opinion. He implies that the pressure and confusion of war impair the rational 
capacity of those involved and thatfama and opinio come to shape the emotions of the 
combatants. The conduct of war has, therefore, a psychological dimension, and since 
reason inevitably gives way to emotion, auctoritas can be an effective weapon. Three 
relatively brief rhetorical questions follow, all of them logically connected: the first deals 
with Pompey's renown (nomen) , the second with his accomplishments (res gestae), the 
third with his election to various offices (iudicia). These three elements- reputation, 
accomplishments, and office - together constitute auctoritas.69 Each is essential to its 
68 Leg. Man. 43-4. 
69 See also : Hellegouarc'h 1972: 299, who identifies res gestae, honores, and aetas as three components of 
auctoritas. 
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formation, but because of the setting, Cicero maintains that election is id quod maxime 
facit auctoritatem. 
In the rhetorical question that follows, Cicero recalls the People's approval of the 
lex Gabinia the previous year, and just prior to his description of the vote, he claims that 
the ill ius diei Jam a reached even the farthest shores of the empire - theaters in the war 
against piracy. Like men, decisions of the People can also have the kind ofjama that 
affects the conduct of others. In the case of the lex Gabinia, the enthusiasm of the 
People's support indicated their appraisal-respect, itself a product of Pompey's character 
and achievements.70 This public display of appraisal-respect further enhanced Pompey's 
auctoritas, leading to, among other things, a dramatic decline in the price of grain. 
At the time, Pompey's popular support manifested itself in at least three different 
ways. First, he had received many public honors. Cicero deliberately places Pompey's 
appointment within the context of the many other honors granted to him over the course 
of his career. The orator refers to these earlier in the passage (tanta praeclara iudicia) 
and elsewhere more explicitly.71 Thus, his appointment to the command against the 
pirates is part of a pattern, an indication of long-standing public confidence based on a 
record of accomplishment. In addition, the People supported his appointment 
overwhelmingly. The entire populace (universus populus Romanus) packed the Forum 
and the temples so that the crowd filled every available place from which to view the 
Rostra (referto foro completisque omnibus temp/is, ex quibus hie locus conspici potest). 
70 Though appraisal-respect applies to a person's moral qualities, his achievements and abilities can be 
objects of appraisal-respect since almost every skill and deed depends in some way on character for its 
development and/or execution. Darwalll977: 42. 
71 Leg. Man. 30-1. 
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Finally, the People's enthusiasm translated into active participation: though faced with 
senatorial opposition, the populus defied their leadership and demanded (depoposcit) 
Pompey's appointment. Similarly, Cicero reports that the citizens and allies of Asia now 
demand Pompey's appointment in the war against Mithridates. Referring to 
correspondence received from Asia earlier in the speech, the orator maintains that unum 
[ sc. Pompeium] ab omnibus sociis et civibus ad id bellum imperatorem deposci at que 
. 72 expetz ... 
In sum, Cicero's rhetoric suggests that election offers the means by which 
domestic appraisal-respect becomes international recognition-respect. Upon passage of 
the lex Gabinia, grain prices fell dramatically, something normally associated with long-
standing peace and prosperity rather than war. In addition, Cicero attributes the restraint 
shown by Mithridates and Tigranes after the Roman disaster at Zela to Pompey's mere 
appearance in Asia during his campaign against the pirates.73 Cicero also recalls that, in 
the same year, the Cretans became eager to surrender to Pompey rather than the 
proconsul Metellus, whom the Senate had previously sent to finish pacifying the island. 
The orator attributes these things to Pompey's auctoritas, and as part of an a fortiori 
argument, asks how much more he will accomplish when his virtus and armies are 
brought to bear. 74 He concludes with the following: 
72 Leg. Man. 5. See also: Leg. Man. 2, where Cicero alludes to the People's appraisal-respect for himself 
by citing his election three times at the head of the poll. 
73 Leg. Man . 44-6. 
74 Leg. Man. 45- Et quisquam dubitabit, quid virtute p eifectunts sit, qui tantum auctoritate perfecerit . .. 
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Potestis igitur iam constituere, Quirites, hanc auctoritatem multis postea rebus gestis 
magnisque vestris iudiciis amplificatam quantam apud illos reges, quantum apud exteras 
nationes valituram esse existimetis. 
You, therefore, now have the power to determine, my fellow Romans, how much you 
think this auctoritas, having since been enhanced by many deeds and your great 
decisions, will carry with those kings and foreign nations. 
The full significance of this claim becomes apparent only in light of the ideological 
alternative. As we saw earlier, the Sullan constitution had reestablished the Senate's 
leading role in imperial administration. When it came to extraordinary commands, its 
preferred method was to prorogue magistrates without reference to the People; such was 
the manner in which Lucullus and Metellus had obtained their respective commands. 
As Cicero notes, Pompey managed to upstage each in the course of his campaign against 
the pirates, which along with the decline in grain prices, Cicero attributes to Pompey's 
superior auctoritas. Claiming that Pompey's auctoritas has since been enhanced by the 
People's magna iudicia and with his earlier pronouncement that popular election is id 
quod maxime facit auctoritatem, Cicero implies the superiority of democratic election 
over the Senate's method of appointment. Hence, the emphatic placement of potestis 
(literally, "You have the power. .. ") affirms the People's institutional power, not only 
against claims of senatorial prerogative, but also over the most tyrannical of Rome's 
enemies - foreign reges. 
56 
The People as Honor Group 
In the debate over the lex Man ilia, one of the challenges facing Cicero was the 
auctoritas of the opposition, namely Catulus and his son-in-law Hortensius. Their 
standing as principes meant that, as a praetor, Cicero lacked the kind of recognition-
respect and attending credibility of his opponents. One of the ways in which he 
compensates is to call attention to those of comparable standing who support the 
measure. In the fmal part of the refutatio, Cicero enumerates the virtues and 
accomplishments of the four consulars supporting the proposal and concludes: Quare 
videte, horumne auctoritatibus illorum orationi, qui dissentiunt, respondere posse 
videamur. 75 But even earlier, Cicero argues that his audience- the Roman People -not 
only has the requisite auctoritas in the debate over the issue of Pompey's command but 
h h. . h . 76 t at, on t IS Issue, t ey are preemment. 
To justify this rather extraordinary claim, Cicero engages in an effort to diminish 
the auctoritas of his opponents. Though he acknowledges that their auctoritas ordinarily 
ought to carry great weight, he urges his audience to disregard it in this case and to 
arrive at the truth through reason and fact (omissis auctoritatibus ipsa re ac ratione 
exquirere possumus veritatem ). 77 Significant is the limited front on which he purports to 
attack Hortensius and Catulus. By acknowledging the merit of his opponents' auctoritas 
in general, Cicero claims to limit his criticism to the issue at hand. This is not altogether 
unusual. The respective auctoritates of jurists and medical doctors, for example, 
75 Leg. Man. 68- His treatment begins 'quodsi auctoritatibus hanc causam, Quirites, confirmandam 
putatis ... ' 
76 Rose 1995: 383-4. 
77 Leg. Man. 51. 
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presumably applied only to their fields of expertise: a praetor would not ask a medical 
doctor for clarification on a point of law any more than a patient would summon a jurist 
for diagnosis and treatment.78 But given that the People expected senators to advise 
them properly on a range of issues and that imperial administration was a special 
competency of the Senate, Cicero's insistence that his faultfinding applies only to the 
issue at hand is untenable. His suggestion that the People withhold its respect (omissis 
auctoritatibus) and instead rely on reason and the facts (ipsa re ac ratione) in order to 
see the truth of the matter (veritas) implies a lack of credibility, a failure by his 
opponents to advise the populus properly. At the same time, it suggests that the People 
have the capacity to decide such issues for themselves. 
In the case ofHortensius, Cicero's criticism stems from the consular's earlier 
opposition to the lex Gabinia. Cicero reminds his audience that Hortensius had openly 
attacked the earlier measure in much the same way as he was now attacking the Manilian 
proposal. In light of Pompey's success against the pirates, the orator poses the following 
question to Hortensius: 
Tum, per deos immortales, plus apud populum Romanum auctoritas tua quam ipsius 
populi Romani salus et vera causa valuisset, hodie hanc gloriam atque hoc orbis terrae 
imperium teneremus? 
By the immortal gods, ifyour auctoritas at that time and in front of the Roman People 
had prevailed over the true cause and welfare of the Roman People itself, would we 
today retain this glory and our world empire?79 
78 Hellegouarc'h 1972: 302. 
79 Leg. Man. 53. 
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Cicero charges his opponent with failing to advise the People properly, using his 
position and influence to advocate policies ultimately detrimental to the populi Romani 
salus et vera causa.80 To make such an accusation in private or within the noble 
confines of the Curia was one thing, but to air it openly before the assembled populus -
the arbiter of auctoritas -was quite another. While deeds (res gestae), reputation 
(jama), and election (iudicia) all contributed to an individual's auctoritas, politics in the 
end was about one's reputation. As a rhetorical medium, an individual's reputation 
served as a lens through which his accomplishments were accounted, framed, and 
disseminated for the People's consumption. This made it susceptible to manipulation. 
As the career of Lucullus clearly illustrates, deeds and elections alone did not suffice. 
To be politically successful required that the populus view one's conduct as generally 
consistent with its own values and normative expectations.81 While the populus 
ultimately judged the influence an individual would carry, rhetoric had the capacity to 
shape public perception by crafting narratives that engaged societal norms. Among 
other things, these narratives could generate respect on the one hand (as Cicero does at 
the beginning of the speech) or shame on the other (as Cicero does in the passage 
above). 
Whether understood as a social fact or an emotion, shame involves a failure by a 
member of the group to measure up to the collective moral standard.82 Whatever the 
8° Cicero later couches his criticism by claiming that the People realized Hortensius and the others spoke 
with good intentions: bono te animo tum, Q. Hortensi, populus Romanus et ceteros, qui erant in eadem 
sententia, dicere existimavit ea ... (Leg. Man. 56). 
81 See Bell2004: esp. 2-7. 
82 On shame, generally: Kaster 2005: 15-64; Rawls 1999 : 389-90; Cairns 1993: 1-47; Miller 1993: 116-57; 
Williams 1993; Taylor 1985 : 53-84. 
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nature of the group- be it a religious order, professional organization, class, or state-
membership entails adherence to a standard of conduct, and in exchange, members enjoy 
certain benefits and status. Though the Roman Republic cannot be considered a true 
"shame culture" (that is, a society in which public esteem is the greatest, if not exclusive, 
good), shame - pudor- and its prospect nonetheless played an important role in 
regulating the conduct of political leaders. When it comes to constructing shame, the 
society-at-large comprises a kind of broad-based "honor group" that has tremendous 
power because it supplies the moral standard and enforces compliance through the 
administration of social sanctions.83 The severity of these sanctions can range, 
depending on the group and the nature of the offense, anywhere from a loss of public 
esteem (in modem society, e.g.) to outright expulsion (in a true "shame culture"). 
Like auctoritas, shame ultimately depends on public perception more than the 
facts themselves. An individual may engage in a shameful act, but ifunreported, avoid 
incurring public shame. This does not mean, however, that the offender always escapes 
punishment. Ideally, the group socializes its members by inculcating a moral standard, a 
sense of right and wrong, and hence, a "sense of shame." To be shameless, therefore, is 
to be anti-social. Having internalized the values of the group, the offender participates 
in punishing himself. He sees himself through the eyes ofhis peers and (to use Robert 
Kaster's phrase) "seeing himselfbeing seen" in this way,feels ashamed.84 
83 On the role of the group: Cairns 1993 : 39-44; Miller 1993: 116-8; Taylor 1985: 54-7. 
84 On dispositional (a sense of shame) and occurent shame (an emotion): Kaster 2005: 56, 62; Miller 1993 : 
146, 178; Taylor 1985: 57. On sight and the issue of an audience: Kaster 2005: 56; Cairns 1993 : 16-8; 
Williams 1993: 78-82; Taylor 1985: 53, 58-67 (with J.-P . Sartre. Being and Nothingness. 3.1.1). 
Essential to every definition of shame is the element of sight, of being seen to 
have acted inappropriately. This implies an audience. In politics as on the battlefield, 
the public gaze - real or imagined- has a coercive effect. At the risk of incurring 
shame, the gaze of others compels conformity to the moral standard, while at the same 
time, it provides an opportunity for participants to gain respect and enhance their 
reputation by displaying excellent conduct. Within the context of Republican politics, 
the People constituted an honor group, and elected leaders were beholden to them. 
Those with the most prestige were the most visible and, paradoxically, the most 
vulnerable to public scrutiny by virtue of their position. 
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The contio provided a venue for such scrutiny.85 In the passage above, Cicero 
takes advantage of the setting, the People's presence and their role as the moral arbiter, 
to shame Hortensius for his earlier failure to recognize and pursue the populi Romani 
salus et vera causa. The phrasing itself- the invocation, the antithesis between his 
opponent's auctoritas and the People's salus et vera causa, and the potentially disastrous 
results of his advice - suggests that Hortensius is guilty of more than just an honest 
mistake. What is more, his present opposition to similar legislation betrays his 
shamelessness, an inability or unwillingness to recognize the gravity of his earlier 
failure. Rather than being contrite, his opposition to a second special command makes 
him seem obstinate. Through Cicero's rhetorical lens, the People see evidence of not 
just a lack of expertise but an ethical deficiency as well. This, in tum, provides 
85 Kaster 2005: 97- "The contio is the formal space for creating nemesis-invidia under the Republic ... " 
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justification for his call that the People set aside his opponents' auctoritates in order to 
perceive the truth. 
At the same time, Cicero argues that if Hortensius and his allies had been 
successful in defeating the lex Gabinia, piracy would have continued unabated, 
compromising the Roman People's imperium and attendant gloria( ... hodie hanc 
gloriam atque hoc orbis terrae imperium teneremus?). Gloria and the related laus 
denote the prestige that comes with the possession of an empire, 86 and prior to the lex 
Gabinia, Cicero maintains that the inability of the Romans to deal with the threat of 
piracy meant that the People were without the benefits of empire, including prestige.87 
In addition to the practical advantages of empire (utilitas) , the pirates had deprived the 
Roman People of both their power (imperium) and honor (dignitas). The last of these 
implies that the situation brought shame upon the Roman People. In the ideology of the 
Republic, possession of dignitas distinguished the senator from an ordinary citizen; it 
marked him as worthy of receiving recognition, admiration, and glory.88 An individual 
senator's legitimacy, and that of the order itself, ultimately depended on the People 
perceiving him as "worthy" of esteem. Without the qualities of dignitas and the 
semantically related auctoritas,89 little or no justification for the senatorial order 
remained. 
86 Brunt 1978. 
87 Leg Man. 54 -At hercule aliquot annos continuos ante legem Gabiniam ille populus Roman us ... magna 
ac multo maxima parte non modo uti/ita tis, sed dignitatis at que imperii cantil. 
88 On dignitas: Posch! 1989; Piscitelli 1979; Drexler 1966; Wirszubski 1950: 12-7, 36-7. 
89 Cic. Inv. 2.166 provides the best evidence: dignitas est alicuius honesta et cultu et honore et verecundia 
digna auctoritas. See also: TLL 5.1.1137.63. While dignitas generally corresponds to your worthiness in 
a passive sense, auctoritas is a kind of dignitas-in-action, referring to the effect that your reputation has on 
others . Piscitelli 1979: 260; Drexler 1966: 242. The relationship between these concepts resembles the 
one betweenpudor and verecundia, as described by Kaster; the fo1mer is (like dignitas) ultimately about 
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His suggestion that the threat of piracy diminished the dignitas of the populus 
Romanus underscores the importance he attaches to the issue.9° Cicero repeatedly refers 
to Rome's empire as belonging to the populus,91 and in international affairs, he 
maintains that they ought to enjoy the respect of other nations in the manner of a senator 
among the People. Rome's inability to maintain her empire brought more than just 
humiliation or embarrassment -feelings associated with more trivial matters and which 
leave the subject's overall sense of worth intact- but shame.92 As those entrusted with 
oversight of foreign affairs, blame falls squarely on the magistrates: 
Nos, qui antea non modo Italiam tutam habebamus, sed omnes socios in ultimis oris 
auctoritate nostri imperii salvos praestare poteramus ... idem non modo provinciis atque 
oris Italiae maritimis ac portibus nostris, sed etiam Appia iam via carebamus; et iis 
temporibus non pudebat magistratus populi Romani in hunc ipsum locum escendere, 
cum eum nobis maiores nostri exuviis nauticis et classium spoliis omatum reliquissent! 
Bono te animo tum, Q. Hortensi, populus Romanus et ceteros, qui erant in eadem 
sententia, dicere existimavit ea, quae sentiebatis; sed tamen in salute communi idem 
populus Romanus dolori suo maluit quam auctoritati vestrae obtemperare. 
We, who before not only kept Italy safe but were able to keep all the allies on the 
farthest shores safe by the auctoritas of our empire ... we same people were not only 
deprived of our provinces, the coasts ofltaly and our ports, but even the Appian Way; 
and in those days, the magistrates of the Roman People were unashamed to mount this 
very place, even though our ancestors had left it to us adorned with naval trophies and 
the spoils of fleets! The Roman People judged that you and the rest who agreed with 
you were well intentioned when you gave your opinions; with regard to the common 
welfare, nevertheless, the same Roman People preferred to submit to their own 
resentment than to your auctoritas.93 
the subject, while the latter (like auctoritas) is concerned more about the effect on others. Kaster 2005: 
64. 
90 Thus, Cicero earlier admonishes the People regarding their imperial inheritance: Videte, ne, ut illis [sc. 
maioribus] pulcherrimum fit it tan tam vobis imperii gloriam tradere, sic vobis turpissimum sit id, quod 
acceptistis, tueri et conservare non posse (Leg. Man . 12). 
91 Examples: Leg. Man. 11-2, 14, 19, 21. 
92 On the relationship between shame and humiliation, embarrassment: Kaster 2005: 63; Miller 1993: 136-
8, 157. 
93 Leg. Man. 55-6. 
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The antithesis between the power and influence historically enjoyed by Rome on 
the one hand and its impotence in the years leading up to the People's passage of the lex 
Gabinia on the other picks up on the theme of the preceding section, where Cicero 
contrasts Rome's triumph over once great naval powers with her recent inability to 
defend the patria from pirates. Piracy undermined the People's auctoritas in the eyes of 
the world. Despite the loss of national honor, the magistrates, whom the People had 
elected to administer their empire (magistratus populi Romani), shamelessly continued 
to ascend the Rostra (non pudebat escendere)- a monument commemorating Rome's 
fourth-century victory over Volscian pirates at Antium. Though the leaders were 
oblivious to their own and the nation's disgrace, the true state of affairs did not escape 
the People. According to Cicero, righteous indignation took the form of dolor, leading 
them to take matters into their own hands to restore their collective dignitas.94 They 
ignored the auctoritas of Hortensius and the others and appointed Pompey to a special 
command.95 
The themes of national shame, the moral deficiency of magistrates, and the 
potential of popular legislation to restore the People's honor are also features of Cicero's 
narrative of the Manilian proposal. Instead of piracy, Mithridates' unavenged massacre 
of thousands of Roman citizens in Asia twenty-two years earlier and his ongoing threat 
to the empire are a national disgrace. Cicero refers to the massacre as "that stain on the 
name of the Roman People" (ilia macula ... in nomine populi) and warns the assembly 
that their failure to maintain the integrity of the empire would be the utmost disgrace (sic 
94 On the relationship between shame, righteous indignation (invidia), and dolor: Kaster 2005: esp. 84-95 . 
95 Much of the Senate supported Hortensius' opposition (Dio 36.24.1-3; Plut. Pomp. 25.3-4). Once the 
People passed the law, Cicero relates that Rome was free from illa miseria ac turpitudo (Leg. Man. 56). 
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vobis turpissimum sit id).96 At the same time, he attacks the widespread corruption of 
those charged with administering the provinces.97 Passage of the lex Manilia promises 
to restore Rome's good name by dispatching a commander known as much for integrity 
and self-control as for his martial prowess. With the People's adoption of the Manilian 
proposal, Cicero predicts that Pompey will renew the imperii vestri splendor and that 
allies will reach the same conclusion as their ancestors - servire populo Romano quam 
imperare aliis maluisse.98 
The People's Sovereignty 
Between his criticism of Hortensius and Catulus, Cicero undertakes a digression 
in order to profess his own loyalty to the People in terms of the law. Given his position 
as praetor, the topic for digression is not insignificant, since it offers him an opportunity 
to draw a sharp contrast between his own popularis approach to governance and that of 
his opponents. To the extent that there was in fact a controversy, the issue seems to have 
been whether Pompey could appoint Gabinius as a legate, even though the earlier leges 
Aebutia and Licinia barred an individual from directly benefitting from his own 
legislation.99 It seems safe to assume that Hortensius and Catulus were among many 
others- perhaps even a large majority of senators- who opposed Gabinius' appointment 
on these grounds. Cicero, however, characterizes their opposition as arbitrary, claiming 
96 Leg. Man. 7, 12. 
97 Leg. Man. 13, 37-41 , 65-7. 
98 Leg. Man. 41. 
99 Steel2001: 179. Among the laws prohibiting the sponsor of a piece of legislation from benefitting are 
the first-century(?) leges Licinia and Aebutia: Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.21 ; Dam. 51. 
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that it is indignius, since every other general has been able to appoint his own legates to 
plunder allied provinces, but Gabinius - the one who proposed the law whereby the 
salus ac dignitas populo Romano atque omnibus gentibus constituta est- cannot. 100 
Cicero pledges to raise the issue in the Senate: 
De quo legando consules spero ad senatum relaturos. Qui si dubitabunt aut gravabuntur, 
ego me profiteor relaturum; neque me impediet cuiusquam inimicum edictum, quo 
minus vobis fretus vestrum ius beneficiumque defendam, neque praeter intercessionem 
quicquam audiam, de qua, ut arbitror, isti ipsi, qui minantur, etiam atque etiam, quid 
liceat, considerabunt. 
I hope the consuls will refer the question of his appointment to the Senate. If they 
hesitate or are pressured, I promise to do it; neither will a wicked edict of any magistrate 
keep me - with your help - from defending your right and privilege nor will I heed 
anything except a veto. Those who threaten to veto the appointment, in my estimation, 
will themselves go round and round considering whether it is allowed.101 
That Cicero raises the issue at all implies that Gabinius had not been appointed, 
which in tum suggests something of a consensus regarding its illegality. Nonetheless, 
Cicero promises to raise the issue in the Senate, pledging that he will not allow the 
hostile ruling of a magistrate (inimicum edictum) to trump the People's ius 
beneficiumque. The higher magistrates of the late Republic possessed the ius 
honorarium -the right to determine which legal principles would apply when settling 
legal disputes. These principles ofjurisprudence took the form of edicts (edicta) and 
were recognized sources oflaw. 102 This inevitably created a certain tension between the 
ius honorarium of the magistrates and the People's own legislative authority. Cicero 
100 Leg. Man. 57. 
101 Leg Man. 58. 
102 Mousourakis 2003 : 79-89, 185-8. 
seeks to exploit this tension. He vows that the cuiusquam inimicum edictum will not 
prevent him from defending the People's ius beneficiumque. 
Cicero concedes, however, that he needs the People's support ifretus vobis). 
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Technically, the People needed to enact new legislation to overturn legal provisions 
enacted earlier, but the rest of what Cicero has to say suggests that this is not what he has 
in mind. He says that nothing will stop him except a veto (intercessio ), which in this 
case could only be offered by a consul, tribune, or one of his fellow praetors. With his 
prediction that those who threaten to interpose a veto will go round and round 
considering whether it is allowed (etiam atque etiam, quid liceat, considerabunt), he 
raises the specter of collective action not unlike that meted out against the two tribunes 
who had earlier opposed the lex Gabinia. But Cicero must have known that it would 
never come to this. The provisions of the lex Man ilia, now on the verge of passage, 
would have set aside the provisions of the lex Gabinia, allowing Gabinius to serve as 
Pompey's legate in Asia. Cicero looks to be promoting a false controversy in order to 
portray himself as the People's hero: he pledges to fight on the People's behalf without 
running any risk of actually having to follow through.103 
After burnishing his own popularis credentials and threatening his opponents, 
Cicero attacks Catulus. The former consul had apparently objected to the extraordinary 
nature of Pompey's command, and Cicero responds that the Romans have repeatedly 
approved of extraordinary commands when facing external threats. Moreover, he points 
103 Steel2001 : 179. 
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out that Catulus himself had previously approved of granting such commands to 
Pompey.104 He concludes with the following: 
Quare videant, ne sit periniquum et non ferendum illorum auctoritatem de Cn. Pompei 
dignitate a vobis comprobatam semper esse, vestrum ab illis de eodem homine iudicium 
populique Romani auctoritatem improbari, praesertim cum iam suo iure populus 
Romanus in hoc homine suam auctoritatem vel contra ornnes, qui dissentiunt, possit 
defendere, propterea quod isdem istis reclamantibus vos unum illum ex omnibus 
delegistis, quem bello praedonum praeponeretis. Hoc si vos temere fecistis et rei 
publicae parum consulistis, recte isti studia vestra suis consiliis regere conantur; sin 
autem vos plus tum in re publica vidistis, vos iis repugnantibus per vosmet ipsos 
dignitatem huic imperio, salutem orbi terrarum attulistis, aliquando isti principes et sibi 
et ceteris populi Romani universi auctoritati parendum esse fateantur. 
Therefore, let them beware, lest it be unjust and intolerable that, on the issue of 
Pompey's worthiness, their auctoritas has been approved by you while your election of 
the same man and the cmctoritas of the Roman People has been rejected by them, 
especially now when, in this man, the Roman People is by its own right capable of 
defending its own auctoritas against all who oppose it; for this reason and over the 
protests of those same men, you selected out of everyone this man alone for supreme 
command in the war against the pirates. If you did this recklessly and with too little 
regard for the republic, those men rightly attempt to curb your zeal with their counsel; 
but if you, however, better discerned the needs of the Republic at that time, if you -
despite their opposition - by your very selves brought honor to this empire and safety to 
the world, then at last those leading men should admit that they and all others must be 
subject to the auctoritas of the Roman People as a whole. 105 
Given that auctoritas was exclusive of the Senate and its membership, its attribution to 
the populus here is something of a contradiction in terms. 106 The orator's emphatic use 
of vas in the protasis of the final condition underscores this remarkable claim: the People 
have usurped the Senate's duties in this area because it better discerned the needs of the 
Republic and returned honor to the empire (dignitatem huic imperio ... attulistis). For 
104 Leg. Man. 59-63 . 
105 Leg Man. 64. 
106 Auctoritas populi is not entirely unattested in Cicero's rhetoric: Leg. Agr. 2.16; Phil. 6.18. Moreover, it 
may be used to refer to the People 's approval required in cases of adrogatio. Hellegouarc 'h 1972: 313-4; 
Berger 1953: 369. 
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Cicero, the People's support of the lex Gabinia, the Senate's opposition, and Pompey's 
subsequent success against the pirates combine to vindicate the Roman People's 
auctoritas in the current debate. In as much as the positions of Hortensius and Catulus 
reflect the will of the Senate, Cicero asserts that its current opposition to Manilius' 
proposal constitutes a betrayal, not only because they fail to perceive and advocate for 
the interests of the People, but also because they have failed to acknowledge the 
auctoritas of the People on this issue. Cicero alludes to the People's sovereignty by 
asserting that they are capable by their own right (suo iure) of defending their own 
auctoritas against all who oppose them (contra omnes qui dissentiunt) . This claim is a 
double entendre: it ostensibly refers to the ability of the populus Romanus to defend its 
empire from external threats, but the reference to ius and the characterization of the 
People's opponents as "all who disagree" is a veiled threat to those who would oppose 
their sovereign will. Instead, the leading men of the state, the principes, ought to confess 
that the auctoritas of the Roman People must be respected. 
Cicero points to the assembled crowd as evidence of the People's desire. 1 07 Its 
size and enthusiasm resemble the one that approved the lex Gabinia, and the orator 
concludes that such support is both an indication of the popular will and the rightness of 
Manilius' proposal. He addresses the tribune: 
. . . te hortor, ut auctore populo Romano maneas in sententia neve cuiusquam vim aut 
minas pertimescas. Primum in te satis esse animi perseverantiaeque arbitror; deinde, 
cum tantam multitudinem cum tanto studio adesse videamus, quantam iterum nunc in 
eadem homine praeficiendo videmus, quid est, quod aut de re aut de perficiendi facultate 
dubitemus? 
107 Steel2001 : 177. 
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. .. I urge you, with the Roman People as sponsor, to remain steadfast in your proposal 
and not to be intimidated by threats or violence from anyone. In the first place, I judge 
you lack neither heart nor persistence. In the second, when we see a crowd present as 
great and with as much zeal as that now gathered a second time to appoint the same man 
to a command, what is there about the proposal or its prospects for passage to cause us 
doubt? 108 
With the populus Romanus as auctor, lending its recognition-respect, there is no reason 
to doubt bill's wisdom or its prospects for success. While it is customary for senators to 
be auctores - sponsors of a measure - their failure to approve of Manilius' proposal 
means that the People have again appropriated the senators' role. With the Roman 
People sponsoring Manlius' bill in the comitia, success is assured. 
108 Leg. Man. 69. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Role of the People in the Public Courts 
in Verrem Actio Prima (70 B.C.) 
Even after Sulla had effectively done away with routine comitial trials, the iudicia 
publica served as a source of the People's power and a place where it could be exercised. 
The public setting of the courts meant that they exhibit many ofthe same features as 
contiones: orators appealing to the crowds in attendance, crowds learning about political 
affairs and making their voices heard through acclamationes, advocates subjecting 
opponents, witnesses, and even the courts themselves to public scrutiny. The first actio 
of the Verrines provides ample illustration ofhow the notional populus Romanus could 
influence court proceedings and how an orator could take advantage of those dynamics to 
make his case. 
Though not his first forensic speech, Cicero's speeches against Verres had the 
greatest impact on his early political career. That he himself shared this view explains 
why he decided to publish seven speeches related to the trial, all but two of which he 
never even delivered. As such, they collectively serve as a literary monument ofhis 
victory; he intended them, more than anything else, to remind the Roman public of his 
character, skills, and achievement as an orator.1 
1 See Introduction. Among others, Stroh 1975: 21 , 52-4 has argued that the purpose of publishing speeches 
was pedagogical. Sources: Cic. Att. 2.1.3; Brut. 126; Quint. Jnst. 12.1 0.53 . This cannot have been the only 
reason, however: Dugan 2005 : 1-74; Alexander 2002: 25-6. 
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Background 
No other speech in the Verrine corpus compares with the first actio in terms of its 
sustained political tenor. We can attribute this, at least in part, to Cicero's "novel" 
strategy for the prosecution. Ordinarily, each actio began with lengthy orations by the 
prosecution and defense (orationes perpetuae).2 In these speeches, both sides dealt with 
the various charges and offered an interpretation of the evidence based on written 
testimony provided in advance by the witnesses. The hearing of testimony followed, in 
the course of which, both sides had an opportunity to question witnesses and probably 
one another.3 In the trial ofVerres, the defense strategy was to draw out the proceedings 
so that they would carry into the following year. Had this occurred, it would have meant 
that the prosecution would have been required to recall witnesses and retry the case from 
the beginning; moreover, a new praetor- M. Metellus- a political ally of those ranged 
for the defense, would have overseen the trial.4 In response, Cicero elected to forego a 
lengthy oration and instead proceeded almost immediately to the hearing of witnesses. 
He claims in the first actio that he will make his case, not by means of a sustained, 
comprehensive oration but with "records, witnesses, private and public documents and 
decrees" (tabu/is, testibus, privatis publicisque litteris auctoritatibusque).5 
2 Lintott 2004: 76; Greenidge 1901: 477-9; Quint. Inst. 5.7.25. 
3 It is unclear whether the altercatio, verbal exchange between prosecution and defense, took place after the 
hearing of all testimony or after each witness. The latter seems more likely, since the questioning of 
witnesses would have inevitably led to a back-and-forth between the parties. Greenidge 1901: 478-9; 
Lintott 2004: 76; Quint. Inst. 6.3.112. 
4 On the defense strategy: Verr. 1.26, 30-1 , 34, 53-5 . After the reforms of70, the slate of magistrates for 69 
was decidedly more conservative, owing perhaps to the influx of wealthy landholders into Rome for the 
census. 
5 Verr. 1.33- nunc hominem tabu/is, testibus, privatis publicisque litteris auctoritatibusque accusemus; 
1.55 - Hoc testibus, hoc tabu/is privatis publicisque auctoritatibus ita vobis planumfaciemus; 2.1.29. 
Vasaly 2009: 110-2. 
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It is presumably for this reason that the orator devotes only a brief section of the 
narratio to treating the actual crime.6 His decision to treat the facts during the hearing of 
testimony meant that Cicero could deliver an oration that was abbreviated and 
emphasized ethical and qualitative issues over those of fact and/or law. Consequently, 
Cicero devotes most of the narratio to detailing Verres' malfeasance, not as governor of 
Sicily, but as a prospective defendant at Rome. He outlines the different ways in which 
the former governor employed his ill-gotten wealth to corrupt the proceedings against 
him and to thwart the efforts of Cicero. Though not immediately relevant to the charge 
of extortion, treating the allegations of the defendant's attempts to corrupt the 
proceedings serves two main purposes. First, it allows Cicero to establish a pattern of 
misbehavior on the part of the defendant, one that engenders hostility from the audience.7 
Second, it enables him to politicize the case by providing an entree to the theme of 
judicial corruption. At least since the time of the Gracchi, judicial corruption had been a 
recurring political issue; renewed efforts to address the problem often accompanied shifts 
in the political landscape. So it was in the year of the trial. 
If it did not mark the end of the Sullan Republic, the year 70 proved pivotal in its 
collapse. During the period ofhis dominatio, Sulla had strengthened the hand of the 
Senate at the expense of the Republic's popular institutions. He curbed the powers ofthe 
People's representatives- the tribunes- and in their place reestablished the requirement 
that all legislative proposals receive the auctoritas patrum prior to being voted upon. 8 At 
6 Verr. 1.10-15. 
7 Tempest 2007: 27-9. See also: Riggsby 1999: 124-6, 169. 
8 Depriving tribunes of the right to introduce legislation coincided with a measure requiring that the Senate 
approve all legislation before its introduction in the assembly, the so-called auctoritas patrum. On Sullan 
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the same time, equites were barred from serving as jurors. Panels consisted exclusively 
of members of the senatorial class.9 Sulla also repealed the lex Domitia, which had 
instituted a kind of popular election for four of the major priesthoods.10 The rolling back 
of the Sullan constitution began modestly enough in 75, when the consul C. Aurelius 
Cotta secured the passage of legislation allowing tribunes to seek higher office. 11 The 
following year, the tribune L. Quinctius launched two high-profile prosecutions for 
alleged judicial corruption, all the while holding contiones and agitating for change in the 
composition of the juries.12 
These proved a foretaste of the attacks launched in the year of the trial. Early on, 
the consul Pompey proposed and the People ratified a law reinstating the full powers of 
the tribunate. 13 One of the tribunes, A. Plautius, wasted no time in making use of the 
newly restored powers. 14 With the aid of a young Julius Caesar, he ultimately passed 
legislation restoring the citizenship of followers of the former renegade, Lepidus. He 
also secured passage of an agrarian law that provided land to Pompey's veterans and a lex 
de vi, which was likely aimed at those who had used violence to obtain property during 
the Sullan proscriptions. Some six weeks after the start of the trial, L. Aurelius Cotta 
introduced a judicial reform measure, intended to break the senatorial monopoly over the 
restrictions to the tribunate: App. B. Civ. 1.100; Asc. 67.1-4, 78.23-5, 81.3-5C; Caes. Civ. 1.7; Cic. Leg. 
3.22; Verr. 2.1.155; Liv. Ep. 89; VeiL Pat. 2.30.4. On auctoritas patrum: App. B. Civ. 1.59; Graeber 2001: 
esp. 213-5, 220-1; Biscardi 1987: esp. 130, 194-7. 
9 Cic. Verr. 1.37; Tac. Ann. 11.22. 
10 Dio 37.37.1. 
11 MRR 2.96, esp. Asc. 78 .23-5C; Sal. Hist. 3.48.8M. 
12 MRR 2.103, esp. Cic. Clu. 77-80,89-96, 103-16; Ps-Ascon. 216St. 
13 MRR 2.126, esp. App. B. Civ. 2.29; Asc. 76.5-12C; Cic. Leg. 3.22, 26; Verr. 1.44-5; Dio 36.38.2; Liv. 
Per. 97; Plut. Pomp. 22.3; Sal. Cat. 38.1. 
14 On the restoriation of citizenship to the followers of Lepidus: Marshall1972; Smith 1957; Dio 44.47.4; 
Gell. NA 13 .3.5; Suet. Jul. 5. On the agrarian law and a lex de vi: Riggsby 1999: 79-84; Gruen 1974: 225-7; 
Lintott Violence 1999: 107-24. Sources: Cic. Att. 1.18.6, 1.19.4; Gai. Inst. 2.45; Dig. 41.3 .33.2 (Julianus). 
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courts. The bill, which became law before the end of the year, replaced the exclusively 
senatorial juries with mixed juries composed of senators, equites, and tribuni aerarii. 15 
His first speech against V erres suggests that Cicero took full advantage of the 
political atmosphere. In a recent article, Ann Vasaly has refocused scholarly attention on 
the political context of the trial and the opportunity it afforded Cicero as an up-and-
coming politician. Vasaly argues convincingly that not only Cicero's account of the 
tense political atmosphere is largely accurate, but also that the trial provided the orator 
with a venue for political self-fashioning. 16 The notion that an orator could intend 
aspects of a forensic speech for something other than persuading a jury to acquit or 
convict runs counter to the dominant approach to the forensic speeches -persuasive 
process criticism. This approach conceives of each speech as "a document of persuasive 
manipulation," intended to be "delivered in specific circumstances for a specific 
audience."17 Thus, political rhetoric is presumed to be subordinate to the immediate 
(forensic) objective. For us, whether Cicero politicized the speech in order to sway the 
jury or to promote his own political views is ultimately irrelevant. The effect was the 
same: those in attendance witnessed an up-start politician attacking judicial corruption, 
seeming at times as if he were in a contio rather than a iudicium. This contionalizing 
rhetoric relies in no small part on the orator's expressed ideology of the populus. 
The Shame of Judicial Corruption 
A statement from the peroratio captures the theme of the speech as a whole: "This 
15 MRR2.127,esp.Asc.l7.4-7,67.11-2C;Cic. Verr. 2.5 .177-8. 
16 Vasaly 2009: 104-8, 114-34. 
17 Leeman 1982: 199. See also: Alexander 2007: 102; Powell and Patterson 2004: 1-9; Brunt 1988: 377. 
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is a trial in which, just as you will judge the defendant, so the Roman People will judge 
you" (hoc est iudicium in quo vas de reo, populus Romanus de vobis iudicabit). 18 
According to Cicero, there are two trials taking place, and throughout the speech, he 
devotes most of his attention to the second, political trial. In this, the Roman People 
serve as the jury, and the actual jurors, representing the senatorial order, stand accused. 
At the very beginning of the exordium, Cicero alludes to the crime -judicial COITUption-
saying that there exists a widespread belief that the courts will never convict a wealthy 
man, however guilty: 
Quod erat optandum maxime, iudices, et quod unum ad invidiam vestri ordinis 
infamiamque iudiciorum sedandam maxime pertinebat, id non humano consilio sed prope 
divinitus datum atque oblatum vobis summo reipublicae tempore videtur. Inveteravit 
enim iam opinio pemiciosa rei publicae no bisque periculosa, quae non modo Romae sed 
apud exteras nationes omnium sermone percrebruit, his iudiciis quae nunc sunt 
pecuniosum hominem, quam vis sit nocens, neminem posse damnari. 
What you ought to have desired most, gentlemen, that one thing that will do the most to 
alleviate the indignation toward your order and the ill-repute of the courts, seems to have 
been given not by human design but almost divinely, and granted to you at this pivotal 
moment for the Republic. For already an opinion, destructive to the Republic and 
dangerous to us, has become prevalent not only at Rome but also among the provincials, 
that no wealthy man, however guilty, will ever be convicted in these courts as they are 
now constituted. 19 
Though Cicero fails to mention the populus Romanus by name, he has them in 
mind. His references to the invidia vestri ordinis and the opinio perniciosa reipublicae 
no bisque periculosa implies class struggle - a conflict of the ordines - rather than an 
external threat. As such, the opinio perniciosa periculosaque threatens neither the 
18 Verr. 1.47. 
19 Verr. 1.1. 
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Roman nation (populus) nor the empire (imperium), but the existing political order (res 
publica). The situation has the potential to remake the political landscape, and given 
recent political developments, this would not have seemed far-fetched. 
Thus, "public opinion" (opinio) implies the populus, and it frames the issue of 
corruption primarily in terms of perception rather than fact. As we saw in the last 
chapter, political success for individuals and institutions required that the community 
view their conduct as consistent with its own values and expectations.Z0 A failure to 
measure up to the collective moral standard occasioned shame (pudor), while honor 
(dignitas) attended those who embodied the moral standard and were esteemed worthy of 
recognition, admiration, and glory.21 In political terms, the honor group consisted of the 
Roman citizenry, the populus Romanus in its abstract sense. Through election, its 
institutional counterpart- the assemblies - bestowed honor and power on those it deemed 
worthy. In exchange, the electorate expected magistrates to exercise their authority in the 
interests of the collective.Z2 Judicial corruption violated the terms of the social contract, 
and according to Cicero, it brought the courts into disrepute (infamia), while causing the 
Senate to be the target of righteous indignation (invidia).23 
But the situation had the potential to become even worse, since - as Cicero relates 
- some were preparing to use the popular institutions of government, the contiones and 
20 Bell 2004: 2-7. 
2 1 On shame: Kaster 2005: 56, 62; Miller 1993 : 146, 178; Taylor 1985 : 57. On dignitas: Poschl1989; 
Piscitelli 1979; Drexler 1966; Wirszubski 1950: 12-7, 36-7. 
22 Lintott 1999: 86-7; Morstein-Marx 2004: 204-40; Laser 1997:31-43. See also: Polyb. 6.14.9. 
23 On invidia: Kaster 2005: 84-103. 
77 
the legislative assemblies, to fan the flames of senatorial invidia?4 With the legitimacy 
of the senatorial courts on the line, Verres was brought into court. The senatorial class 
now had an opportunity to restore its honor by convicting a man who had already been 
convicted in the court of public opinion (homo vita atquefactis omnium iam opinione 
damnatus)?5 In so far as it was true, the fact that the defendant was widely perceived as 
guilty meant that the trial posed both a substantial political risk for the senatorial jury as 
well as a real opportunity. In the event of a conviction, the public would be satisfied that 
justice had been done and that the jury had met its obligations to the community. If a 
conviction did not restore the dignitas of the senatorial courts entirely, the jury would at 
least be seen to have acted honorably. 
At the same time, popular opinion placed the jury in a bind. Though the express 
purpose of the courts may have been "to determine whether or not defendants had 
violated the various 'criminal' statutes which established them," a juror's concern for his 
own dignitas or that of his order could well trump his desire to see justice done in a given 
case. 26 Indeed, justice mattered little in the abstract if the Senate and its membership 
risked losing their standing. As it is in the construction of honor and shame, what the 
People perceived to be true- opinio- mattered more than the truth itself. Orators could, 
of course, shape perceptions, but the People were neither a passive audience nor a blank 
24 Verr. 1.2 - cum sint parati qui contionibus et legibus hanc invidiam senatus injlammare conentur .. . 
Kaster 2005: 97- "The contio is the formal space for creating nemesis-invidia under the Republic ... " 
25 Verr. 1.2. See also: 1.10, 15. 
26 Riggsby 1997: 248. Finley Peter Dunne's fictional character - Mr. Dooley- famously observed, "No 
matter whether the country follows the flag or not, the Supreme Court follows the election returns." 
Considering the weakness of the judiciary under the Constitution, specifically its reliance on the other two 
branches of government to abide its decisions, this is hardly surprising: it has neither the power of the 
purse, nor the army. So Andrew Jackson, is famously (though incorrectly) thought to have remarked after 
the Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia - "John Marshall has made his decision . Now let 
him enforce it." 
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slate. In the case of Verres, Cicero contends that the People had already made up their 
mind. Given the rampant invidia and the courts' infamia, popular opinion afforded the 
jury little choice but to convict. 
Cicero characterizes his own role as follows: 
Huic ego causae, iudices, cum summa voluntate et exspectatione populi Romani actor 
accessi, non ut augerem invidiam ordinis, sed ut infamiae communi succurrerem. Adduxi 
enim hominem in quo reconciliare existimationem iudiciorum amissam, redire in gratiam 
cum populo Romano, satis facere exteris nationibus possetis. 
I have entered upon this case, gentlemen, as an advocate accompanied by the fervent 
desire and anticipation of the Roman People, not in order to add to the indignation 
directed at the senatorial order, but to assuage our common dishonor. For I have brought 
to court a man by whom you are able to restore the lost reputation of the courts, to revive 
good relations with the Roman People, and to do right by foreign nations?7 
Cicero casts himself as a mediator. On the one hand, he assures his audience that he is 
not one of those popularis demagogues preparing to use the contiones and assemblies to 
inflame senatorial invidia. Instead, he has brought the case to relieve the Senate's 
infamia. At the same time, he potrays himself like a modern prosecutor, claiming to be 
an actor carrying out the will of the populus Roman us. As Cicero would have it, the 
present trial offers a win-win opportunity for nearly everyone involved. Indeed, he twice 
suggests that it has been sent from heaven (divinitus) to deliver the entire senatorial order 
from infamia and invidia.28 
The use of infamia, meaning "a negative reputation," denotes the shame brought 
27 Verr. 1.2. 
28 The motif occurs at the very beginning of the exordium and again at the beginning of the p eroratio : 
Verr. 1.1 - Quod erat optandum maxime, iudices, et quod unum ad invidiam vestri ordinis infamiamque 
iudiciorum sedandam maxime pertinebat, id non humano consilio sed prope divinitus datum atque oblatum 
vobis summa rei publicae tempore videtur. Verr. 1.43- Moneo praedicoque id quod intellego, tempus hoc 
vobis divinitus datum esse ut odio, invidia, infamia, turpitudine tatum ordinem liberetis. 
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about by the corruption of the courts. Verres' conviction has the potential to dispel the 
Senate's infamia, and in the final tricolon above, Cicero details the potential benefits: the 
jury has the opportunity to recover the lost reputation ( existimatio) of the courts, to 
reestablish good relations (gratia) with the People, and to see justice done for the 
aggrieved provincials (satis facere exteris nationibus). Each colon describes how Verres' 
conviction would affect a segment of the population: the frrst is concerned with the courts 
and (by metonymy) the senatorial order; the second with the People; the third with the 
provincials. 
The three cola are logically related as well, with the former predicated on the 
latter. In particular, salvaging the Senate's existimatio depends on reestablishing a good 
relationship with the People. One cannot have existimatio without being viewed 
favorably. 29 Gratia- or "good relations"- signifies not only a relationship characterized 
by goodwill, but also one based on reciprocity.30 Reestablishing gratia with the People 
depends on dealing justly with the provincials - sa tis facere exteris nationibus. 
The absence of relational vocabulary in the final clause alludes to the fact that the 
provincials stand outside the honor group; what they think of the courts is ultimately a 
secondary issue. Central is the Senate's failure in its relationship with the People. From 
its acquisition to its administration, Roman ideology conceived of the empire as 
29 Roughly equivalent to the English "reputation," existimatio generally carries a positive connotation as it 
does here. Kaster 2005 : 29, 43. In a legal context: Dig. 50.13 .5.1 -3 (Callistratus) - existimatio est 
dignitatis inlaesae status. On occasion, it seems to have a more neutral sense: Yavetz 1974: esp. 35-50; 
Pliny Ep. 2.9.1 - alioqui meus pudor, mea existimatio, mea dignitas in discrimen adducitur. 
30 So, Brunt 1988: 389 - " Gratia signifies not only a favor done to others, and especially a favor done in 
return for those received, and the gratitude evinced in such a requital, but also the influence that accrues to 
men with a claim on the gratitude of others. Its ambivalence reflects the reciprocity of services and 
obligations, which was characteristic of Roman society." See also: Yakobson 1999: 83; Gelzer 1969: 74-5 . 
Gratia as relationship: OLD s.v. 2 = TLL 6.2.2210.17-2211.1, esp. Cic. Att. 1.14.7, 7.9.3; Rab. Post. 19; 
Verr. 2.2.113. 
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essentially just, its power more akin to that of a patronus than an overbearing tyrant. 31 In 
the de Officiis, Cicero maintains that the provinces and allies ought to be defended with 
aequitas and fides and that the empire ought to be called a patrocinium orb is terrae 
verius quam imperium.32 Through its poor oversight of the courts, the Senate has failed 
to act in accordance with the People's normative expectations regarding the 
administration of the provinces. 
According to Cicero, none other than Quintus Catulus viewed the issue of judicial 
corruption as an illustration of the Senate's disregard for the People' s own existimatio. In 
a speech before the Senate recounted by Cicero, Catulus connected the issue of the 
People's existimatio with their desire for honest law courts and the restoration of 
tribunicia potestas: 
Hoc initio est summa cum auctoritate usus, patres conscriptos iudicia male et flagitiose 
tueri: quodsi in rebus iudicandis populi Romani existimationi satis facere voluissent, non 
tanto opere homines fuisse tribuniciam potestam desideraturos. 
Attended by the utmost respect, he [sc. Catulus] began saying that the senators had 
overseen the courts wickedly and immorally. And therefore if they had desired to meet 
their obligations to the People's reputation in judicial matters, men would not have felt 
the loss of the tribunes' powers as much.33 
In the Republic 's governing ideology, the populus Romanus bestowed power and honor 
on those it deemed worthy, and it expected magistrates to exercise those benefits in the 
interests of the collective. The con11ption of the senatorial courts constituted a betrayal 
3 1 Bnmt 1978: 185-90; Gruen 1984: 275. Sources: Cic. Off 2.26-7, Q. Fr. 1.1 .27, 34; Rep. 3.35-7; Tac. 
Hist. 4.74; Verg. Aen. 6.851-3 . 
32 Off 2.27 (here Cicero is comparing the idealized past with the present): nostri autem magistratus 
imperatoresque ex hac una re max imam laudem cap ere studebant, s i provincias, si socios aequitate et fide 
defendissent; itaque illud patrocinium orb is terrae verius quam imperium p oterat nominari. 
33 Verr. 1.44. 
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ofjides and demonstrated a lack of recognition-respect. Thus, the Senate had failed "to 
do right by the People's reputation" (populi Romani existimationi satisfacere). Earlier in 
the speech, Cicero uses a similar expression when relating what various honestissimi had 
told him, namely that the courts were nonexistent and that his prosecution was doomed. 
He asks his audience, "Will the judges not observe the charges, the witnesses, and the 
reputation of the Roman People (iudices non crimina, non testes, non existimationem 
l . R . )?"34 popu z omanz sequentur . 
A failure to account for what is owed to the People occasions indignation, and the 
comments of Catulus highlight the way in which the People translate that indignation into 
action. In the last chapter, we saw how the Senate's incompetence in dealing with piracy 
and the threat ofMithridates brought shame upon the Roman People in the eyes of the 
world. The resulting invidia led the People to take matters into their own hands: they 
dispensed with current practice and assigned successive commands to Pompey through 
legislation. The comments attributed to Catulus reveal a similar pattern: 
maladministration of the courts produces invidia, which in turn leads to the enactment of 
popular legislation. This is precisely why, at the beginning of the speech, Cicero 
describes the political moment as a discrimen ordinis iudiciorumque vestrorum: there are 
men prepared to stoke invidia in order to pass legislation. 35 
Invidia proves critical in motivating the People to wield their power. Consider 
Cicero's account of Pompey's speech in contione, which follows immediately that of 
34 Verr. 1.20. Cicero answers in the negative, observing that, far from respecting the People's existimatio, 
everything is directed by one man- omnia in unius potestate ac moderatione vertentur. 
35 Verr. 1.2- Nunc in ipso discrimine ordinis iudicionanque vestrorum, cum sint parati qui contionibus et 
legibus hanc invidiam senatus injlammare conentur, reus in iudicium adductus est C. Verres. 
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Catulus' in senatu.36 Shortly after his election as consul, Pompey reportedly declared in a 
contio that he would restore the power of the tribunate. According to Cicero, "a rumbling 
and a pleasant murmur" greeted the consul-elect's proposal (strepitus et grata contionis 
admurmuratio). But later in thesame speech, Pompey stirred the passions ofthe crowd 
when he related that the provinces had been plagued and lain waste, and that the courts 
had become disgraceful and infamous; he contended that he wanted to address this crime. 
At that point, the Roman People signaled its will, not with a rumbling, but with the 
greatest outcry (tum vera non strepitu, sed maximo clamore, suam populus Romanus 
significavit voluntatem). 
Behind the anecdote stands an implicit a fortiori argument: "the People have 
already restored the powers of the tribunate, even though they actually care more about 
judicial corruption. What do you think they will do if you acquit Verres?'' The People 
have not yet translated their invidia into corrective legislation. Time remains in which to 
act, and so the jury finds itself in a quandary. The situation, as presented by Cicero, 
requires them to consider popular opinion; in this way, Cicero leverages the power of the 
People in his favor. 
Cicero and the People 
Throughout the speech, Cicero aligns himself with the People while seeking to 
portray his opponents as party to the Senate's corruption. True, Cicero portrays himself 
36 Verr. 1.45. This is the only reference to Pompey in the first actio. 
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as a mediator between Senate and People in the exordium, but read in light of the rest of 
the speech, his professed neutrality is but a fac;ade: huic ego causae, iudices, cum summa 
voluntate et exspectatione populi Romani actor accessi, non ut augerem invidiam ordinis, 
sed ut infamiae communi succurrerem.37 In the late Republic, young Romans routinely 
became accusatores, launching prosecutions as a way to advance their nascent political 
careers.38 Cicero's prosecution ofVerres does not neatly fit this pattern. The orator had 
been engaged in the courts off and on for more than a decade. Having just been elected 
aedile at the age of thirty-six, he was no longer a political novice. In the speech against 
Q. Caecilius delivered during the pretrial divinatio , Cicero conceded that, because of his 
age and status, some might find his conduct improper. He answers the charge, in part, by 
arguing that his prosecution ought to be regarded as a defense of the provincials rather 
than a prosecution.39 In the Verrines themselves, however, Cicero claims to be acting not 
on behalf of the provincials but "with the fervent desire and anticipation of the Roman 
People." What is more, he avoids the politically-charged title of accusator in favor of 
the more neutral actor.40 
His identification with the People extends to the issue of corruption. During his 
recent canvass for aedile, Cicero claims that he "was opposed by a great sum of money" 
(urgebant comitia et in his ipsis oppugnabar grandi pecunia):41 Hortensius had been 
trying to corrupt potential prosecution witnesses in advance ofVerres' trial, while Verres 
37 Verr. 1.2. 
38 Alexander 2002: 7; Fantham 1997: 120-1; Mitchell1979: 147-9. Sources: Off 2.49-50; Verr. 2.3 .3. 
39 Div. Caec. 5 -quod haec quae videtur esse accusatio mea non pot ius accusatio, quam def ensio est 
existimanda. See also: Kurke 1989: 187; Bnmt 1988: 373; Div. Caec. 66-70. 
4° Frazel2009: 161; Greenidge 1901: 475n. See also: Verr. 1.32. 
4 1 Verr. 1.24-5. 
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himself had been distributing bribes to prevent Cicero's election. The People, however, 
came to Cicero's aid: 
Quod cum esset intellectum et animadversum, fecit animo libentissimo populus Romanus 
ut, cuius divitiae me de fide deducere non potuissent, ne eiusdem pecunia de honore 
deicerer. 
When this had been noticed and understood, the Roman People very enthusiastically saw 
to it that I would not be cast from my office by the money of the same man whose wealth 
had been unable to separate me from my integrity.42 
Here, a perception of malfeasance leads the People to act with a "spirit of zeal" (animo 
libentissimo ). Given the context, we should read this zealousness as a euphemism for 
invidia: the People witnessed an attempted injustice and set out to make things right. By 
refusing to be bribed, Cicero preserved his fides and satisfied his obligations to the 
community. In return, the People threw their support behind Cicero, frustrating Verres' 
designs. 
By alluding to his campaign, Cicero seems intent not only to burnish his popular 
bona fides, but also to connect the bribery that his opponents used during his campaign 
with attempts to corrupt the present court. In both cases, V erres and his associates used 
money to stymie Cicero and disrupt the proper functioning of government. Much of the 
narratio details the defendant's efforts to corrupt the judicial proceedings against him 
and, thus, to keep the courts from showing due regard for the People's existimatio. Like 
his attempt to corrupt Cicero's election with grandi pecunia, the orator alleges that the 
defendant "purchased" the extortion court with a great deal of money (redemptio est 
42 Verr. 1.25. 
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huius iudiciifacta grandi pecunia).43 But Cicero and the People thwarted his plan. 
During the empanelling of the jury, the good fortune of the Roman People (fortuna 
populi Romani) prevailed when the lots were cast; then, during the actual challenging of 
jurors, Cicero's diligence (mea diligentia) ensured that an honest jury would be seated. 
Hortensius comes in for criticism as well. As V erres' advocate, he was more than 
a mouthpiece, since he brought his reputation- his dignitas and auctoritas - to bear on 
behalf of his client.44 As consul-elect and a prominent member of the Senate, Hortensius' 
stature presented a formidable obstacle to Cicero, a mere aedile-elect. As a 
counterweight to the dignitas of Verres' patron, Cicero employs the same strategy he 
subsequently uses against Hortensius in the pro Lege Manilia: he appeals to the power of 
his own supporters - the Roman People. Hortensius' ties to prominent Sullani and his 
defense ofthe (corrupt) senatorial establishment made him an especially inviting target: 
Nunc vero, quoniam haec te omnis dominatio regnumque iudiciorum tanto opere delectat, 
et sunt homines quos libidinis infamiaeque suae neque pudeat neque taedeat, qui quasi de 
industria in odium offensionemque populi Romani irruere videantur. ... Hoc mihi sumo, 
hoc mihi deposco, quod agam in magistratu, quod agam ex eo loco, ex quo me populus 
Romanus ex Kalendis Ianuariis secum agere de re publica ac de hominibus improbis 
voluit; hoc munus aedilitatis meae populo Romano amplissimum pulcherrimumque 
polliceor. 
But now, since this whole tyrannical kingdom over the courts delights you [sc. 
Hortensius] so much and there are men who neither feel shame over nor grow weary of 
their own lust and ill-repute, who seem set on provoking the hatred and disfavor of the 
Roman People .... I take this upon myself, I make this demand of myself, that I will 
conduct myself in office, from that position where, from the first of the year, the Roman 
People wanted me to manage affairs with them regarding the Republic and wicked men; I 
offer this to the Roman People as the richest and most splendid work of my aedileship.45 
43 Verr. 1.16- Ut primum e provincia rediit, redemptio est huius iudiciifacta grandi pecunia .... 
Posteaquam reiectio iudicum facta est, quod et in sortitione istius spem fortuna populi Romani, et in 
reiiciendis iudicibus mea diligentia istorum impudentiam vicerat, renuntiata est tota condicio. 
44 Cic. Brut. 97; Off 1.122; Verr. 1.15; Thierfelder 1965: 390. 
45 Verr. 1.35-6. 
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Cicero here makes two moves. First, he diagnoses the situation, implicating Hortensius 
in the rampant senatorial corruption that has provoked the People's ire. In the main 
clause (after the ellipsis), Cicero proposes a solution: if the corruption of the courts 
allows the defendant to go free, Cicero will try him before the People after the first of the 
year. In the first part of the passage, Cicero deploys a popular commonplace of late 
Republican rhetoric. Though populares and optimates both routinely leveled the charge 
of aspiring to tyranny (dominatio or regnum) against one another, the accusation itself 
was more naturally suited to apopularis.46 To the Romans, tyranny entails an 
infringement of an essential right common to all citizens -libertas. Yet the fact that men 
of divergent political persuasions could employ the same tapas again suggests that the 
various ideologies shared a fair amount of content.47 
After accusing Hortensius of holding a dominatio regnumque over the courts, 
Cicero turns to attack those allegedly operating under the consul-elect's influence. 
Cicero describes Hortensius' subjects as provoking the hatred and displeasure (odium 
offesionemque) of the Roman People because of their indifference toward the People's 
normative expectations. Hence, he depicts them as shameless (libidinis infamiaeque suae 
neque pudeat neque taedeat). Though ordinarily virtues, their application of industria 
and conscientiousness (implied by irruo) for corrupt ends betrays their moral perversion. 
Given the failure of the courts under Hortensius to meet their obligations to the 
People, Cicero relates that the People turned to him and elected him aedile. With the 
46 Bnmt 1988: 291-2; Achard 1981: 316-23; Dunkle 1967; Hellgouarc'h 1972: 559-64; Wirszubski 1950: 
13-4. See also: Chapter 3; Verr. 2.5.174-5 . 
47 See Introduction. In his study of mass oratory, Morstein-Marx 2004: 204-40 argues that an orator had to 
employ popularis rhetoric in order to be successful in the contio. 
87 
failure of the senatorial courts, the People want Cicero to bring the matter before them, 
but the orator is vague about what exactly this means. Though secum agere de republica 
ac de hominibus improbis could mean that the People want Cicero to propose legislation 
to address corruption, it seems more likely that the reference is to a contional trial. 
Passages from the second actio support this interpretation, as does the phrasing a few 
lines later. Looking forward to his term as aedile, Cicero admits that his standing will be 
little more than an ordinary citizen, while Hortensius will have summum imperium et 
potestas;48 yet in bringing the matter before the People, Cicero insists that the consul's 
standing will seem inferior to that of an ordinary citizen "in this case" (in hac causa). 
Although the gradual institution of quaestiones perpetuae over the late second 
and early first centuries limited the People's formal role in the judicial process, the 
People did occasionally hear cases in assemblies known as iudicia populi.49 Though 
there had been several such cases prior to the Sullan reorganization of the courts, no trials 
had since been held before the People. 5° Though he probably had little intention of 
following through, Cicero effectively threatened a return to the popular trials of the 
middle Republic, a position more radically popularis than what the reformer L. Aurelius 
Cotta was then proposing. As aedile, Cicero would have been one of a number 
responsible for (among other things) temples, markets, streets, the water supply, and the 
48 Verr. 1.37 - Erit tum consul Hortensius cum summa imperio et potestate, ego autem aedilis, hoc est, 
paulo amp/ius quam privatus: tamen haec lntius modi res est grata atque iucunda, ut ipse consul in hac 
causa prae me minus etiam, si.fieri possit, quam privatus esse videatur. See also: Verr. 2.1.13-4, 5.173. 
49 Greenidge 1901: 349-59. 
50 TLRR 153 mistakenly classifies L. Quinctius' prosecution of C. Junius in 74 as taking place before the 
People. Cic. Clu. 89 (references to a quaestio) and 93 (the antithesis idem in contionibus, idem ad 
subsellia) strongly suggest that a senatorial jury actually heard the case. In the coming years, the tribune T. 
Labienus would prosecute C. Rabirius before the People in 63 (TLRR 220) and Clodius, as curule aedile, 
would prosecute Milo in 56 (TLRR 266). 
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production of spectacles. It was in the interest of an aedile to undertake extravagant 
projects; the more extravagant, the more likely the People would be to elect him to higher 
office. In contrast with Hortensius and his corrupt underlings, Cicero has no interest in 
forsaking his obligations to the People. Retrying Verres in a iudicium populi would not 
only provide the People with a spectacle, it would empower them directly by allowing 
them to participate in the judicial process. This, he claims, would constitute a munus 
aedilitatis meae populo Romano amplissimum pulcherrimumque. In a trial before the 
People, Hortensius' power as consul, his summum imperium, would amount to little more 
than that of a private citizen. 51 
Pleading in the Public Eye 
Were he to retry V erres before the People, Cicero threatens to set forth in detail 
several notorious cases of judicial corruption that have occurred over the past ten years: 
Omnia non modo commemorabuntur, sed etiam expositis certis rebus agentur, quae inter 
decem annos, posteaquam indicia ad senatum translata sunt, in rebus iudicandis nefarie 
flagitioseque facta sunt. Cognoscet ex me populus Romanus quid sit quam ob rem, cum 
equester ordo iudicaret, annos prope quinquaginta continuos in nullo, indices, equite 
Romano iudicante ne tenuissima quidem suspicio acceptae pecuniae ob rem iudicandam 
constituta sit. 
Everything that has been done heinously and disgracefully in the courts over the past ten 
years since they were transferred to the Senate will not only be recalled, but also set forth 
in detail. The Roman People will learn from me how it is that, when there were 
equestrian jurors, for a continuous period of almost fifty years, gentlemen of the jury, not 
even the slightest suspicion of bribery in exchange for a verdict fell on a single equestrian 
. 52 
JUror. 
51 Verr. 1.37- ipse consul in hac causa prae me minus etiam, sifieri pass it, quam p rivatus esse videatur. 
52 Verr. 1.37-8. 
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This passage highlights an important, though frequently overlooked, aspect of any 
public trial. Though a second prosecution of V erres would obviously have required 
Cicero to recapitulate the defendant's crimes, the passage above shows how an orator 
could use judicial proceedings to elucidate political issues for the People- cognoscet ex 
me populus Romanus. Cicero does not promise to be even handed. He threatens to 
shame the Senate by recalling in detail everything that has been done nefarie 
jlagitioseque over the past decade. The prospective iudicium populi will will be a contio, 
which Kaster calls "the formal space for creating nemesis-invidia under the 
R bl. ,53 epu 1c ... 
The question remains, however, whether Cicero intended to make good on his 
threat. The admittedly fragmentary historical evidence indicates that the People last 
heard a case some fifteen years earlier, prior to the reforms of Sulla.54 Not even the 
notorious tribune of 74- L. Quinctius- brought his case against C. Junius before the 
People. Moreover, the issue over the composition of the juries was a subject of debate at 
the time ofVerres' trial. 55 Would it remain so after the New Year or, as it happened, 
would the matter be resolved? Finally, there is the matter of the praeteritio that follows . 
In it, Cicero references eight separate cases of judicial corruption, which he pledges to 
treat thoroughly and severely before the People. 56 This seems key for understanding the 
actual purpose behind this extended "preview." On the one hand, it is a sword of 
Damacles hanging over the jury; on the other, it allows Cicero to inform the attendant 
53 Kaster 2005: 97. 
54 Greenidge 1901: 352-3, though it is unclear whether or not Cn. Papirius Carbo was actually prosecuted. 
55 Verr. 1.2; Vasaly 2009 : 106-8. 
56 Verr. 1.38-9. 
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public about the issue of corruption. In truth, Cicero probably had no intention of 
retrying the case before the People. His "preview" affords him an opportunity to engage 
in political self-fashioning, to elucidate a political issue for the general public, and 
thereby rouse popular invidia against the jury. In other words, Cicero managed to 
transform the present court into a kind of contio. Indeed, several times in the speech, the 
orator refers to the populus Romanus as being in attendance at judicial proceedings. 
There, he frequently portrays them as learning about political issues and the actors 
engaged in the trial. 
But how could an orator construe this kind of crowd as representing the entire 
body politic? Just as it would have been impossible for the entire populus Romanus to 
attend a trial, so it was inconceivable for the entire body politic to gather in an 
assembly. 57 Obvious practicalities prevented the true populus Romanus from ever being 
fully realized in the Forum. Though orators would address the assembled crowds as the 
populus Romanus, and all who were involved recognized the legitimacy of the 
resolutions they adopted in an assembly, there remained a gap between reality and 
ideology. Practicality and the need for legitimacy required this discrepancy be 
overlooked so that, in the eyes of the community, the contional and especially the 
comitial crowds stood for the entire Romanpopulus.58 
This discrepancy between the manifest populus and its abstract counterpart 
57 Only a small percentage of those who were eligible regularly attended comitiae and contiones -
Mouritsen 2001: 32-7, 63. 
58 Drawing on the work of Althusser, Morstein-Marx points out that speech in the form of discourse played 
an important role in constituting or "interpellating" the populus Romanus. Orators hailed the contional 
crowd as the populus, an illocutionary act orienting those in the crowd vis-a-vis the ideology and 
institutions of the Republic. Morstein-Marx 2004: 14-5, 41-2. See also: Austin 1975: esp. 117-20; 
Althusser 1971: esp. 162-3. 
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allowed orators to apply the title populus Romanus to whatever crowd they wished, 
including those attending public trials in the Forum. 59 Unlike modem courtrooms located 
in secure government buildings, the law courts at Rome took place outdoors at the foot of 
what was usually a temporary platform- the tribunal- in the open space of the Forum. It 
says something about the Roman ideology of the courts that, even after Sulla had limited 
the use of comitial trials, the quaestiones perpetuae were carried out amid the din of the 
public square where anyone could watch.60 The late Republican Forum served as the 
center of legislative, judicial, economic, religious, and cultural life in the ancient city: it 
was public land, and everyone enjoyed access.61 In addition to trials, it was the scene of 
triumphal processions, gladiatorial games, theatrical performances, comitiae and 
contiones, funeral banquets and orations, religious rituals as well as the more mundane 
economic activities associated with the shops flanking the open square and lining the 
approaching streets. The flurry of activity inevitably attracted bystanders, who formed a 
ready audience for whatever happened to be taking place. 62 
Aside from commercial activity, judicial proceedings must have been a common 
sight in the Forum. Though several courts might have occupied the entire Forum at any 
given time, the literary evidence suggests that the eastern end of the Forum served as the 
main setting for the iudicia publica, an area extending roughly from the Tabernae Veteres 
and the Temple of Castor and Pollux northeastward toward the Tabernae Novae and the 
59 Corona as populus: Cael. 47; Deiot. 6; Verr. 2.1.158; David 1992:472,474. 
60 See also : Bablitz 2007 : 13; Millar 1998: 70-4, 88-91, and esp. 45 - "[an] ideology of publicity ... 
pervaded every aspect ofRoman communal life." 
6 1 LTUR 2.325-36, esp. 326-8 (Purcell); Millar 1998 : 38-45. 
62 On crowding and the Forum crowd, including the plebs contionalis, turbaforensis: Cic. Flac. 66; de 
Orat. 1.118; Com. Pet. 29; Hor. Epist. 1.6.59; Liv. 9.46.10-5; Quint. Ins!. 12.10.74; Mouritsen 2001 : 43-5; 
Vanderbroeck 1987: 86-90; Meier 1966: 114-5. 
92 
Basilica Aemilia.63 The extortion court, in which Verres was tried, seems to have met 
routinely near the Temple of Castor and Pollux.64 
Given the paucity of archaeological evidence, reconstructing the layout of the 
courts presents a challenge. That said, the arrangement of the quaestio probably 
remained unchanged through the early Imperial Period, thus allowing us to draw on the 
visual and literary evidence from the Empire to get an idea of what the late Republican 
iudicia publica looked like.65 Their most conspicuous feature would have been the 
tribunal- the raised platform about a meter in height on which the presiding magistrate 
sat, attended by a number of assistants. Immediately in front of the tribunal stood rows of 
benches (subsellia) where frequently more than forty judges sat, facing outward with 
their backs toward the tribunal. In front of them was an open area several feet wide 
where the orator would stand, an area flanked on the left and right by rows of benches. 
On one side sat the defendant and his advocates in the front row; the prosecutor sat in the 
front row on the opposite side, an arrangement not unlike the Roman Senate or the British 
House of Commons. Witnesses, assistants, family members, and other interested parties 
occupied the remaining benches on the appropriate side. 
Onlookers unaffiliated with either side of the case routinely stood in a circle 
surrounding the proceedings, a gathering known as a corona.66 When Cicero refers in the 
63 Bablitz 2007: 14-6,21-2, 27-9; Millar 1998: 41-2; David 1992: 40-5; Coarelli 1983-5:2.176-80, 190-9; 
Richardson 1973 . 
64 This was also the site of contiones and comitiae. On the location of the quaestio de repetundis: David 
1992: 40n. 138, 44-5 ; Coarelli 1983-5: 2.178-9; contra Richardson 1973: 225-7. Sources: Cic. Flac. 66; 
Scaur. 46; Verr. 2.1.154; Val. Max. 9.12.7. 
65 Bablitz 2007: 52-8 . See also: David 1992: 466-9, 482-5. 
66 Sources: TLL 4.986.20-56, esp. Cic. Bntt. 192,289, 290; Fin. 2.74; Flac. 69; Mil. 1; Nat. D. 2.1 ; Tusc. 
1.10; Lactant. Div. Jnst. 4.26.21; Plin. Ep. 2.14.6; 6.33.3; 7.17.9; Sen. Controv. 9.4.18; Val. Max. 8.10.2. 
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passage above to homines observant, he almost certainly has these men in mind. Tacitus 
refers to the crowd that regularly attended trials as a vagus auditor, suggesting that it 
wandered the Forum in search of a speaker or case to entertain it.67 The trial ofVerres, 
which among others featured Rome's leading orator and consul-elect- Q. Hortensius -
evidently drew an exceptionally large crowd.68 The fact that a census and various 
spectacles were occurring at or around the same time undoubtedly contributed to the 
large numbers in attendance. While some in the crowd might have sat in an empty seat 
on one of the backbenches, the vast majority stood and, because of the high level of 
interest in the case, the circle was probably several rows deep. Additional vantage points 
included the steps and podia of nearby temples and especially the maeniana - balconies 
located over the shops on the either side of the Forum.69 
For the Roman People, the courts served as a source of political information and, 
therefore, a source of political power. The information was not unfiltered, since orators 
shaped the information that the People received. For example, Cicero claims that a 
remark that he made during the challenging of the jurors profoundly moved the Roman 
People (intellexi vehementer populum Romanum commoveri):70 be said that he believed 
that provincials would eventually ask the Roman People to abolish the extortion court so 
that corrupt officials would carry off only what they wanted for themselves rather than 
67 Tac. Dial. 20.3 - vulgus quoque adsistentium et adjluens et vagus auditor ... For the courts as a source of 
entertainment: Plaut. Poen. 583-7; Bablitz 2007 : 120; Miller 1993: 130. 
68 Vasaly 2009 : 108-10. Sources: Verr. 1.4, 15, 54, 2.5.144. 
69 Describing the death of C. Licinius Macer in 66, Valerius Maximus relates that the disgraced tribtme 
mounted a balcony and, before committing suicide, saw the praetor of the extortion court - Cicero -
removing his robe while the judges deliberated below. Even if spectators on the balconies could not hear 
everything, this anecdote suggests that they could at least observe what was going on. Sources: Cic. Acad. 
2.70; Festus 120L; Val. Max. 9.12.7; Vitruv. 5.1.1-2. 
70 Verr. 1.41. 
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the additional money they needed to bribe a jury. During the same preliminary phase of 
the trial, Cicero relates that the Roman People "judged" (populus Romanus in reiectione 
iudicum iudicavit) that Verres' had put all ofhis hope in money.71 When a combination 
of Cicero's diligence and the good fortune of the Roman People succeeded in obtaining 
an honest jury, Verres seemed like a condemned man, not only to the Roman People, but 
to himself as well (non modo populo Romano, sed etiam sibi ipse, condemnatus 
·..J ) 72 vzueretur. 
In his presentation, Cicero declares that he will reveal the defendant's 
malfeasance to the People. V erres had largely perpetrated his crimes outside the public 
eye. Since the real or imagined gaze of the honor group affects shame, the defendant had 
yet to receive his full measure. At the beginning ofthe frrst actio, Cicero pledges to set 
things right: the orator boasts that he is clearly so well prepared that he will portray the 
defendant's thefts and abominations (suafitrta atqueflagitia), not only to the ears ofthe 
jurors, but also to the eyes of all (in oculis omnium).73 By vividly depicting Verres' furta 
atque flagitia, Cicero brings to light what had previously escaped notice. This would 
provoke invidia on the part of the People, enabling them to exercise their moral power 
against Verres through social censure.74 He reiterates his pledge in the peroratio, saying 
that he will expose the crime in such a way that all of the plans ofVerres and his 
associates will seem to be present before not only the ears of men, but also the eyes of the 
71 Verr. 1.10 - Unum illud intellego, quod populus Romanus in reiectione iudicum iudicavit, ea spe is tum 
fitisse praeditum ut omnem ration em salutis in pecunia constitueret. 
72 Verr. 1.1 7. 
73 Verr. 1.7 -lntellegit me ita paratum atque instructum in iudicium venire ut non modo in auribus vestris, 
sed in oculis omnium, sua jitrta at que jlagitia dejixurus sim. 
74 On shaming rituals, see Kaster 2005: 96-7. 
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Roman People (non modo aures hominum, sed etiam oculi populi Romani).75 
At the same time, the trial presents an opportunity for Cicero to engage in self-
fashioning, specifically to show his devotion to the Roman People. After initially 
agreeing to take the case, Cicero claims to have been motivated by his own invidia 
stemming from the attempts ofVerres and Hortensius, first to undermine his candidacy 
and then to prolong the trial beyond the New Year. But once he began to prepare, he set 
a greater goal for himself: as he contended against Hortensius and his intolerabilis 
potentia over the courts, he desired that the Roman People be able to perceive his 
goodwill toward the Republic (in quo meam in rem publicam voluntatem populus 
Romanus perspicere posset).76 The change in Cicero's motivation reflects an apparent 
shift in perspective about the source of his invidia. Whereas Cicero was previously 
indignant because of what Verres and Hortensius had done to him personally, he now 
suggests that the consul-elect's intolerabilis potentia over the courts serves as the primary 
source of his indignation.77 He de-personalizes the incidents, and at the same time, 
politicizes it so that Hortensius' corruption represents an offense not just against himself, 
but the entire community. Having framed the actions taken by Hortensius in political 
terms, Cicero aligns himself with the People and casts his own performance as conducted 
on their behalf. Thus in the peroratio, Cicero makes a pledge to both the jury and the 
Roman People (hoc vobis, hoc populo Romano, iudices confirmo): if corruption exists in 
the present court, he would sooner lose his life than his drive to punish those who 
75 Verr. 1.48- ita res a me agetur ut in eorum consiliis omnibus non modo aures hominum, sed etiam oculi 
populi Romani interesse videantur. 
76 Verr. 1.34-5. 
77 A difference between invidia that is conceived self-referentially versus that which is conceived 
impersonally, on behalf of a general societal principle. Kaster 2005: 87, 89-90. 
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initiated it.78 
While the People stand to learn from and about the protagonists in the present 
trial, Cicero uses the peroratio to remind the jury that the People are also watching them: 
Nunc autem homines in speculis sunt; observant quem ad modum sese unus quisque 
vestrum gerat in retinenda religione conservandisque legibus. 
Now, however, men are on watch; they are observing to what extent each one of you will 
maintain your self-restraint and uphold the laws in your conduct.79 
Cicero imagines the public evaluating the jury, paying particular attention to how each 
conducts himself in relation to his normative and legal obligations. Though religio 
usually refers to public communal behavior toward the gods, it applies in a more general 
sense to what is right and proper. 80 It is related to shame, both in a general sense because 
it is a product of socialization and, more specifically, because the failure to observe 
religio incurs shame. As such, it reflects the group's power over the individual. The 
community ideally socializes its members such that they regulate themselves 
automatically. In the fmal antithesis, Cicero distinguishes the observance of norms 
(religio) from that oflaws (leges), which enforce compliance through punishment or its 
prospect. In instances where socialization is ineffective, the laws assign penalties to 
those who break them, while deterring those who might otherwise violate them. In both 
cases, the populus as the honor group defines the moral basis for religio and lex. It is 
fitting, therefore, that Cicero portrays unnamed homines as watching the proceedings. 
78 Verr. 1.50- deinde, si plures improbi.fiterint, hoc vobis, hoc populo Romano, iudices, confirmo, vitam 
mehercule mihi prius quam vim perseverantiamque ad illorum improbitatem persequendam defitturam. 
79 Verr. 1.46. Seealso: 2.5.175. 
80 OLD s.v. 1, 2; Beard et al. 1998: 1.216; Vasaly 1993: 197. 
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The orator later clarifies who these homines are, saying a few lines later: populus 
Rornanus de vobis iudicabit. The People are on watch, and the fact that they are in 
speculis- watchtowers- alludes to the important role of surveillance in their exercise of 
power. 
Consider also the following excerpt from the second actio. In it, Cicero seeks to 
contrast the nature of his tenure in Sicily with that of the defendant. In the lines 
immediately preceding the passage, the orator describes how Verres betrayed his oath 
and routinely returned to the city in a litter after nightfall in order to carry on an affair 
with a married woman, contra ornnes divinas atque hurnanas religiones:81 
Ita mihi meam voluntatem spemque reliquae vitae vestra populique Romani existimatio 
comprobet, ut ego, quos adhuc mihi magistratus populus Romanus mandavit, sic eos 
accepi ut me omnium officiorum obstringi religione arbitrarer. Ita quaestor sum factus ut 
mihi ilium honorem tum non solum datum sed etiam creditum et commissum putarem; 
sic obtinui quaesturam in Sicilia provincia ut omnium oculos in me unum coniectos esse 
arbitrarer, ut me quaesturamque meam quasi in aliquo terrarum orbis theatro versari 
existimarem ut semper omnia quae iucunda videntur esse, ea non modo his 
extraordinariis cupitatibus sed etiam ipsi naturae ac necessitati denegarem. 
May your estimation and that of the Roman People confirm my ambition and desire for 
the future, in so far as I undertook the magistracies, one of which the Roman People even 
now have entrusted to me, in such a way that I judged myselfbound by the strict 
observance of all my duties. When I was elected quaestor, I supposed that the office was 
not only given to me, but also committed and entrusted to me. I carried out my duties as 
quaestor in Sicily in such a way that I judged the eyes of everyone to be cast upon me 
alone; I regarded myself and my office as things to be conducted as if in some theater 
with the whole world watching, so that I always renounced everything that seemed 
pleasing, not only to abnormal desires, but also to those inevitable desires that are from 
nature herself.82 
In this idealized self-portrayal, Cicero attributes a coercive power to the People's sight. 
81 Verr. 2.5.34 - noctu stupri causa lectica in urbem introferri solitus est ad mulierem nuptam uni, 
f:ropositam omnibus, contrafas, contra auspicia, contra omnes divinas atque humanas religiones. 
2 Verr. 2.5.35 
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As we have already seen in the ideology of the Republic, the legitimate exercise of 
political power required a magistrate to adhere to popular morality. Thus, Cicero justifies 
his political ambition, not by citing his accomplishments, but by outlining the political 
ideology to which he has devoted himself. He describes his magistracy as entrusted to 
him by the People (non solum datum sed etiam creditum et commissum); ever faithful, he 
maintains that he is bound by the strict observance of all his duties (me omnium 
officiorum obstringi religione arbitrarer). Because it falls outside the realm oflaw, the 
"strict observance" of norms - religio - requires a combination of social pressure and 
self-regulation to be effective. 
In the passage, Cicero attributes his remarkable self-restraint to the imagined gaze 
of the honor group (omnium oculos in me unum coniectos), which he compares to an 
audience in the theater (quasi in aliquo terrarum orbis theatro). He depicts the honor 
group as comprised of the entire world rather than just the Roman People, implying that 
the values are universal and that all would approve of his performance. The balance of 
power resides with the audience. In his classic study of the penal system in the West, 
Michel Foucault describes a similar kind of power that serves to regulate the behavior of 
inmates housed in a Panopticon- a prison developed in the nineteenth century by Jeremy 
Bentham. The prison's design enabled a limited number of guards, located in a tower at 
the center of a circular courtyard, to observe a host of prisoners, each of whom occupied 
a single cell opening onto the central courtyard. Foucault reasoned that observation 
itself, or more specifically its potential at any moment, had a controlling effect on the 
resident population: 
99 
Hence the major effect ofthe Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things 
that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; 
that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary . . . 83 
Foucault here distinguishes between a kind of induced self-regulation and the actual 
exercise of power. Within the context of Cicero's theater, it is the difference between 
acting in anticipation of receiving applause or criticism and actually receiving applause or 
criticism. When speaking of republican morality, it is the difference between the 
prospect of receiving shame and actually being shamed or, more precisely, between 
having a sense of shame and actually being in a state of shame. The former prevents the 
latter, since having a sense of shame assumes that the individual has internalized the 
collective moral standard. 84 
The relationship between magistrate and public approximate that of the 
Panopticon but in reverse. In both situations, the potential gaze of those in authority 
exerts a regulatory effect on behavior. But unlike the Panopticon where the few monitor 
the many, Cicero portrays political activity as conducted by a few under the gaze of the 
many. What is more, the surveilling gaze of the Panopticon is inherently punitive in that 
it only instills in its subjects a fear of further punishment. For Cicero, the public's gaze 
offers the potential of censure for misconduct, but also honor for good performance. 
Since the public gaze serves as the means by which the People evaluate their leaders, its 
presence - wherever the People are gathered - has a coercive effect. While Cicero claims 
to have been restrained by the imagined gaze of the world, V erres conducts himself 
83 Foucault 1977: 201. 
84 See Chapter 1 and also: Kaster 2005 : 56; Miller 1993: 146, 178; Taylor 1985: 57. 
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shamelessly: he carries on his affair contra omnes divinas atque humanas religiones, in 
the dark when no one can see him. 
It is, therefore, hard to overstate the importance of public trials in the late 
Republic. Though the creation of the quaestiones perpetuae had effectively done away 
with the People's formal role in the courts, their gaze and (as we will see in the next 
chapter) their presence influenced the proceedings. By calling attention to homines in 
speculis, Cicero seeks to foster the jurors' collective sense of shame, the capacity of each 
to see himselfbeing seen through the eyes of the honor group.85 For Cicero, an acute 
sense of shame on the part of the jury will ensure a conviction, while preventing the court 
from further becoming an object of invidia. This, in turn, will lessen the likelihood of 
corrective legislation being enacted, transferring the courts from the Senate's exclusive 
control to a system of joint control with the equites. 
At the same time, those hearing the case have an opportunity to redeem 
themselves in the eyes of the People. Toward the end ofthe speech, Cicero addresses the 
praetor- Manius Glabrio. He exhorts the magistrate to be a champion of justice and 
integrity and of the Senate, so that the Roman People will perceive (intelleget populus 
Romanus) that when a praetor of the utmost integrity and virtue presides over a court of 
select judges, the guilty will fmd that his money has tended to confirm suspicion of his 
guilt rather than belief of his innocence.86 In one sense, the reference to the populus 
Romanus is superfluous. Directly addressing the praetor, Cicero could have exhorted the 
85 Kaster 2005: 56. On sight and the construction of shame: Cairns 1993: 16-8; Williams 1993: 78-82; 
Taylor 53, 58-67 (w. J.-P. Sartre. Being and Nothingness 3.1.1). 
86 Verr. 1.52 - intelleget populus Romanus integerrimo atque honestissimo praetore delectoque consilio 
nocenti reo magnitudinem pecuniae plus habuisse momenti ad suspicionem criminis quam ad rationem 
salutis. 
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magistrate to pursue justice so that those who are guilty would be convicted, regardless of 
their wealth. But the orator elects to relate his admonition to the Roman People - the 
ultimate source of political and moral authority at Rome. As a result, it orients the 
praetor vis-a-vis the People, forcing him to see the situation through the lens of the honor 
group. 
A little later on, Cicero employs the same tactic when he alludes to the potential 
political impact of the trial on himself and the jury: 
Huius iudicii et laudis fructum et offensionis periculum vestrum, laborem 
solicitudinemque nostram, scientiam quid agatur, memoriamque quid a quoque dictum 
sit, omnium puto esse oportere. 
I believe in this trial that both the benefit of praise and the danger of offense on your part, 
the labor and anxiety on my part, the knowledge of what transpires, and the memory of 
what will be said by each should be shared by all. 87 
This highly wrought sentence contains two pairs of antitheses, followed by the governing 
verb and its complements. Given its structure, there is a natural emphasis on the final 
thought: everyone ought to know what is about to transpire. Despite the formal balance 
of the initial antithesis, the initial clause (with an internal balance of its own- et laudis 
fructum et offensionis periculum) also calls for attention, if only because of its placement 
at the beginning ofthe sentence. With the focus of the second clause on Cicero, the 
opening phrase focuses on the jury and, specifically, the potential implications for 
rendering one verdict or the other. The jury has the potential to earn either praise (taus)-
which contributes to dignitas- or offense (offensio)- which calls for shame. But the fact 
87 Verr. 1.54. 
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that these alternatives are in the genitive suggests that they are not the ends the orator has 
in mind. Laus and offensio produce benefits (fructus) and danger (periculum), 
respectively. In other words, Cicero has in mind the actual, political repercussions- the 
fructus of the courts remaining in senatorial hands or the periculum of a change in the 
political order. Cicero, too, stands to gain from the performance. Employing the rhetoric 
of a novus homo, he anticipates that his laborem sollicitudinemque will allow him to 
make a name for himself. 88 
But these outcomes are predicated on public knowledge, the subject of the second 
antithesis and the conclusion. It necessarily involves the People. Cicero views the trial 
as a form of civic education that everyone ought to have (omnium puto esse oportere). 
What is done and said in the course of the trial forms the content (scientiam quid agatur 
memoriamque quid a quoque dictum sit). The fact that knowledge ought to be shared by 
everyone means that it is not just for an occasion, but something to be remembered and 
conveyed to others. If it is committed to public memoria, as Cicero hopes, the offensio or 
laus and the orator's labor sollicitudoque will have a lasting impact. Coming at the end 
of the speech, this serves as a reminder to the jury that the trial is not taking place in a 
vacuum but in view of the Roman People. 
88 On rhetoric ofnovi homines: Dugan 2005: 6-13 ; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 476-8; Earll967: 44-6; Wiseman 
1971 : 1 09-11. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Violence in Defense of Liberty 
in Verrem Actio Secunda (70 B.C.)- pro Cornelio Actio Prima (65 B.C.) 
Previously, we saw how Cicero used the specter of public condemnation in the 
first actio of the Verrines to press the jury into delivering a conviction. With the 
community looking on, he employed contionalizing rhetoric to bring the weight of public 
opinion to bear upon the jury. He stirred the emotions and shaped the perceptions of the 
corona, while at the same time, claiming that the senatorial class, of which the jurors 
were a part, would forfeit its prestige and political power if they elected to acquit the 
defendant. At two points during the first actio, Cicero's case seemed to threaten not only 
the moral and political standing of the senatorial order, but public order in general. On at 
least two occasions, testimony alleging that V erres had murdered innocent Roman 
citizens nearly sparked a riot among those in attendance. The present chapter will begin 
with Cicero's account of these near-riots before moving on to consider the pro Cornelio. 
In both speeches, we will see how popular violence or its prospect occurs when a member 
of the governing class infringes upon the rights of the People. 
Definition 
Overall, modem scholarship has taken an expansive view of violence. Since the 
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nineteenth century, Marxists have spoken ofviolence as systemic (or "objective"), in that 
it includes "not only direct physical violence, but also the more subtle forms of coercion 
that sustains relations of domination and exploitation, including the threat ofviolence."1 
In this way, Pierre Bourdieu famously (and incoherently) attacked the violence of the 
capitalist system for its so-called violence of exchange, which allows one to dominate 
another through "gifts or debts, the overtly economic obligations of debt, or the 'moral,' 
'affective' obligations created and maintained by exchange, in short, overt (physical or 
economic) violence, or symbolic violence- censored, euphemized, i.e. unrecognizable, 
socially recognized violence."2 Growing out of the Marxist tradition, the study of 
discourse has identified a rhetorical form of violence, whereby the failure to name and 
classify a certain behavior as "violent" (e.g. spousal abuse) perpetuates said violence.3 
Others have framed rhetorical violence "as taking sides, political partisanship" such that 
even Gandhi in his otherwise peaceful struggle against British colonialism stands 
accused.4 
The Marxist tradition of scholarship has left us with a conception of violence that 
conflates figurative with actual violence, though there is little reason to think that Marx 
himself thought of violence as anything other than the use of physical force to inflict 
injury, cause damage, or interfere with the freedom of another.5 Since the Romans 
1 Zizek 2008: 9. 
2 Bourdieu 1977: 191. 
3 de Lauretis 1987: 31-50. 
4 Lawrence and Karim 2007: 5, 8. 
5 Marx 1976: 1.896-904, 914-26. OED s.v. 1a. "The exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or 
cause damage to, persons or property; action or conduct characterized by this; treatment or usage tending to 
cause bodily injury or forcibly interfe1ing with personal freedom." 
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themselves defined violence (vis) literally,6 I have elected to define collective violence as 
the exercise of physical force by a crowd with the intent or result of causing personal 
injury, property damage, or interfering in the freedom of another. Thus, violence remains 
semantically distinct from related concepts of (non-physical) coercion, intimidation, 
power, strength, force (broadly understood), and authority.7 
In Verrem Actio Secunda 
At two points in the final speech of the second actio, Cicero revisits testimony 
delivered in the first actio, alleging the judicial murder of Roman citizens.8 In both cases, 
Cicero relates that the People (that is, the corona) attending the first part of the trial 
became outraged, though they refrained from taking matters into their own hands. 
Despite the shouts and groans issuing from the crowd, no violence actually took place, 
though the orator insists that it easily could have.9 In both cases, Cicero refers to the 
prospect of collective violence rather than actual violence, an important distinction to 
which we shall return. 
The second actio of the Verrines is a work of fiction. During the first phase of the 
trial, the jurors heard at least thirty hours of testimony, much of it coming from the 
6 Though they did understand that violence could have a metaphorical sense, they defined it quite narrowly 
in a legal sense: Riggsby 1999: 79-84, 112-3 . 
7 Vanderbroeck 1987: 148, 152 takes a more expansive view of collective violence, one that includes 
"threats" and "physical intimidation." For a general, though problematic, attempt to distinguish violence 
from several related terms, see Arendt 1970: 35-56. 
8 Verr. 2.5.74, 143-4, 162-5 . 
9 Verr. 2.5 .74- fi t gemitus et clamor omnium; 2.5.165 - Quid enim nuper tu ipse, cum populi Romani 
clamore at que impetu p erturbatus exsiluisti .. . ? 
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Sicilians themselves. The parade of witnesses apparently overwhelmed the defendant, so 
that he feigned illness and went into exile before the proceedings could come to a formal 
conclusion. 10 Though Cicero later spoke during the litis aestimatio at which damages 
were assessed, 11 he never actually delivered the five speeches of the second actio as 
presented. V erres' flight made them unnecessary. Leaving aside the issue of whether or 
not the five speeches could have been delivered as written,12 the matter of Cicero's 
motivation for publishing the orations as if they had persists, since it is a question that 
ultimately goes to their interpretation. In particular, what did Cicero hope to achieve by 
referring to the near-riots that broke out during the first phase of the trial? 
As was said earlier, the primary motivation for publishing a forensic speech must 
have been self-promotion, to advertise political views and associations and to showcase 
one's skill as an orator. Additionally, in the case of the Verrines, the publication of the 
speeches might have been intended as a way to minimize the political risks associated 
with being a prosecutor- an accusator. Though prosecuting a high-profile case could 
entail rewards, it also involved certain risks. For example, if an accusation seemed either 
frivolous or lacking an adequate basis, the prosecutor could be accused of calumnia. 13 
Whether or not a charge was justified, a prosecutor inevitably made an enemy of the 
accused, thus alienating a possible source of political support and potentially setting off a 
feud. 14 Verres not only had friends in high places, but the fact that he fled before all of 
10 Lintott 2007: 11-13 . 
11 Plut. Cic. 8.1; Lintott 2008: 16. 
12 Lintott 2008: 15-32, has adopted a more skeptical view, that taken earlier by Humbert 1925. Vasaly 
2002: 92 follows in the more credulous tradition of Stroh 1975. 
13 Alexander 2002: 2, 7. 
14 Brunt 1988: 372-6. 
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the evidence could be presented left Cicero open to the charge ofhaving driven an 
innocent man into exile.15 By reminding his readers of the near-riots sparked by reports 
of the defendant's crimes against citizens, the crowd's reaction serves to confirm the 
actual verdict, reassuring Cicero's readers of the justice of the outcome. Still, Cicero 
risked appearing as a demagogue. When referring to the instances of near-violence, the 
orator needed to be sure that the audience would see the primary cause of popular unrest 
as the heinousness of V erres' crimes rather than his own inflammatory rhetoric. 
Cicero's references to the near-riots that took place during the first actio are 
concentrated in the fmal speech of the second actio. According to the orator, the charge 
that the defendant had violated the rights of Roman citizens in each case triggered the 
crowd's reaction. By beating and executing citizens without due process, the governor 
had violated their libertas, the quality that distinguished them from slaves. 16 Libertas 
was integral to the Roman conception of citizenship, and the fact that it was ideologically 
antithetical to magisterial imperium made it a mainstay of popularis rhetoric. 17 Given the 
heinousness of the crime, it comes as no surprise that such cases should have excited the 
passions of the crowd. Their emotional potential also explains why Cicero frames the 
second actio with references to these crimes. Indeed, they are the first crimes mentioned 
explicitly by Cicero in the first speech and the final crime to which he refers before the 
peroratio in the fifth. 18 In both speeches, the specter of popular violence attends their 
15 Vasaly 2002: 98-99, who argues that the evidence in the first actio was overwhelming. See also: Chapter 
4 and esp. Cat. 1.22-3, where Cicero fears a similar backlash with respect to Catiline. 
16 Brunt 1988: esp. 283; Nicolet 1980: 320-3; Wirszubski 1950: 7-14. 
17 Morstein-Marx 2004: 51-7, 84; Brunt 1988: 330-4; Meier 1965: 598; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 542-65; 
Wirszubski 1950: 16, 66. 
18 Verr. 2.1.7-13; 5.139-71. 
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treatment. 
At the beginning of the first speech, Cicero sets the fictive stage for the second 
actio, claiming that the defendant has unexpectedly appeared in court. His reference to 
the popular belief that Verres would not appear because of the strength of the 
prosecution's case playfully alludes to what actually transpired. 19 As he does at the 
beginning of the first actio, the orator then pivots to the political implications of the case 
before declaring that the defendant's evil deeds- specifically his fear of retribution-
have driven him mad, causing him to appear in court rather than flee into exile?0 The 
execution of Roman citizens heads this list of crimes; at the conclusion ofhis treatment 
ofVerres' insanity, the orator calls the defendant not just "a murderer, but the cruelest 
butcher of citizens and subjects."21 That the murder of Roman citizens frames the 
orator's treatment ofVerres' insanity just as it does the entirety of the second actio points 
to the emotional (and hence, rhetorical) potential surrounding the charge. 
At this point, Cicero returns to the juridical-political situation and, in the process, 
makes the first in a series of what are, at times, oblique references to collective violence. 
Should the jury acquit V erres, the orator asks "who cannot see that that man cannot 
possibly be wrenched free from the hands of the Roman People?" (Nam quis hoc non 
19 Verr. 2.1.1-2. 
20 Verr. 2.1 .6 - Multa enim et in deos et in homines impie nefarieque commisit, quorum scelerum poenis 
agitatur eta mente consilioque deducitur. 
21 Verr. 2.1.7-9. The passage consists of three series listing Verres' crimes. The first begins with the 
charge of executing Roman citizens- Agunt eum praecipitem poenae civium Romano rum, quos par tim 
securi percuss it, partim in vinculis necavit, partim implorantes iura libertatis et civitatis in crucem sustulit 
- before alleging that the defendant charged parents to bury their children and that he violated shrines (§7). 
The second series refers to his theft, the violation of shrines, and finally the tmture and murder of Roman 
citizens (§8). After calling him a thief, an adulterer, and a profaner, Cicero concludes the third series 
calling Verres a crudelissimum carnificem civium sociorumque (§9). In each series, Cicero gives the 
charge of murdering Roman citizens a prominent place. 
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intellegit istum ... ex manibus populi Romani eripi nullo modo posse?) On the surface, 
Cicero appears to refer to the pledge, made in the first actio and reiterated in the second, 
that if he is unable to secure a conviction, he will retry the defendant before the People.22 
Still, the imagery conveyed by manus populi Romani and eripio suggests the prospective 
trial will be a kind of lynching_23 
This assumes the People will not preempt the judicial process and take matters 
into their own hands. If the current jury has the stomach to oppose the determined will of 
the Roman People, Cicero promises to find a new panel of jurors in another court, ifthe 
defendant can be brought to court alive (si istum vivum ad aliud iudicium perducere 
poterimus).24 Failing that, the orator pledges to try the case again before a third 
senatorial court - the quaestio de maiestate - where he will again relate the matter of the 
pirate captains. Cicero warns the defendant to recall, "that during the previous actio, he 
[ sc. V erres] was frantic on account of the aggressive and hostile uproar from the Roman 
People" (meminerit se priOJ'e actione clamore populi Romani infesto atque inimico 
excitatum).25 If that senatorial jury should likewise acquit him, Cicero declares that he 
will take the matter directly to the People. Though Verres may use violence to disrupt 
the senatorial courts, the bonds that restrain him will be tighter before the Roman People 
22 Verr. 2.1.9. See also: 1.36-40, 2.1.13-4, 5.173. 
23 Nippel1995: 44 notes that "to tear apart with hands" (discerpere manibus) is a common way to describe 
a lynching. Examples: Curt. 6.11 .8- clamantibus discerpendum esse parricidam manibus eorum; Liv. 
1.16.4- discerptum regem patrum manibus, 39.13.5 - manibus suis discerpturi essen!, 45.38.2- eum non 
isdem manibus discerpitis quibus Macedonas vicistis; Val. Max. 9.9.1- Cinna ... populi manibus discerptus 
est. 
24 Verr. 2.1.10-1 - Tantae populi Romani voluntati restitisse? Sustineat: reperiemus, si istum vivum ad 
aliud iudicium perdu cere poterimus .. . 
25 Verr. 2.1.12. 
110 
(artioribus apud populum Romanum laqueis tenebitur).26 
Beginning with the Conflict of the Orders and concluding with the establishment 
of the quaestiones perpetuae, a citizen could appeal a magistrate's treatment or verdict in 
a capital case to a popular assembly - a iudicium populi. Such an assembly served as a 
remedy to the arbitrary, heavy-handed treatment of a magistrate toward an ordinary 
citizen.27 It obtained as a safeguard of libertas as Cicero himself claims in the passage_28 
After Sulla' s reorganization of the courts, the People continued to hear cases on occasion 
in assemblies known as iudicia populi, but henceforth, the defendants were almost 
exclusively magistrates charged with infringing upon the rights of citizens.29 His threat 
to retry the defendant before the People prompts the orator to recount V erres' crimes 
against Roman citizens. Beyond the summary treatment given here,3° Cicero does not 
detail the allegations fully until the fifth and final speech of the second actio, and it is in 
the course of his treatment there that Cicero mentions the violence that nearly erupted 
during the first phase of the trial. 
That the audience threatened violence upon hearing of V erres' abuse of citizens is 
not coincidental, since traditionally, collective violence served as the remedy for 
magisterial abuse. Like other pre-modem societies, the early Romans generally left it to 
victims and their families to administer justice and prevent injustice through self-help. A 
26 Verr. 2.1.12-3 . In the singular, laqueus commonly denotes a "noose," and so it may be that Cicero is 
trading on the ambiguity of the word in order to portray the trial as a kind of lynching. 
27 Lintott 1999: 155-7; 1972: 238-46; Cic. Rep . 2.54, Leg. 3.11. 
28 Verr. 2.1.12-3 - proficiscar eo quo me iampridem vocat populus Romanus; de iure enim libertatis et 
civitatis suum putat esse iudicium, et recte putat. 
29 Greenidge 1901: 353-9, 518-9. Other noteworthy iudicia include the case of C. Rabirius in 63 (TLRR 
220) and Clodius' prosecution of Milo in 56 (TLRR 266). Antonius' proposal in 44 to allow those 
convicted in certain quaestiones to appeal to the People suggests that the issue of the People' s role in the 
courts was not fully resolved until the Principate. Cic. Phil. 1.21. 
30 Verr. 2.1.13-4. Cicero revisits these episodes in detail at 2.5 .73-4, 147, 155-6, 162-3. 
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common tactic was to enlist aid from the broader community. Individuals who were 
being attacked or otherwise wronged in some way would "call forth" their fellow citizens 
in order to witness the act and render assistance. Evidence from very early on suggests 
that the Romans adopted this practice of"calling forth"- provocatio. 31 During the 
Conflict of the Orders, provocatio gained a popular connotation that it would retain 
through the end of the Republic. In the initial decades after the overthrow of the 
monarchy, one of the grievances leveled by the plebs was abuse of power by the patrician 
magistrates.32 Magistrates with imperium enjoyed the right of coercitio, allowing them to 
use force against those who did not comply with their orders. 
Amid the social unrest of the early fifth century, a group of plebs undertook a 
general strike - the first secessio - and withdrew to the Mons Sacer three miles outside of 
Rome. 33 The upshot of this collective act was, among other things, the establishment of 
the tribunate. The plebs vowed to obey their newly elected magistrates, the tribunes; they 
pledged to defend them with their lives and to kill anyone who harmed them. This threat 
of collective violence was integral to the tribunes' power as it rendered them inviolable 
(sacrosanctus). 34 In this way, the plebs served as the guarantor oftribunician power. 
When a citizen made an appeal (appellatio) to a tribune for aid (auxilium) , he was 
effectively employing a synechdochic form of provocatio. Beginning with the lex 
Valeria in 300, provocatio received the first in a series of statutory protections. The law 
31 Lintott Violence 1999: 11-6; 1972: 232-8. 
32 Raaflaub 2005 : 195. 
33 Liv. 2.55.1 -the consuls of 494 sought to prolong plebeian enlistments beyond the term of the popular 
Manius Valerius as dictator. 
34 Lintott Violence 1999: xv-xvi; Comell1995 : 259-60; Lintott 1972: 230-4; Festus 424L 1-13; Liv. 2.33.1 
- Agi deinde de concordia coeptwn concessumque in condiciones ut plebi sui magistratus essent 
sacrosancti, quibus auxilii latio adversus consules esset ... See also : 3.55.6-15. 
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prohibited magistrates from executing citizens who had exercised provocatio, thereby 
reducing the need for collective violence and introducing a new, formal kind of 
provocatio. Over time, the term would come to refer not only to a citizen's appeal to 
bystanders for protection, but also to the formal appeal of a magistrate's decision to an 
assembly of the People. 35 
By executing Roman citizens and depriving them of due process, Verres had all 
but ignored over four centuries of legal development. Worse, the fact that populares 
sowed distrust over the Senate' s stewardship of the courts (or of the Republic as a whole, 
for that matter) meant that popular remedies were becoming increasingly attractive. 
These included violence. For Cicero and his late Republican audience, therefore, the 
history of provocatio was of more than antiquarian interest. The frequently violent nature 
of popular politics in the first century coupled with the divide between optimates and 
populares made it a politically charged issue. While the defense of libertas stood at the 
center of popularis ideology, provocatio, the tribunate, and collective action offered the 
means by which individuals could physically defend themselves against the arbitrary use 
of coercitio. At the intersection of libertas,provocatio, the tribunate, and collective 
violence lay an ideological nexus manifest not only in Ciceronian rhetoric but in the 
historical work of Livy as well. 
Scholars have long noted that first-century political issues figure prominently in 
Livy's narrative of early Rome. To some extent, the paucity of documentary evidence 
and the historian's cyclical view of Roman history explain this. But Gary Miles has 
35 On later, "formal" provocatio- Lintott 1999: 33 , 153-7; Jolowicz and Nichols 1972: 306-16; Lintott 
1972: 238-49 . 
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noted that whatever Livy's intentions were, his effective concern was not so much 
historical fact as recording the tradition itself- memoria rerum gestarum.36 Tradition, 
memoria or "memory," is by definition fluid since it is a function of the ever-changing 
values and concerns of a society. It both mediates between and is a product of the present 
and the past. Livy's history preserves what Romans of the frrst century believed about 
their past, and for the plebs, they remembered that their rights had been won by physical 
strength. 37 
Livy' s account of a crowd's reaction to the attempted arrest of one Volero 
Publilius in the first decades of the Republic illustrates the aforementioned nexus - the 
defense of libertas, the tribunate, provocatio, and the use of collective violence.38 Livy 
places the event in the years between the frrst and second secessiones; the episode occurs 
in the second book, whose central theme is libertas.39 It serves as an exemplum of 
provocatio and the appropriate use of collective violence in the Republic. 
Following the patricians' assassination of a tribune - Cn. Genucius - the consuls 
sought to lessen the possibility of a conspiracy by keeping the Roman population under 
arms. They held a levy, and despite the measure's unpopularity, the nine remaining 
tribunes refused to interpose their veto. Enraged, the plebs claimed that their liberty was 
lost and that the power of the tribunes had died with Genucius (dicere actum esse de 
libertate sua, rursus ad antiqua reditum; cum Genucio una mortuam ac sepultam 
tribuniciam potestam). Sometime later, the consuls dispatched a lictor to arrest Volero 
36 Miles 1995 : 13 , 18, 63, 68, 98-9. See also: Gowing 2005: 9-13 . 
37 Lintott Violence 1999: xvi-xvii. 
38 Liv. 2.55 .1-11. Livy relates a compressed version of a similar story at 2.27.12. 
39 Ogilvie 1965 : 233; Bi.irck 1964: 51-89, 194. 
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Publilius. Valero was a plebeian who, having formerly served in the army as a centurion, 
was protesting his demotion to the rank of a common soldier. He initially appealed to the 
tribunes (Valero appellat tribunos), but when they refused to render him aid, he appealed 
directly to the People (provoco ad populum). Addressing the consuls, he said that it 
appeared the tribunes would rather witness a Roman citizen being beaten with rods than 
that they themselves be murdered in their beds by the consuls (tribuni civem Romanum in 
conspectus suo virgis caedi malunt quam ipsi in tecto suo a vobis trucidari) . With the aid 
of some bystanders, Valero managed to break free of the lictor and flee to the part of the 
crowd that was shouting the loudest. As he did so, he cried: 
Provoco et fidem plebis imploro. Adeste cives! Adeste commilitones! Nihil quod 
exspectetis tribunos, quibus ipsis vestro auxilio opus est. 
I appeal and call upon the good faith of the plebs! Come citizens! Come brothers-in-
arms! There is nothing to be gained from awaiting the tribunes, who themselves require 
"dl 40 your at . 
The men in the gathering then prepared themselves as if for a battle. The episode 
concludes: with their lictors having been injured and the fasces smashed, the consuls 
were driven from the Forum and into the Curia ( violatis lictoribus, fascibus fractis, e foro 
in curiam compelluntur). 
Even before Valero makes his appeal to the populus, the aggrieved crowd makes 
an explicit connection between the death of the tribunate and the loss of libertas. The 
connection between the tribunate and the use of collective violence is a subject to be 
40 Liv. 2.55 .6-7. 
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considered more fully below, in relation to the pro Cornelio. At this point, it is enough to 
point out that the attempted arrest ofVolero demonstrates to the People that an institution 
intended to protect them from magisterial abuse has failed. Volero' s plight reflects their 
own. When he appeals to the crowd, the latter uses violence to protect him. To our 
modem eyes, the level of violence seems proportional, but in fact, the crowd exhibits 
restraint. That the consuls initially cower in the Curia unsure ofVolero's next move 
(incerti quatenus Valero exerceret victoriam) suggests that they expected the crowd to 
engage in vindicatio, a combination of self-defense and retribution. In the de Inventione, 
Cicero writes that it is through vindicatio that "we repel violence and insult from 
ourselves and those dear to us through defense or revenge, and we punish wrongs."41 
During the first actio of the Verrines, Cicero recalls how the People threatened to 
do violence when they learned that the defendant had violated the libertas of citizens. 
Like the crowd in the Volero episode, Cicero portrays the crowd as showing restraint. 
The crowd allows the institutional process to play itself out. Though the Republic 
permitted (and in some cases encouraged) the use violence in certain circumstances, it 
also established institutions to obviate violence that threatened the social order.42 Such 
institutions included the courts, whose custom of having private individuals conduct 
4 1 Cic. Inv. 2.66 - vindicationem per quam vim et contumeliam defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsamus a 
nobis et nostris, qui nobis cari esse de bent, et per quam p eccata punimur; Cic. de Oral. 2.199 -
provocationem, patronam illam civitatis ac vindicem libertatis . See also: Dig. 43 .16.1.27 (Cassius)- vim 
vi repellere licet. Lintott Violence 1999: xv, "For Romans, self-defence was more than defence: it was not 
merely a matter of repelling force with force but of taking reprisals for an attack (Cic. pro Mil. 7-11)." 
42 Weber 1978: 54 famously maintains that "a compulsory political organization with continuous operations 
will be called a 'state ' insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order." This cannot hold for the Roman 
Republic, despite its attempts to regulate violence that threatened the social order: Gaughan 201 0; Lintott 
Violence 1999: 6-66, 89-174; Nippel 1995 : esp. l-46. 
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prosecutions represented a more civilized version of self-help.43 But Cicero's rhetoric in 
the Verrines suggests that, if the senatorial jury should acquit the defendant of violating 
the rights of Roman citizens, the People may well take matters into their own hands 
(manibus populi Romani). To prevent this, Cicero's pledge to take the case directly to 
the People actually serves the interests of the senatorial class in that it offers an 
alternative to a lynch mob. It provides an opportunity to demonstrate that the Republic's 
institutions work and, as such, resembles the argument that Cicero makes at the 
beginning of the first actio.44 On the other hand, the orator's references to the crowd's 
violent potential signals to the jury that the People are prepared to play their normative 
role, even if the courts should fail to play theirs. 
In the final speech of the second actio, Cicero recalls how one of the witnesses for 
the prosecution - M. Annius, an eques - alleged that V erres had executed an innocent 
Roman citizen instead of a pirate captain. The captain had apparently bribed the 
governor to spare him. When the people of Syracuse saw that the captain and numerous 
other pirates were not being executed, Verres substituted Roman citizens with their heads 
covered.45 After reviewing the testimony, Cicero proclaims, "0 the mercy of the Roman 
People, or rather, what amazing and extraordinary forbearance" ( 0 clementiam populi 
Romani seu potius patientiam miram ac singularem).46 That the orator attributes 
dementia to the Roman People suggests that violence was predictable, if not 
43 Lintott Violence 1999: 34 - "Roman legal procedure was originally modeled on ritualized self-help, and 
for its successful functioning, it relied on self-help. Private action was its foundation, and so it cannot be 
surprising that it allowed the individual so much scope to right his own wrongs, nor that this 
permissiveness survived the disappearance of old rituals." 
44 For example: Verr. 1.1-3, 43-51. 
45 Verr. 2.5.63-73 . 
46 Verr. 2.5.74. 
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appropriate.47 It also implies that the crowd had the power to exact revenge. 
Cicero makes this point explicitly a couple of lines later, when he says that shouts 
and groans issued from everyone, but that the Roman People restrained themselves from 
punishing Verres immediately; instead, they withheld consideration for their own safety 
and entrusted it to the strictness of the judges (jit gemitus omnium et clamor, cum tamen a 
praesenti supplicio tuo continuit populus Romanus se et repressit et salutis suae rationem 
iudicum severitati reservavit). As we saw in the Volero episode from Livy, the violation 
of one citizen's libertas threatened that of the People as a whole. Cicero claims that 
evidence of the judicial murder of Roman citizens caused the People to consider their 
own collective safety. Traditionally, they banded together to repel such attacks, but in 
this case, they defer to the Republic's institutions. Cicero interprets their reluctance to 
commit violence as dementia, though it is clearly predicated on the senatorial courts 
exercising severitas. 
After relating the incident of the pirate captain, Cicero shifts his attention to the 
defendant's malfeasance toward provincials, before again turning to his crimes against 
Roman citizens.48 As he makes this transition, he articulates the ideology of popular 
solidarity in the face of a threat to libertas: a threat to one citizen is a threat to all. With 
regard to the rest of the prosecution's case, Cicero claims that "it does not pertain to the 
welfare of our allies but of Roman citizens; that is, it pertains to the life and blood of each 
one of us" (quae non ad sociorum salutem, sed ad civium Romanorum, hoc est ad unius 
47 There is another possible implication of Cicero ' s use of d ementia: the People have power over Verres. 
Though it is true that the People do have power over the defendant, d ementia does not necessarily denote 
lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem (Sen. Cl. 2.3.1). Kaster 2010: 136-40; Konstan 2005. 
48 Verr. 2.5.80-138. 
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cuiusque nostrum, vitam et sanguinem pertinet).49 
The corona's reaction to the crucifixion of another Roman citizen- Gavius of 
Cons a- during the first phase of the trial bears this out. The prosecutor identifies the 
victim as one of many Roman citizens that Verres planned to execute in order to 
appropriate their wealth for himself.50 The placement of the Gavius narrative and the 
ensuing argumentum at the end of the speech, just before the peroratio, testifies to its 
emotional impact. Indeed, during the first actio, a riot nearly erupted when the corona 
learned of Gavius' mistreatment. As I have been arguing, one must look at the alleged 
crime to explain the crowd's reaction. 
Having been first wrongfully imprisoned in the Quarries at Syracuse, Gavius 
managed to escape to Messana with the intention of crossing over to Italy and escaping 
Verres' jurisdiction. As he was about to cross the straits, the governor's allies in the city 
had him arrested. They had heard the fugitive complaining that V erres had violated his 
rights and that he was going to Rome for justice. Sometime later, V erres arrived and 
ordered the man beaten and crucified in the city's forum: 
Caedabatur virgis in medio foro Messanae civis Romanus, iudices, cum interea null us 
gemitus, nulla vox alia illius miseri inter dolorem crepitumque plagarum audiebatur nisi 
haec, "civis Romanus sum." Hac se commemoratione civitatis omnia verbera 
depulsurum cruciatumque a corpore deiecturum arbitrabatur; is non modo hoc non 
perfecit, ut virgarum vim deprecaretur, sed, cum imploraret saepius usurparetque nomen 
civitatis, crux, crux, inquam, infelici et aerumnoso, qui numquam istam pestem viderat, 
comparabatur. 0 nomen dulce libertatis! 0 ius eximium nostrae civitatis! 0 lex Porcia 
legesque Semproniae! 0 graviter desiderata et aliquando reddita plebi Romanae 
tribunicia potestas! Hucine tandem haec omnia reciderunt, ut civis Romanus in provincia 
49 Verr. 2.5.139. See also: 5.143 - sed ubicumque terrarum et gentium violatum ius civium Romanorum sit, 
statuitis id pertinere ad communem causam libertatis et dignitatis. 
50 Verr. 2.5.145-150. 
populi Romani, in oppido foederatorum, ab eo qui beneficia populi Romani fasces et 
secures haberet deligatus in foro virgis caederetur? 
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As a Roman citizen, gentlemen, he was beaten with rods in the middle of the forum at 
Messana; and yet, no groan, no other cry was heard from that wretched man amid the 
anguish and crack of the blows except these words, "I am a Roman citizen." By this 
reference to his citizenship, he reasoned that he would drive away all the lashes and cast 
off the torment from his body. He not only failed to achieve this, to avert the violence of 
the rods by begging, but when he begged too much and invoked the title of citizenship, a 
cross - a cross, I say - was prepared for that unfortunate and afflicted man who had never 
seen such an abomination. 0 the sweet name of liberty! 0 the special law of our 
citizenship! 0 the Porcian and Sempronian laws! 0 the tribunician power of the Roman 
plebs, terribly missed and finally restored! Have they all come to this? That a Roman 
citizen, in a province of the Roman People and in an allied town, was bound and beaten 
with rods in the forum by one who held the axes and fasces bestowed by the Roman 
People?51 
The passage consists of two-thirds narratio and a third querimonia, the transition corning 
at the first apostrophe. The theme of the narrative is the contrast between the brutality of 
Gavius' treatment on the one hand and his legal status, captured by his pathetic plea civis 
Romanus sum, on the other. The pathos of the narrative builds, in the course of which 
Cicero reminds the reader of the victim's citizenship no less than four times. It 
culminates with the first apostrophe, invoking the defming quality of citizenship -
libertas. Three more apostrophes follow, all of which refer to its institutional safeguards. 
First, there is the law- ius eximium nostrae civitatis- namely the ius civile, whose 
provisions apply exclusively to Roman citizens.52 Next, he invokes the Porcian and 
Sempronian laws; though details remain obscure, these measures likely afforded statutory 
51 Verr. 2.5.162-3. 
52 Also known as the ius Quiritium - DNP 6.89-100 (Schiemann). 
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protection to those citizens, like Gavius, who were exercisingprovocatio.53 The final 
apostrophe invokes tribunician power and alludes to its recent restoration by Pompey. 
The rhetorical question- Hucine tandem haec omnia reciderunt - underscores the failure 
of these institutions to protect Gavius, while the final part of the passage uses republican 
ideology as a framework through which to view the defendant's misconduct: a Roman 
citizen was deprived of his rights in a province of the People and by a magistrate who 
owed his authority to the People (in provincia populi Romani ... ab eo qui beneficia 
populi Romani fasces et secures haberet). 
Moreover, the final line contains an implicit criticism of the residents of Messana. 
It was an allied town (oppidumfoederatorum) and, therefore, enjoyed certain rights not 
shared by other peoples of the empire. Though the victim's insistence that he was a 
Roman citizen amounted to a formal provocatio entitling him to a trial at Rome, he does 
not, according to Cicero, employ the formulaic language oftraditionalprovocatio.54 To 
be sure, his declaration of citizenship should have sufficed to prompt the crowd- or at 
least the citizens present - to intervene, and the orator's use of implorare to refer to 
Gavius' pleas hints at this. Instead of rendering aid, the citizens in the crowd reportedly 
offered only tears and the loudest groan (ne civium quidem Romanorum qui tum aderant 
jletu et gemitu maximo commovebare).55 Perhaps the Roman citizens at Messana 
53 Lintott 1999: 33, 125-6; Cloud 1992: 493-4; Jolowicz and Nicholas 1972: 307, 315-7; Lintott 1972: 249-
53 . The lex Porcia seems to have extended the right ofprovocatio beyond the limits of the city. The lex 
Sernpronia ne de capite civiurn Rornanorurn iniussu populi iudicaretur (Cic. Rab. Perd. 12), also known as 
the lex Sernpronia de provocatione, probably reinforced the tight of provocatio. 
54 For example, Valero employs the formulaic provoco ad populum and provoco et fidem plebis imploro. 
On fidem implorare as a common phrase by which a person summons those nearby to use force on his 
behalf: Lintott Violence 1999: 11-3; 1972: 231. 
55 Verr. 2.5.163. 
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themselves feared Verres. They were surely outnumbered by the provincials, whom 
Cicero earlier implicates in Verres' crimes. 56 
Whatever the reason the crowd at Messana refused to help Gavius, the Roman 
crowd at the first actio did not prove to be so passive. When Gaius Numitorius, a 
distinguished equestrian, appeared as a witness for the prosecution and related the details 
of the Gavius affair, Cicero recalls that his testimony nearly touched off a riot. 
Nolui tam vehementer agere hoc prima actione, iudices, nolui; vidistis enim ut animi 
multitudinis in istum dolore et odio et communis periculi metu concitarentur. Statui 
egomet mihi tum modum orationi meae et C. Numitorio, equiti Romano, primo homini, 
testi meo, et Glabrionem id quod sapientissime fecit facere laetatus sum, ut repente 
consilium in medio testimonio dimitteret. Etenim verebatur ne populus Romanus ab isto 
eas poenas vi repetisse videretur quas veritus esset ne iste legibus ac vestro iudicio non 
esset persoluturus. 
I did not want to relate this incident so forcefully during the first actio, gentlemen, I did 
not. Indeed, you saw how the spirit of the crowd was stirred up against that man out of 
resentment, hatred, and fear of a common danger. I myself then imposed limits for my 
speech and for C. Numitorius - a Roman eques, a most distinguished gentleman, and my 
witness; and I was glad that Glabrio did what he very wisely did: right away, he 
dismissed the jury in the middle of testimony. For, indeed, he was afraid that the Roman 
People would be seen to have violently exacted the penalties that they themselves feared 
the defendant would not pay under the laws and your verdict. 57 
Cicero's rhetoric reveals not only that the crowd came close to rioting during the first 
actio, but also that the orator believed he was susceptible to the accusation of having 
provoked the unrest. From the beginning of the first actio and despite his occasionally 
inflammatory rhetoric, Cicero distances himself from those unnamed populares who 
56 Verr. 2.5.160 - hanc sibi iste urbem delegerat quam haberet adiutricem scelerum, fur to rum receptricem, 
flagitiorum omnium consciam. 
57 Verr. 2.5.163. 
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were preparing to use contiones and the legislative assemblies to incite senatorial 
invidia.58 His repeated insistence (nolui ... nolui ... ) that he did not wish to treat the Gavius 
affair as vehemently in the first part of the trial, coupled with his claim that he exercised 
restraint in his remarks on the testimony ofNumitorius, speaks to his sense of 
vulnerability. For the near-riot, he insists he was not to blame. Indeed, he "rejoiced" 
(laetatus sum) at the "very wise" (sapientissime) decision of Glabrio to suspend the 
proceedings. Responsibility lay elsewhere, namely with the failure of senatorial 
institutions to protect the People. These failures incited the crowd, not he. 
Cicero claims that the crowd was roused by its resentment (dolor), hatred 
(odium) , and fear of a common danger (metus communis periculi). While odium requires 
little comment, dolor does as it is the "unpleasant psychophysical response" that attends 
invidia - righteous indignation. 59 In other words, the moral outrage over the former 
praetor' s immoral treatment of Roman citizens fueled the unrest. Moreover, they shared 
a common fear, a reference to the plebeian ideology of solidarity when faced with a threat 
to an individual's libertas. The corruption ofthe senatorial courts exacerbated this fear, 
since- according to Glabrio- they feared the defendant would escape the laws and the 
court. But this raises the following question: how did Cicero know what Glabrio 
understood at that time to be going through the mind of the crowd? I think it safe to say 
that he did not. The presiding magistrate obviously feared that the crowd would violently 
exact justice, but it seems less likely that they were mainly concerned that the defendant 
would escape justice. Rather, an emotional response to Verres' crimes - dolor, odium, 
58 Verr. 1.2 - cum sint parati qui contionibus et legibus hanc invidiam senatus injlammare conentur ... 
59 Kaster 2005: 86. 
123 
and metus - prompted the crowd, and any consideration of senatorial corruption was, at 
best, secondary. 
The orator obviously bore some responsibility for this, but in the fmal clause, he 
passes off responsibility to the senatorial courts. Instead of acting purely on emotion, the 
crowd observed the failure of the senatorial class - both magistrates and the courts - to 
protect the rights of Roman citizens, and they decided to take collective action to 
preserve their libertas. In this way, Cicero renders the crowd's conduct as normative in 
the tradition of provocatio and self-help. 
The account of the near riot serves to orient the senatorial jury in relation to the 
political realities surrounding the case. Even in ordinary circumstances, the courts' 
survival as an institution entailed cultivating a perception of operating normatively in the 
best interests of the community. A perception of failure brought shame and, in this case, 
the potential of violence. It bears repeating that while the express purpose of the courts 
was "to determine whether or not the defendants had violated various 'criminal statutes'," 
the facts mattered little if the Senate and its membership risked losing their standing or 
their lives. The reference to the near-riot serves as a reminder to the jury of the nature 
and volatility of public opinion ( opinio ). 
Of course, Cicero never actually delivered the second actio to a jury, and so we 
are left to consider the intended effect of these passages on Cicero's first-century readers. 
As it is written, the second actio appears to be, in part, a recapitulation of the actual 
testimony and arguments made during the first actio. There remains, of course, the 
possibility that not all of what Cicero alleges to have transpired during the first phase of 
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the trial- including the near-riots- actually happened. For the purpose of interpreting 
the second actio, however, this question is ultimately ofless importance than Cicero's 
decision to refer to them as if they had. 
As I have already suggested, the near-riots serve to insulate Cicero from charges 
of having driven an innocent man into exile. The outbursts from the corona suggest that 
"everyone alive" agreed with the prosecution that Verres was guilty.60 What is more, the 
specter of violence underscores Cicero's repeated warnings about the dangers posed by 
senatorial corruption. Even after it lost its monopoly over the courts in 70, accusations of 
corruption and incompetence continued to plague the senatorial class. Cicero presents 
himself as a mediator in the Verrines, a senator who offers his colleagues constructive 
criticism. Still, invidia often characterizes his remarks, perhaps nowhere more so than in 
the peroratio, where he asserts that "certain nobles" (like Hortensius) routinely treat novi 
homines like himselfunjustly.61 Here, the trial ofVerres serves as a cautionary tale: 
injustice caused by corruption produces invidia, which in tum can lead to violence. 62 
To avoid this, Cicero addresses the jurors at the beginning of the peroratio, 
though he might well be addressing his senatorial readers. The orator reminds them of 
their obligations to the People, to be guardians of the rights, privileges, safeguards, and 
Iibert as owed to every Roman citizen (omnia sua iura, commoda, auxilia, to tam denique 
60 Verr. 2.5.177 - nam istum paucis horis primae actionis omnium mortalium sententiis condemnavi. On 
the appearance of consensus, see Chapter 4. 
61 Verr. 2.5.180-2, esp. 181 - Videmus quanta sit in invidia quantoque in odio apud quosdam nobiles 
homines novorum hominum virtus et industria. 
62 Though violence does not break out at the trial, a number of riots occur in the provinces dming Verres' 
tenure. For example: Verr. 2.1.62-85, 5.93-5. 
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libertatem).63 Calling attention to the crowd of citizens gathered for the trial, the orator 
declares to the jurors that all- present or not- desire their severity (vestram severitatem 
desiderant), plead for their loyalty (vestramfidem implorant), and seek their aid (vestrum 
auxilium requirunt). The second and third cola feature the language of appellatio. As if 
appealing to a tribune, Cicero calls on the senators to fulfill their obligations to the 
community and to intervene on behalf of the populus whose rights are being threatened. 
Pro Cornelio Actio Prima 
The year after his praetorship, as he was anticipating his consular canvass, Cicero 
elected to defend the former tribune Gaius Cornelius against a charge of maiestas. Like 
most of the individuals Cicero represented prior to his consulship,64 Cornelius was not a 
distinguished member of the Senate. He was a man of the street, a popularis both in 
terms of his tactics and political agenda. He, nonetheless, had friends in high places, 
notably Pompey, under whom he had served as quaestor in Spain.65 The former tribune's 
relationship with Pompey evidently helped him to win most of the jury's favor at his trial 
in 65. As an aspiring consular candidate, Cicero probably hoped that his defense of 
Cornelius would earn him Pompey's gratia; at the same time, the case afforded him an 
63 Verr. 2.5 .172. 
64 Before his consulship, the majority of Cicero's advocacy was on behalf of equestrian provincials. 
Exceptions included Sulla's son (in contione) in 66, a group of young nobles in 75, three praetors - M. 
Fonteius (TLRR 186), C. Orchivius (TLRR 211), Q. Gallius (TLRR 214) -and likely the wife of a fourth-
C. Aurelius Cotta (TLRR 133). For sources and background, see Lintott 2008: 101-3 ; Crawford 1994: 145-
58; 1984: 33-8, 61-3, 73-4. 
65 On being popularis: Asc. 61.12-3C- Cornelius had a destrictum propositum animi adversus principum 
voluntatem. On his alliance with Pompey: Marshall1980: 88-91; Asc. 57.5, 61.16-20C. MRR 2.122 
establishes 71 as the last year in which Cornelius could have served as Pompey's quaestor. 
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opportunity to advertise his association with the general. His brother, Quintus, would 
later write that, by praising Pompey, pledging to take the case ofManilius, and defending 
Cornelius (Pompeio ornando, Manili causa recipienda, Cornelio defendendo), Cicero 
had won the support of the urban masses and those who hold sway over the contiones.66 
Cornelius was a prominent member in one of Rome's sodalitates, fraternal organizations 
that political candidates frequently used to mobilize support. After the trial, Quintus 
wrote that Cicero's defense of the former tribune ensured that his brother would enjoy the 
political support of Cornelius' fellow sodales during his consular canvass.67 
Cicero undoubtedly had similar reasons for circulating the texts of the two 
speeches pro Cornelio. Their publication served as an advertisement of his forensic 
success, while also affording him an opportunity to reach a wider audience. Asconius' 
comments that the trial took place amid a great throng (magnus conventus) and great 
anticipation (res acta est magna exspectatione) and that prominent Sullani appeared on 
behalf of the prosecution indicate a high level of public interest. 68 Like the earlier 
Verrines and pro Lege Man ilia, Cicero almost certainly published the pro Cornelio in an 
effort to cultivate an image of himself as a popularis, thereby gaining support among the 
urban plebs and their leaders (in the words of Quintus, urbanam illam multitudinem et 
66 Comment. Pet. 51 - iam urbanam illam multitudinem et eonun studia qui contiones tenent adeptus es in 
Pompeio ornando, Manili causa recipienda, Cornelio defendendo. Though the tricolon suggests three 
distinct activities, they all in some way promoted Pompey's interests. Over the past forty years or so, many 
of the challenges to the authenticity of the Commentariolum have been satisfactorily refuted, and I see no 
compelling reason to break with conventional wisdom. Among the most recent or significant works: 
Lintott 2008: 130-1 ; Morstein-Marx 1998: 260-1; David et al. 1973: 248-56; Richardson 1971; Nardo 
1970; Balsdon 1963; Nisbet 1961 ; Henderson 1950. 
67 Comment. Pet. 19 - Nam hoc biennia quattuor sodalitates hominum ad ambitionem gratiosissimorum 
tibi obligasti, C. Fundani, Q. Galli, C. Corneli, C. Orchivi; hontm in causis ad te def erendis quid tibi 
eorum sodales receperint et confirmarint scio; nam interfiti. 
68 Asc. 60.15-6, 19-21, 61.20-2C. 
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eorum studia qui contiones tenent) .69 Unfortunately, only fragments of the two speeches 
remain. In addition to being our single best historical source, what remains of As coni us' 
first-century commentary on the speeches of Cicero also constitutes our single best 
source for reconstructing the texts themselves. His work preserves thirty-seven of the 
eighty lemmata, which like a modem commentary, are arranged in order. The balance of 
the fragments comes mostly from later grammarians and commentators, though a few 
have been culled from other works of Cicero. Modem editors have used these fragments, 
coupled with various testimonia about the speeches and a familiarity with conventional 
dispositio, to reconstruct the shape of the first speech in the main. A lack of material 
prevents the same for the second?0 
The case against Cornelius stemmed from an event that took place when the 
defendant was tribune, two years earlier. During his tenure, Cornelius proposed at least 
four pieces of legislation, all of them directed at various forms of senatorial corruption. 
At one point, he attempted to promulgate a law in the concilium plebis reaffirming the 
People's exclusive right to grant legal exemptions (privilegia).71 The People had always 
enjoyed this right, but over time, the Senate had assumed this power for itself, granting 
legal exemptions without reference to the People. In response, the Senate enlisted a 
69 His speeches on behalf of Cornelius and Manitius struck a popularis tone and so seem to have made 
certain optimates uneasy. Comment. Pet. 5, therefore, advises Cicero to send friends to wavering optimates 
in order to allay their concerns; his brother says that they should insist that Cicero was never a popularis, 
and that if he seemed to be, it was in order to attach himself to Pompey (ut nobis Cn. Pompeium 
adiungeremus) . See also : Asc. 70.19-21C; Comment. Pet. 14. 
70 Modern editors have generally identified sixty-two fragments belonging to the first speech, eighteen to 
the second. The main differences between the three modern editions of Crawford (Cr), Kumaniecki (K), 
and Puccioni (P) ultimately stem from the arrangement ofnon-Asconian fragments within the framework 
suggested by Asconius' commentary. On the method of arranging fragments: Crawford 1994: 94-8. On 
conventional dispositio and parts of a speech: Cic. de Oral. 2.315-32; Quint. lnst. 4. 
71 Asc. 58.3-24C; Dio 36.39.2-4. 
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fellow tribune, P. Servilius Globulus, to interpose his veto. At the contio held prior to the 
vote, the scribe handed a copy of the bill to the herald to be read aloud, and Globulus 
issued his veto. What Cornelius did next provided the basis for the charges subsequently 
brought against him: he ignored his colleague, took the text of the measure, and read it 
aloud himself. Seeing this, the consul- C. Calpumius Piso, an ally of the leadership and 
who was present at the proceedings- objected, claiming that Cornelius' actions 
threatened the tribunician right of veto. The crowd, apparently full of Carnelian 
supporters, turned on the consul, shaking its fists and directing a torrent of abuse at the 
magistrate. Confronted with an angry mob, Piso ordered his lictors to arrest those who 
were most unruly. A full-blown riot ensued; from everywhere, stones were thrown at the 
consul, his fasces were smashed, and Cornelius - apparently taken aback by the riot he 
himself had caused- disbanded the contio rather than proceeding with a vote. Though 
his original version of the bill was never voted upon, a modified version later became 
law.72 
After making an initial, abortive attempt to prosecute Cornelius in 66, the 
Cominius brothers succeeded in bringing the defendant to trial on a charge of maiestas in 
65. One of Cicero 's central arguments in the speech seems to have hung on the definition 
of minuta populi Romani maiestas - diminishing the majesty of the Roman People. The 
testimony of the fifth-century commentator Grilli us, whose work contains a fragment of 
the speech, suggests that Cicero began the narratio by referencing the text of the law. 
The lex Cornelia de maiestate, under which Cornelius was charged, appears to have 
72 As did a separate measure compelling praetors to abide by their edicts: Asc. 59 .7-llC; Dio 36.40.1-3 . 
See also: Kunkell972: 91-4. 
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incorporated language from an earlier version of Saturninus' law while adding a list of 
specific offenses.73 Early in the speech, Cicero argues that the law did not apply in the 
case of Cornelius because the offenses listed in the statute do not include what the 
defendant actually did.74 
A seven-line summary of the issues found in the commentary of Asconius bears 
this out. Most editors have concluded that this summary, which is located just before the 
first lemma, is a later interpolation, though clearly written by someone familiar with the 
entire speech.75 It relates that there were three points at issue: Cicero argued that what 
Cornelius had done was not specifically covered under the provisions of the lex Cornelia; 
he further argued that what Cornelius had done did not constitute maiestas and, finally, 
that the defendant had no intention of diminishing the maiestas populi Romani when he 
read from the text ofhis proposal. The three issues reflect the application of 
Hermagoras' stasis theory, whereby an orator proceeds systematically through the issues 
of a case (staseis) and identifies those that allow him to make the most effective 
argument.76 The orator generally proceeds from the staseis affording the strongest 
argument to those that are weakest. It seems that Cicero had settled on three particular 
issues: he contested the application ofthe law, the defmition of the crime, and the 
defendant's intent. 
73 Seager 2001 : 148-50; Cloud 1992:519-20. Sources: Cic. Fam. 3.11.2; Pis. 50; de Oral. 2.107. On the 
lex Julia de maiestate: Dig. 48.4.7.3 (Modestinus) . 
74 Corn. 1.3Cr = 3P- Unde igitur ordiar? An ab ipsa lege? The comment of Grilli us (in Cic. de 
Jnventione, RL 604.18) introducing this lemma implies that the first speech began with the text of the law 
rather than a conventional narratio- aut certe nee narratio esse debet, sed aut a lege ab aliquo firmissimo 
argumento inchoare debet orator, sicut in Corneliana ... 
75 Asc. 62.6-12C. One of the three key manuscripts (P) does not contain this passage, leading many to 
conclude that it is an interpolation. Lewis 2006: 269. 
76 Lat. constitutiones or status. Kennedy 1963: 303-14; Lausberg 1998: §§ 79-138, esp. Cic.Inv. 1.10-6; 
Rhet. Her. 1.18-25 . 
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Cicero apparently conceded the facts of the case: at that fateful assembly, the 
defendant took the text of his proposal and read it aloud over the veto of his colleague.77 
The number of witnesses left him little choice. Success for Cicero would ultimately 
depend on whether his interpretation of the law proved more convincing than that of his 
opponent. To do this, Cicero needed to argue that the defendant's role in the violent 
episode did not constitute maiestas populi Romani minuta. 
The concept of maiestas was relative, and the meaning of populus Romanus 
variable. 78 When the latter was understood as the entire nation, maiestas referred to the 
superiority of the Roman People relative to other peoples. But populus Romanus could 
also refer to the People versus the Senate; in this case, maiestas denoted the supremacy of 
the People over the Senate and, particularly, magistrates. L. Appuleius Saturninus most 
certainly had this second sense in mind when he promulgated the original/ex de 
maiestate, probably during his second term as tribune in 100. The precipitating event 
was likely the violent disruption of a vote on another piece of legislation he had proposed 
-a lexfrumentaria.79 The author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium relates that one of the 
quaestors- Q. Servilius Caepio- had argued before the Senate that the Treasury could 
not afford Saturninus' proposed grain law. The body agreed and decreed that, if 
Saturninus should promulgate the measure, he be deemed adversus rem publicam videri 
77 Asc. 61.5, 22-3C; Quint.lnst. 5.13.18, 6.5.10. 
78 Ferrary 1983 : 562-5; Bauman 1967: 6-15. 
79 Alternatively, if the lex de maiestate is to be dated to Satuminus' first tribunate, the precipitating event 
might well have been the violence that broke out during Norbanus ' prosecution of the elder Caepio before 
the People. In this scenario, Satuminus might have taken the phrase maiestas populi Romani (in relation to 
other peoples) and reinterpreted it vis-a-vis the Senate and magistrates. Yet another possibility is that 
Satuminus promulgated his grain law in 103 rather than 100. 
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eafacere.80 After Saturninus ignored the veto ofhis colleagues, Caepio- armed with the 
senatus consultum - violently disrupted the vote by tearing down the gangways and 
overturning the voting urns. For the quaestor, the principle of senatorial auctoritas 
trumped the maiestas populi Romani as Saturninus understood it; according to Jean-Louis 
Ferrary, the tribune intended his lex to affirm the supremacy of the Roman People over 
the Senate and magistrates.81 
But the aforementioned ambiguity of maiestas populi Romani meant that, in the 
wake of Saturninus' death, two of his popularis allies found themselves charged under 
the very same lex Appuleia. 82 Indeed, the senatus consul tum ultimum authorizing the 
consuls to move against Satuminus and Glaucia seems to have been unique in that it 
incorporated the phrase maiestas populi Romani, instructing the magistrates to see to it 
that the People's majesty and power be preserved (ut ... consules ... operam 
darent ... imperium populi Romani maiestasque conservaretur) .83 So it appears that, 
within months of the law's passage, the opposition had co-opted the phrase maiestas 
populi Romani for its own ends. The ambiguity of the phrase would be an issue in the 
case against Cornelius as well. As we have already seen, Cicero seems to have begun by 
arguing that what the defendant had done was not included among the specific Sullan 
provisions of the law. This left the advocates to contest the definition of minuta populi 
Romani maiestas. 
Cicero almost certainly adopted the strategy first employed by M. Antonius, when 
80 Rhet. Her. 1.21. 
8 1 Ferrary 1983 : 568-9. 
82 Ferrary 1983 : 567- C. Appuleius Decianus (trib. 98) and Sextus Titius (trib. 99). Sources: MRR 2.3n., 
4-5, esp. Cic. Rab. Perd. 24-5 ; Val. Max. 8.l.d 2-3 . 
83 Rab. Perd. 20; Bauman 1967: 49-50. 
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the latter was defending C. Norbanus nearly three decades earlier. Cicero references the 
case and Antonius' rhetorical strategy as exempla in two of his rhetorical treatises - the 
Partitiones Oratoriae, as part of a treatment of the stasis of definition, and in the second 
book of the de Oratore, which features Antonius as one of the main characters. 84 In the 
dialogue, Antonius directs his comments on the stasis of defmition and the use of pathos 
toP. Sulpicius Rufus, his opponent in the case ofNorbanus. In important respects, the 
cases of Cornelius and N orb anus resemble one another, and so it comes as no surprise 
that Cicero adopted Antonius' strategy as his model. Both defendants had been tribunes 
when they allegedly diminished the maiestas populi Romani. Before an assembly of the 
People in 103, Norbanus had attempted to prosecute the elder Q. Servilius Caepio for his 
defeat at the Battle of Arausio; two of his tribunician colleagues interposed a veto. Like 
Cornelius, Norbanus ignored the veto, and a riot ensued in which the obstructing tribunes 
were driven from the assembly and a stone struck the princeps senatus who was in 
attendance. Nine years passed before Norbanus was brought to trial: in apparent 
retaliation for the prosecution of the younger Caepio for disrupting the vote on 
Saturninus' grain law, Sulpicius Rufus launched the prosecution ofNorbanus in 94. 
Antonius conducted the defense. 85 
As Cicero appears to have done in the case of Cornelius, Antonius recalls in the 
de Oratore how he expressed trepidation at the beginning of the speech before going on 
84 de Orat. 2.107-9, 164, 167, 197-204; Part. Orat. 105. On the trial: TLRR 86. On the event that 
precipitated the trial: MRR 1.563-6, 568-9, esp. de Orat. 2.197. 
85 As a fellow sodalis , Antonius conducted the defense ofNorbanus, who had also served as quaestor 
during his campaign against the Cilician pirates. 
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to concede most of the facts. 86 He disputed, however, the prosecution's defmition of 
maiestas minuta, a term on which, he says, the whole of the lex Appuleia depends ( ... ab 
illo maiestatem minutam negabam, ex quo verba lege Appuleia tota ilia causa 
pendebat).87 As it would be with Cicero, this contention over the defmition of minuta 
populi Romani maiestas formed the basis ofhis defense. Antonius' success coupled with 
the notoriety of the case explains why Cicero used it as an exemplum in two of his 
rhetorical treatises and as a model for his defense of Cornelius. 
On whatever stasis a defense-advocate chooses - fact, defmition, or quality -
Cicero instructs the reader in the Partitiones Oratoriae that he must deny the charge and 
offer a counterargument. The following passage on the status de definitione, consists of 
three parts - a paraphrase of Antonius' argument, a paraphrase of the definition put 
forward by Sulpicius, and the point of contention (disceptatio ): 
In illis autem ubi ita dicitur, 'Non minuit maiestatem quod egit de Caepione turbulentius; 
populi enim Romani dolor iustus vim illam excitavit, non tribuni actio; maiestas autem, 
quoniam est magnitudo quaedam populi Romani, in eius potestate ac iure retinendo aucta 
est potius quam diminuta,' et ubi ita refertur, 'Maiestas est in imperii atque in nominis 
populi Romani dignitate, quam minuit is qui per vim multitudinis rem ad seditionem 
vocavit,' exsistit illa disceptatio, minueritne maiestatem qui voluntate populi Romani rem 
gratam et aequam per vim egerit. 
But in those cases when it is argued, 'What he did too violently concerning Caepio did 
not diminish maiestas; for the just indignation of the Roman People produced that 
violence, not an act of the tribune. But since it is a kind of greatness of the Roman 
People, maiestas was enhanced rather than diminished in the preserving of its power and 
right,' and when reply is made that 'Maiestas resides in the honor of the power and name 
of the Roman People, which one has diminished who has urged sedition through mob 
violence,' the argument arises whether one who has accomplished through violence a just 
86 Antonius : de Oral. 2.202. Cicero: Corn. 1.1 , 2, 4Cr = 1, 2, 4P. See also: Lausberg 1998: § 275J3, y, and 
Quint. 4.1.11 - Etiam partis adversae patronus dab it exordia materiam, interim cum honore, si 
eloquentiam eius et gratiam nos tim ere fingendo, ut ea suspect a sint iudici, fecerimus ... 
87 de Oral. 2.107. See also: 2.20 1. 
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and favorable outcome in accordance with the will of the Roman People has diminished 
the maiestas.88 
The various definitions of what constitutes minuere maiestas populi Romani found in the 
rhetorical works, coupled with the fact that the Sullan version of the law added a specific 
list of crimes, strongly suggests that the offense itself was ill-defined, inviting an 
argument based on the status de definitione. The onus was on the prosecutor to define 
what diminishing the maiestas of the Roman People entailed. In the de Oratore, 
Antonius relates that both he and Sulpicius refused to offer succinct defmitions of 
maiestas, since such defmitions are prone to being twisted by an opponent, are difficult to 
grasp, and "wreak of learning. "89 Instead, both sides expounded as much as possible on 
what it meant maiestatem minuere. Thus, the two-part definition of Sulpicius in the 
passage above is an abstract: the first part uncontroversially defines the quality of 
maiestas, and the second details what constitutes maiestas minuta. 
The first part of the defmition (maiestas est imperii atque in nominis populi 
Romani dignitate) resembles the one offered by Antonius: maiestas is "a certain greatness 
of the Roman People" (est magnitudo quae dam populi Romani); in the de Oratore, he 
88 Part. Oral. 105. Some interpret the statement, which I attribute to Su1picius (Maiestas est imperii atque 
in nominis populi Romani dignitate .. . ), as an excerpt of the actual law. Thus, Rackham's Loeb translation 
of ubi ita refertur reads" . . . when the terms of reference are ... " But, the parallel use of ubi ita dicitur/ubi 
ita refertur within the context of a discussion of the status de definitione suggests that the actual logic of 
the passage is point-counterpoint-status. See also: Bauman 1967: 2-3, 51-2. 
89 de Oral. 2.109 - nam quantum uterque nostntm potu it, omni co pia dicendi dilatavit, quid esset 
maiestatem minuere: etenim definitio primum reprehenso verba uno aut addito aut dempto saepe 
extorquetur e manibus; deinde genere ipso doctrinam redolet exercitationemque paene puerilem: tum et in 
sensum et in mentem iudicis intrare non potest, ante enim praeterlabitur, quam percepta est. See also: 
Fantham 2004: 125-6. 
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defmes it as the "grandeur and honor of the citizenry" (amplituda ac dignitas civitatis).90 
Though at first-glance contradictory, the use of civitas here alludes to the more expansive 
sense of populus Romanus - the entire Roman nation. In what follows, Antonius plays 
on the ambiguity of the word, saying that the elder Caepio was guilty of diminishing the 
maiestas populi Romani when he handed over the army to the enemies of the Roman 
People (i.e. the Roman nation), while Norbanus was not when he handed Caepio over to 
the power of the Roman People (i.e. the Roman People versus Senate). In the de 
Inventione, Cicero offers yet another definition of maiestas, one the prosecutor of C. 
Flaminius in the third century might have offered. Here, maiestas pertains to both the 
People and the magistrates: "To diminish maiestas is to detract from the dignitas or 
amplituda or potestas of the People or of those to whom the People have granted some 
power. "91 In this fmal definition, the meaning of maiestas is consistent with previous 
definitions, and though it may be applied to magistrates, the point of reference remains 
the populus Romanus. This brief survey reveals that the issue in cases of maiestas populi 
Romani was not so much the meaning of maiestas as it was the meaning of populus 
Romanus and especially what constitutes minuere. 
A passage from Quintilian indicates that Cicero adopted the first part of Sulpicius' 
definition in the pro Cornelio.92 In the Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian uses the quote (ut 
Cicero dicit), maiestas est in imperi atque in nominis populi Romani dignitate to illustrate 
90 de Orat. 2.164- Si maiestas est amplituda ac dignitas civitatis, is earn minuit, qui exercitum hostibus 
populi Romani tradidit, non qui eum, qui idfecisset, populi Romani potestati tradidit. 
91 Inv. 2.53- Maiestatem minuere est de dignitate aut amplitudine aut pates tate populi aut eorum quibus 
populus potestatem dedit aliquid derogare. For a similar conception ofmaiestas, applied to magistrates: 
Asc. 61.2-SC; Rhet. Her. 2.17. 
92 Corn. 1.5Cr = 6P. Crawford 1994: 78, 100. 
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a case when both sides agree on a settled definition.93 Despite agreeing on the definition 
of maiestas, Quintilian goes on to say that the question becomes "whether maiestas has 
been diminished, as it was asked in the case of Cornelius" (quaeritur tamen an maiestas 
minuta sit, ut in causa Cornelii quaestium est). As I do, every modem editor of the pro 
Cornelio believes that Quintilian is here quoting the pro Cornelio as opposed to the 
passage from the Partitiones Oratoriae quoted above. However, the same editors believe 
that the first-century rhetorician has only recorded part of the definition; they argue that 
Cicero used the same definition in the pro Cornelio as he attributes to Antonius ' 
opponent in the Partitiones Oratoriae- maiestas est in imperi atque in nominis populi 
Romani dignitate, quam minuit is qui per vim multitudinis rem ad seditionem vocavit. 
Not only does the actual content (or, more precisely, the absence of the second clause) of 
Quintilian's passage argue against this, but the issue at stake in the trials ofNorbanus and 
Cornelius was precisely whether the defendants in fact minuerunt maiestatem. Both sides 
contested the definition; thus, the full defmition found in the passage from the Partitiones 
would not have been a suitable illustration of a settled definition ( certa finitio de qua 
inter utramque partem convenit). 
Moreover, though Antonius and Cicero might have been willing to concede that 
the defendants had "acted too violently" (egit turbulentius) or "urged sedition through 
mob violence" (per vim multitudinis rem ad seditionem vocavit), they rejected the 
prosecutions' contention that this amounted to maiestas minuta. As the passages from 
the Partitiones, the de Oratore, and the pro Cornelio reveal, Cicero and Antonius both 
93 Quint.lnst. Or at. 7.3 .35 - Est interim certa finitio, de qua inter utramque part em convenit, ut Cicero 
dicit, 'maiestas est in imperi atque in nominis populi Romani dignitate. ' Quaeritur tamen an maiestas 
minuta sit, ut in causa Corneli quaesitum est. 
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maintained that violence does not always diminish the People's maiestas. Indeed, it 
could enhance it. Violence that challenged the functioning of the established order 
amounted to seditio- civil discord.94 Nonetheless, the Roman People attained many of 
their rights through such acts of seditio, as Antonius recalls having argued in the case of 
Norbanus: 
Omnium seditionum genera, vitia, pericula conlegi eamque orationem ex ornni rei 
publicae nostrae temporum varietate repetivi conclusique ita, ut dicerem, etsi omnes 
semper molestae seditiones fuissent, iustas tamen fuisse non nullas et prope necessarias. 
Tum illa, quae modo Crassus commemorabat, egi: neque reges ex hac civitate exigi 
neque tribunos plebis creari neque plebiscitis totiens consularem potestatem minui neque 
provocationem, patronam illam civitatis ac vindicem libertatis, populo Romano dari sine 
nobilium dissensione potuisse; ac, si illae seditiones saluti huic civitati fuissent, non 
continuo, si quis motus populi factus esset, id C. Norbano in nefario crimine atque in 
fraude capitali esse ponendum. 
I reviewed the types, faults, and dangers of every civil discord, and I composed that 
speech drawing from the full scope of our republic's history and so concluded, saying 
that even if every disturbance had always been troublesome, some nevertheless had been 
just and almost necessary. Then I proceeded through those arguments, which Crassus 
was recalling just now, that neither the kings could have been driven out from the state, 
nor the tribunes of the plebs created, nor the power of the consul so often checked by 
popular decrees, nor could provocatio -that bulwark of the citizenry and avenger of 
freedom- have been granted to the Roman People without opposition from the nobles; 
and if those instances of civil discord had been of benefit to this state, C. N orb anus, if 
some disturbance of the People had been made, must not automatically be subject to a 
heinous charge and accused of a capital crime.95 
What remains of the first pro Cornelio indicates that Cicero pursued the same 
strategy presented here. His own survey of Roman history, like that of Antonius, focuses 
94 DNP 13.195 (von Ungern-Sternberg); Osthoff 1952: 102-10; Cic. Leg. 3.19; Rep. 6.1. 
95 de Oral. 2.199. 
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on the history of the tribunate.96 Although violence in the final century of the Republic 
was commonplace, the earlier comments of L. Licinius Crassus, his chief interlocutor in 
the de Oratore, suggest that Antonius' argument was highly controversial. Only partly in 
jest, Crassus observes that when defending Norbanus, whom he refers to as a "mad and 
factious human being" (hominem seditiosumfuriosumque), Antonius did not hesitate to 
glorify seditiones themselves and to explain in the most dignified terms that many attacks 
by the People were often not unjust (non dubitavit seditiones ipsas ornare ac 
demonstrare gravissimis verbis multos saepe impetus populi non iniustos esse).97 
Antonius certainly recognized the perilousness of this tack: in the passage above, he 
claims to have acknowledged up front the faults and dangers of every discord (omnium 
seditionum vitia, pericula), though he made distinctions (genera), presumably between 
those that are just and those that are unjust. In the category of the former, he classifies 
the overthrow of the monarchy, the establishment of the tribunate, and other popular 
victories that no political figure of any class or persuasion in the late Republic would 
have dared to condemn openly. 
He concludes that Norbanus should not automatically be subject to a capital 
charge, since the People would not have attained their rights without incurring opposition 
from the office-holding class (dissensio nobilium).98 Moreover, the comments of Crassus 
earlier in the dialogue reveal that Antonius had insisted that the defendant was not 
responsible. He claimed that the seditio involving Norbanus could not have been 
96 Corn. 1.48-54Cr = 49-51 , 35, 52-4P. 
97 de Orat. 2.124. 
98 See also: Rep . 6.1 =Non. p. 25.3 = Serv. A. 1.149 - eaque dissensio civium, quod seorsum eunt alii ad 
alios, seditio dicitur; Cic. Verr. 2.1.34 (dissensio civium); Tac. Ann. 3.27 (dissensione ordinum). Dissensio 
does not ordinarily take an objective genitive. 
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repressed and had been justly stirred up from the citizens' sorrow and hatred of Caepio, 
who had lost an army (illam Norbani seditionem ex luctu civium et ex Caepionis odio, qui 
exercitum amiserat, neque reprimi potuisse et iure esse conjlatam ). In such cases of 
seditiones iustae, no one can be responsible (praestare nemo potuisse).99 Thus, Antonius 
not only argued that Norbanus had not been responsible for the riot, but that the 
defendant had acted in accordance with the will of the People. 
To sum up, what remains of the pro Cornelio indicates that Cicero modeled his 
defense strategy after the one used by Antonius when defending Norbanus on a charge of 
maiestas minuta. Both Cicero and Antonius conceded the facts of the case and instead 
elected to dispute the definition of maiestas populi Romani minuta. Both advocates 
argued that seditio did not necessarily amount to diminishing the maiestas of the Roman 
People. By undertaking a (selective) historical survey of seditiones in the Republic, both 
maintained that even violent civil discord frequently advanced the interests of the People. 
Such disturbances arise from legitimate grievances and in accordance with the popular 
will. 
In the case of Cornelius, the prosecution alleged that the defendant had done three 
things to diminish the maiestas of the Roman People: he had proposed a bad law (tulit 
mal am legem), he had violated the veto of a colleague by reading out the text of the law 
(legendo codicem intercessionem sustulit), and he had fomented seditio (seditionem 
fecit). 100 The first of these has little bearing on the subject of violence. Suffice it to say, 
99 de Oral. 2.124. See also: 2.203 - illam non Norbani seditionem, sed populi Romani iracundiam neque 
earn iniustam, sed meritam ac debitamfitisse defenderes . 
10° Corn. 1.19Cr = 5P - quod malam legem tulit, quod legendo codicem intercessionem sustulit, quod 
seditionem fecit. 
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Cicero rejects the notion that proposing a bad law- in this case, his privilegia law-
necessarily involves diminishing the maiestas of the Roman People. The orator points 
out that prominent consulares in the past had secured passage of legislation later deemed 
detrimental to the Republic. 101 Moreover, the Senate had various methods by which it 
could either invalidate a law or encourage its repeal or amendment. 102 
In part, Cicero responds to the charge that Cornelius had disregarded the veto of a 
tribune (legendo codicem intercessionem sustulit) by comparing what he had done with 
what his colleague, Aulus Gabinius, had done the same year. Like Cornelius, Gabinius 
had ignored the veto of another tribune when promulgating his law appointing Pompey to 
an extraordinary command against the pirates. Unlike the case of Cornelius (and, earlier, 
Norbanus), no actual violence seems to have occurred at the assembly in which the lex 
Gabinia was passed. Indeed, Cicero takes pains throughout the speech to dissociate the 
defendant from the violence that resulted from his actions. That said, the proceedings 
concerning the Gabinian law took place amid an atmosphere ofunrest. 103 Dio relates 
that, prior to the assembly, an attempt was made on Gabinius' life and that a mob had 
retaliated, nearly lynching one of the consuls -C. Calpurnius Piso. During the vote 
itself, L. Trebellius, a fellow tribune who had promised the Senate that he would die 
before he saw the law passed, interposed his veto. The assembled crowd threatened the 
10 1 Corn. 1.20-7Cr = 20-7P. C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75); L. Licinius Crassus and Q. Mucius Scaevola 
(coss. 95); P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus (cos. 194). The examples of Cotta and Scipio serve as a ring for 
this section. All of them also serve as an implicit a fortiori argument, since each of the measures was 
enacted while that of Cornelius was not. 
102 Corn. 1.26Cr = 25P references the lex Calpurnia de ambitu as an illustration of senatorial derogatio 
(amendment of an existing law). Since the optimas Calpurnius Piso proposed this law, Cicero likely 
intended this reference to highlight the prosecution's hypocrisy. 
103 Sources: Asc. 72.8-21C; Dio 36.24.4, 30.1-4; Plut. Pomp. 25.3-7. 
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obstructionist tribune with a menacing shout, and Gabinius moved to impeach him. 
Trebellius ultimately withdrew his veto, but not before seventeen tribes had voted to 
remove him from office. 
Pompey's subsequent success served to vindicate the wisdom of the law and the 
tactics used to pass it. This, at least, was the line taken by Cicero previously in the pro 
Lege Manilia and again in the following fragment. 104 Having detailed precisely what 
Gabinius had done at that contentious assembly and comparing it with what Cornelius 
had done, Cicero concludes his a fortiori argument with the following: 
Quae vir fortis, huius collega -A. Gabinius - in re optima fecit omnia; neque, cum 
salutem populo Romano atque omnibus gentibus finem diutumae turpitudinis et servitutis 
afferret, passus est plus unius collegae sui quam universae civitatis vocem valere et 
voluntatem. 
All these things, a brave man and colleague of this man - Aulus Gabinius - did in an 
excellent cause, and when he brought safety to the Roman People and to all nations an 
end to long-standing disgrace and servitude, he did not permit the voice and preference of 
one colleague to prevail over those of the entire state. 105 
As we saw in the first chapter, the widespread raids by pirates in the period 
leading up to the passage of the lex Gabinia shook the public's confidence in the Senate's 
ability to handle the situation. 106 With the support of the populus, Gabinius was able to 
overcome the Senate's obstructionism and appoint Pompey to a special command. 
Pompey proceeded to restore the safety and dignitas of the Roman People and, by 
104 See Chapter 1, esp. Leg. Man. 43-4, 53, 55-6, 64. 
105 Corn.l.31.6-9Cr=31P. 
106 App. Mith . 93; Cic. Leg. Man. 32-3, 53, 55-6; Plut. Pomp. 24.6. 
142 
extension, its maiestas. Thus, Cicero argues in the case of Cornelius that the defendant's 
disregard of Globulus' veto did not, in and of itself, amount to a diminishing of the 
People's maiestas. Gabinius had, in fact, enhanced the safety and dignitas of the People 
and their allies by taking even more extreme measures than Cornelius: whereas Cornelius 
suspended the vote on his proposal, Gabinius actually saw his measure passed; while 
Cornelius was prepared to legislate over the veto of his colleague, Gabinius sought to 
annul the office ofhis opponent. 107 
In tandem with this a fortiori argument, Cicero argues that the will of an 
individual should not trump that of the People- the civitas universa. The prosecution's 
contention that the maiestas populi Romani extended to the tribunician veto almost 
certainly prompted this assertion. Asconius relates that the prosecution's witnesses were 
arguing that Cornelius' reading out of his own law diminished the maiestas of the 
tribunate (ad crimen imminutae maiestatis tribuniciae pertinere), since the veto would 
prove ineffective if tribunes were permitted to do this. 108 The view that maiestas applies 
not only to the People, but to its elected officials as well coincides with the definition 
offered in the de Inventione, mentioned earlier: "to diminish maiestas is to detract from 
the dignitas or amplituda or potestas of the People or of those to whom the People have 
granted some power."109 Likewise in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, the author uses 
107 Corn. 1.31.1-6Cr = 31P = Asc. 71.17-72.1C- Unum tamen quod hoc ipso tr. pl.factum est 
praetermittendum non videtur. Neque enim maius est Iegere codicem, cum intercedatur, quam site/lam 
ipsum coram ipso intercessore deferre, nee gravius incipere ferre quam perferre, nee vehementius 
ostendere se laturum invito collega quam ipsi collegae magistratum abrogare, nee criminosius tribus ad 
legem accipiendam quam ad collegam reddendum privatum intra vocare. 
108 Asc. 61.2-SC- Valebant videri se iudicare earn rem magnopere ad crimen imminutae maiestatis 
tribuniciae pertinere; etenim prope tollebatur intercessio, si id tribunis permitteretur. 
109 Inv. 2.53- Maiestatem minuere est de dignitate aut amplitudine aut pates tate populi aut eorum quibus 
populus potestatem dedit aliquid derogare. 
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Caepio's disruption of the vote over Satuminus' grain law in order to illustrate the stasis 
of definition. Here again, maiestas extends to include the People's duly elected 
magistrates: "he has diminished maiestas who destroys the things from which the 
grandeur (amplituda) of the state is composed ... the vote of the People and the judgment 
(consilium) of the magistrate."110 
Implicit in Cicero's response is the idea that maiestas tribuniciae is qualitatively 
different from, indeed derivative of, maiestas populi Romani. This economy of maiestas 
is similar to that of political power, outlined in the first chapter: magistrates derive their 
power and prestige from the People and were expected to exercise that power in the 
interests of the community. So it is with maiestas. The maiestas of a magistrate was 
subordinate to that of the People. 111 Thus, Cicero frames the conduct of Gabinius as 
normative, since by ignoring the veto of his colleague, he upheld a fundamental 
republican principle: neque passus est plus unius collegae sui quam universae civitatis 
vocem valere et voluntatem. To have done otherwise would have been to acquiesce in 
tyranny. For this reason, Cicero deliberately uses civitas universa instead of populus 
Romanus, both to avoid the partisan connotations of the latter and to underscore the 
breadth of public sentiment. 
In the case of Cornelius, Cicero is able to point to the assembled crowd's reaction 
as evidence of the intensity of public sentiment and the direction of popular sympathy. 
That the crowd lashed out, not at Cornelius, but at the consul protesting the tribune's 
110 Rhet. Her. 2.17 - Maiestatem is minuit qui ea to/lit ex quibus rebus civitatis amplituda constat. Quae 
sunt ea, Q. Caepio? Suffragia populi et magistratus cons ilium. 
111 Badian 1972: 694-701; Bauman 1967: 12-3. 
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tactics suggests that the measure and its sponsor enjoyed strong public support. 11 2 
Similarly, Cicero relates that another Comelian proposal- a bribery law- also enjoyed 
popular support: 
Quare cum haec populus Romanus videret et cum a tribunis plebis doceretur, nisi poena 
accessisset in divisores, extingui ambitum nullo modo posse, legem bane Comeli 
flagitabat, illam quae ex S.C. ferebatur repudiabat, idque iure, ut docti sumus duorum 
consulum designatorum calamitate. 
For this reason, when the Roman People saw these things and when they were informed 
by the tribunes of the plebs that, unless a penalty against the distributors of bribes were 
added, it was altogether impossible for bribery to be abolished, they were demanding this 
law of Cornelius and rejected that law being put forward by a senatus consul tum, and 
rightly, as we have learned from the disaster of the two consuls designate. 113 
Like his initial proposal regardingprivilegia, the People supported Cornelius' 
bribery law. Indeed, they were agitating (jlagitabat) for it, though Cicero carefully 
avoids the impression that the tribunes roused the People. Instead, the People took action 
on their own when they saw and were informed by the tribunes (videret et ... tribunis 
plebis doceretur) of the ill effects ofthe bribe-distributors. Using antithesis, Cicero 
claims that they pressed for the Comelian law, while at the same time, rejecting the 
consular proposal carried in accordance with a senatus consultum (legem hanc Corneli 
jlagitabat, illam quae ex S.C. ferebatur repudiabat). The Comelian proposal, however, 
never became law. In the end, it was probably vetoed in favor of a less robust version 
sponsored by the consul, Piso. In the wake of elections the following year, the consuls-
11 2 Asc. 58 .18-23C. On the power of (perceived) consensus, see Chapter 4. 
11 3 Corn. 1.40Cr = 41P. Other sources for the law: Corn . 1.41Cr = 42P; Dio 36.38.1-5. 
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designate were accused ofbribery under the terms of the new law, the lex Calpurnia de 
ambitu. Cicero appears to argue that the ensuing trials and convictions- which he 
characterizes as a spectaculum - could have been avoided if the People had been 
permitted to approve the more stringent Carnelian law, which they supported. 114 
Assuming this interpretation is correct, then the demise of Cornelius' bribery law would 
be another example of an improper use of the veto: like the Gabinian law and the riot 
over the Carnelian privilegia law, the veto of the bribery law neither reflected the popular 
will nor served the People's interest. 
Cicero, therefore, gives the impression that the "seditious" tribune was not only in 
step with the desires and interests of the People, but that the Senate's leadership and the 
consul C. Calpumius Piso were not. Moreover, in the controversy over his privilegia 
law, the defendant sought to protect an exclusive right of the People that the Senate had 
arrogated for itself. Cicero could not deny that violence had resulted from Cornelius' 
actions, but he argued that the defendant had acted to promote rather than to diminish the 
maiestas of the Roman People. 
In this case, Cicero probably took the same position Antonius had, denying that 
the defendant was ultimately responsible for the actions of the crowd. Indeed, as we saw 
with the bribery proposal, Cicero portrays the People as having agitated for the law on 
their own. The prosecution, by contrast, appears to have tried to connect Cornelius with 
other episodes of public violence. In particular, Cominius sought to tie the defendant-
114 Corn. 1.41 Cr = 42P - ut sp ectaculum illud re et tempore salubre ac necessarium, genere <ef> exemplo 
miserum ac fimestum videremus. 
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and Cicero himself- to one of Cornelius' successors in the tribunate, C. Manilius. 115 
Early in his tribunate (perhaps December of 67), Manilius had used violence to secure 
passage of a law, first introduced by the infamous tribune, P. Sulpicius Rufus. 116 The 
measure allowed freedmen to vote in the tribes of their patrons rather than being 
relegated to one of the four urban tribes. On the day of the Compitalia, Manilius 
convened an illegal assembly and used violence to gain the law's passage. When public 
sentiment turned decisively against him, Dio relates that Manilius attempted to disown 
the proposal, claiming that the idea had originated with Crassus and others(£<; TE TOV 
Kpacrcrov Kat£<; UAAOU<; nvac; TIJV yYcOflT]V avfjycv). The prosecution's allegation that 
Cornelius had been the originator of the Manilian proposal suggests that the defendant 
might have been among those unnamed inDio's account. 
The violence unleashed at the assembly spurred further violence. One of the 
quaestors - L. Domitius Ahenobarbus - gathered a mob and succeeded in breaking up the 
assembly and killing some of the tribune's supporters. 117 Fearing for his own life, 
Manilius fled the city for the safety of Pompey's camp in Cilicia. 118 The prosecution also 
attempted to tie Cornelius to another violent episode - the riots of the bribe distributers 
(divisores) against the lex Calpurnia de ambitu. The prosecutor alleged that a certain 
slave of Cornelius had orchestrated the riot, but this seems unlikely. Beyond the reasons 
given by Cicero in the speech, the tribune's version of the law, as mentioned above, was 
115 Corn. 1.7, 14-8Cr = 8, 10-2, 18-9P. On Manitius as tribune, see Chapter 1; Crawford 1994: 127. 
116 Asc. 45 .7-19C, 65.3 -5, 10-8C; Cic. Corn. 1.14Cr = lOP (Asc. 64.11-6C); Dio 36.42.2-3; Treggiari 1969: 
49-50, 165. 
11 7 Asc. 45.11-9C. 
11 8 This probably explains why the witnesses for the prosecution insisted that the Republic could not 
survive if Cornelius remained a part of it. Val. Max. 8.5.4. 
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even more severe than the one proposed by Calpurnius Piso. Indeed, it targeted the 
divisores specifically, whereas the Calpurnian proposal did not. 119 
Though Cornelius may not have been directly involved in either of these episodes, 
there remained the issue of the abortive prosecution by the Co mini us brothers the 
previous year. It is hard to imagine that Cornelius was unaware of his supporters' 
intimidation of the prosecutors. The trial in 66 never progressed beyond the preliminary 
phase. On the first day of the proceedings, the praetor- L. Cassius - failed to appear and 
a number of known gang leaders surrounded the prosecutors and forced them to flee. 120 
The following year, a similar incident occurred during the trial of C. Manilius. When the 
proceedings resumed sometime later, both consuls stood watch in accordance with a 
consultum of the Senate; Manilius offered no defense and was subsequently 
condemned. 121 
Alarmed at the fate ofManilius and likely anticipating the prosecution's strategy 
of tying him both to Manilius and the use of public violence, Cornelius brought only a 
few companions into court "so that not even any verbal outburst should arise from his 
supporters" (ut ne clamor quidem ullus ab advocatis eius oriretur).122 Thus, the defense 
seems to have arranged it so that there would not be even the slightest hint of coercion at 
the trial. 
11 9 Corn. 1.44-SCr = 45-6P (Asc. 75.20-3C); Asc. 75.20-76.2C. 
120 TLRR 203 = Vanderbroeck 1987: B .l6, esp. Asc. 59.21-60.5C. 
12 1 TLRR 210 = Vanderbroeck 1987: B.l8, esp. Asc. 60.9-14, 66.1-14C; Dio 36.44.2. This followed a 
hearing before Cicero at the end of his term as praetor: Asc. 65 .6-7C; Cic. Corn. 1.7Cr = 8P; Dio 36.44.1-2; 
Plut. Cic. 9. 
122 Asc. 60.16-8C. 
148 
In addition to being iusta, Cornelius had also intended his seditio to be non-
violent. The People took matters into their own hands, and in so doing, the incident in 
question took its place in a long line ofhistorical cases in which the People agitated for 
reforms, sometimes engaging in seditiones, in an effort to preserve and enhance their 
rights. Like Antonius before him, Cicero devoted the final part of the speech to a 
historical survey that set the incident within the context of class struggles at Rome. Most 
of the extant examples in Cicero's survey do not include violent seditiones: most are non-
violent, and others do not rise to the level of seditio at all. Instead, each seems to feature 
the People acting to preserve and extend its rights in the face of senatorial opposition. 
Though only fragments of this survey remain, it seems that Cicero downplayed the role 
of individual leadership. In this way, his account shows an affinity with what we know 
ofCato's Origines and the new Marxists oftoday. The People took the lead, their leaders 
followed and sometimes paid a political price for doing so. Thus, Cicero could claim that 
Cornelius had only done what the People wanted and that responsibility for the violence 
lay squarely with them. 
A eulogy of Pompey, now lost, probably served as the orator's point of departure 
for the survey. 123 In it, Cicero likely referred to Pompey's recent legislation reinstating 
the full powers of the tribunate. Multiple sources relate that the People had long desired 
the restoration ofthe full complement oftribunician powers. Plutarch, for example, 
explains that, "there was nothing on which the Roman People had more frantically set 
123 Corn. 1.46-7Cr = 47-8P. Since it is not found in Asconius, the placement of the first fragment is 
problematic. I follow Crawford 1994: 128-9, contra Kumaniecki 1970: 26-7. Quint.lnst. 4 .3.13, refers to 
it as an example of digressio and characte1izes Cicero ' s treatment of the general as one would expect- a 
popularis commemoratio. See also: Quint.lnst. 9.2.55 . 
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their affections, or for which they had a greater yearning, than to behold that office 
again."124 When Pompey returned from having put down the Sertorians, his critics 
accused him of favoring the People more than the Senate, aiming to restore the authority 
of the tribunate, and courting the favor of the many. In pursuing the interests of the 
People, the same Sullani who were now accusing Cornelius of seditio also opposed him. 
Following his digression on Pompey, Cicero begins his historical survey by 
recounting the establishment of the tribunate, twice by seditio - once in 494 following the 
first secessio and then again in 449. Sixteen years after the founding of the Republic, 
Cicero relates that they "on account of the excessive tyranny of the powerful, they 
themselves restored the sacred laws for themselves ... "125 What remains of Cicero's 
version gives the impression that the populus acted on its own. He mentions no leaders 
by name. 126 Asconius specifically takes note of this when he observes that the account is 
given with brevity and clarity (et breviter et aperte) and that the orator fails to add only 
names (nomina sola non adicit) .127 Indeed, his decision to comment on this passage at all 
seems motivated by the lack of names. Moreover, Cicero uses the intensive pronoun to 
124 Plut. Pomp. 22.5 - oil yag EO"CLV o{mvo£ Ef.LfillVEO"CEQOV 6 'Pwf.La(wv i)gcw8TJ 6fJf.LO£ xal. f.Ld/...Aov 
br68TJOEV i1 ,;Yjv agxi]v ail8L£ bn6£iv f:xdVTJV. See also: Cic. Leg. 3.26; Verr. 1.44-5, which may in fact 
be Plutarch's source. 
125 Corn. 1.48Cr = 49P- Tanta igitur in ill is virtus fuit, ut anna XVI post reges exactos propter nimiam 
dominationem potentium secederent, leges sacratas ipsi sibi restituerunt, duo tribunos crearent, montem 
ilium trans Anienem qui hodie Mons Sacer nominatur, in quo armati consederant, aeternae memoriae 
causa consecrarent. ltaque auspicato postero anna tr. pl. comitiis curialis creati sunt. See also: Sal. Hist. 
3.48.1M. 
126 Liv. 2.32-3 identifies L. Sicinius Velutus as the leader of the first secession. Likewise, Corn. 1.49Cr = 
50P provides no names in the account of the reestablishment of the tribunate during the period of the 
decemvirs. See also: Asc. 77.2-8C. 
127 Asc. 77 .9-12C - Reliqua pars huius loci quae pertinet ad secundam constitutionem tribunorum et 
decemvirorumfinitum imperium et breviter et aperte ab ipso dicitur. Nomina sola non adicit .. . Asconius 
then goes on to supply the names of Appius Claudius Decemvir as the one responsible for the offense 
against L. Verginius and his daughter. He adds that the absence of a name in each case may be explained 
scilicet quod notissimum est (77 .14-6C). 
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emphasize the People's agency -propter nimiam dominationem potentium secederent, 
leges sacratas ipsi sibi restituerent ... 
There follow references to a series of laws enacted to promote the rights and 
freedoms of the People against the interests of Senate. 128 A praeteritio mentions the lex 
Porcia and two leges Cassiae; all of them granted certain rights to the People. 129 In the 
next fragment, Cicero tums to more recent history, the lex Aurelia of75, which allowed 
tribunes to seek higher office.130 When he was consul, C. Aurelius Cotta sponsored the 
measure against the wishes of the Sullani, who thereby became inimicissimi just as they 
would later be of Comelius. Cotta's motives remain obscure, but the speech of C. 
Licininus Macer recorded in Sallust suggests that the People demanded the proposal. In 
his address to the plebs two years after Cotta's law was passed, Macer exhorts his 
listeners to oppose the dominatio paucorum in order to reclaim their rights and liberty. 
He continues: 
An dubium habetis, num officere quid vobis uno animo pergentibus possit, quos 
languidos socordesque pertimuere? Nisi forte C. Cotta, ex factione media consul, aliter 
quam metu iura quaedam tribunis plebis restituit. 
Or do you doubt whether anything could stop you carrying on with one spirit, when faint 
and weak-minded, they were petrified of you? Unless perhaps C. Cotta, a consul drawn 
from the heart of the oligarchy, restored certain rights of the tribunes because of 
something other than fear. 131 
128 Corn. 1.50-54Cr= 51, 35, 52-4P. Crawford 1994:95, 131-5. 
129 Corn. 1.50 = 51P - Etiam haec recentiora praetereo: Porciam principium iustissimae libertatis; 
Cassiam qua lege suffragiorum ius potestasque convaluit; alteram Cassiam quae populi iudiciafirmavit. 
130 Lewis 2006: 274; Seager 1992: 211. 
13 1 Sal. Hist. 3.48.8 
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Seditio characterized the decade ofthe 70s. The example of Cotta provided Cicero with a 
perfect illustration of the People taking matters into their own hands, using violence, and 
compelling a magistrate to follow their lead. One could not accuse Cotta of being a 
firebrand or of orchestrating violence, but he apparently incurred the enmity of senatorial 
conservatives all the same. 
As praetor in 70, Cotta's brother- L. Aurelius Cotta- proposed the lex Aurelia, 
which brought an end to the Senate's monopoly over the courts. Juries would now to be 
comprised of equal numbers of senators, equites, and tribuni aerarii. In one of the fmal 
fragments of the speech, Cicero relates that the plebs agitated ( ejjlagitavit) for the law, 
along with the lex Roscia of 67, which provided equestrians with a certain number of 
seats at the theater. This privilege had been previously afforded to senators alone. 
Quam diu quidem hoc animo erga vos illa plebs erit quo se ostendit esse, cum legem 
Aureliam, cum Rosciam non modo accepit sed etiam efflagitavit? 
How long indeed will the plebs retain that spirit toward you, which they displayed when 
they not only accepted the lex Aurelia and the lex Roscia, but also agitated for them? 132 
By citing these two laws, Cicero calls attention to the benefits bestowed by the People on 
the equestrian class. The plebs did not merely consent to the passage of the leges Aurelia 
and Roscia, they agitated for them ( ejjlagitavit) in much the same way they had initially 
pressed for the defendant's bribery law (flagitabat) .133 But there is also an implicit threat. 
132 Corn. 1.53Cr = 53P. Kumaniecki 1970: 27-8 . contra Lewis 2006: 157; Crawford 1994: 133 who both 
read this lemma as a statement rather than a rhetorical question. 
133 Corn. 1.53 = 53P- ilia plebs ... non modo accepit sed etiam ejjlagitavit. Corn. 1.40Cr = 41P -
[populus] legem hanc Corneli jlagitabat. 
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If the equites on the jury fail to meet their obligations to the People, if they fail to 
vindicate the defendant whose only crime was to preserve the People's maiestas at the 
expense of the Senate's power, then the People may have to reevaluate the constituency 
of the juries. Needless to say, Cornelius was acquitted. 
Whether it was Cornelius, who was accused of inciting a riot, or Cicero himself in 
the Verrines, the rhetorical strategy pursued in both cases was to shift responsibility for 
violence to the crowds themselves. And yet Cicero does not blame the People. He was, 
after all, looking forward to his consular canvass, and he could not afford to alienate the 
People or its leadership. Instead, Cicero contextualizes the crowds' violent reactions, 
ultimately laying the blame at the feet of the governing class. In the Verrines, the orator 
explains how the crowds who attended the first actio became fearful and anxious after 
learning of the defendant's crimes. They wanted revenge and believed that their own 
libertas was being threatened. Such situations traditionally called for the use of 
collective violence. Indeed in the pro Cornelio, Cicero reminds his audience that the 
People won their rights through such seditiones- violent and otherwise. For this reason, 
the orator argues that violence does not necessarily diminish the maiestas populi Romani. 
True, the People's maiestas extends to its elected leaders, but like potestas, it is 
conditional. A tribune (or any other magistrate, for that matter) stands to lose his 
legitimacy, if he fails to act in accordance with the interests and will of the People. In 
such cases, the People are within their rights to reclaim their maiestas. Cicero's rhetoric 
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reveals that, although violence is borne out of the typically irrational emotions of metus, 
dolor, and odium, there is indeed a logic behind the People's use of violence. For the 
senatorial class, this was a lesson they could ill-afford to ignore. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Consular Speeches: The Power of Consensus 
de Lege Agraria II-pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo- in Catilinam I, IV 
Even before his inauguration, Cicero's term as consul promised to be momentous. 
A weak economy had exacerbated political divisions, and all the while, landless plebeians 
continued to migrate to the city in increasing numbers. Rumors of conspiracy abounded. 
From the beginning of the year and through the critical weeks ofNovember and 
December, much of Cicero's rhetorical and political strategy betrays a recognition that 
the exercise of imperium - executive power - and indeed the Republic as a whole, could 
not function without the People's consent. This was especially true in times of crisis. In 
both the pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo and the Catilinarians, Cicero points to the explicit 
consent of the People as a way to justify the abrogation of civil liberties and the use of 
force to restore order. 
Introduction: de Lege Agraria Oratio Secunda 
In his speeches de Lege Agraria, which he delivered in his first days as consul, 
Cicero signaled that he would pursue an unmihodox political strategy. In an apparent 
effort to address the problem of debt among the landless and win popular acclaim, the 
tribunes who had taken office in December of 64 proposed a number of popular reforms. 
Among them, P. Servilius Rullus proposed a sweeping bill to distribute land in Italy to 
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those without property.1 The landless would be settled on public land or land acquired 
from those willing to sell. Funding for the program would come from the sale of public 
property overseas, notably in Egypt, as well as loot gained from conquest. A board of ten 
would administer the program; seventeen tribes chosen by lot rather than the 
conventional thirty-five would elect the members of the board. Though most elements of 
the proposal had precedents elsewhere, the sum of its parts made it unpalatable to much 
of the nobility. When Cicero took office in January, he came out against the measure in 
his inaugural speech to the Senate- the first de Lege Agraria.2 Altogether, he delivered 
four speeches de Lege Agraria, three of which survive in whole or in part. 
When Cicero summoned a contio shortly after his speech to the Senate, most 
probably expected the new consul to give a customary speech outlining his approach to 
governing and thanking the People for his election. 3 The second de Lege Agraria, which 
he delivered on that occasion, begins true to form. In the exordium, Cicero acknowledges 
the People's great beneficia toward him and announces that he will conduct himself in 
office more like a tribune: he will be a popularis consul.4 Shortly thereafter, the speech 
shifts to an attack on the Rullan proposal, which continues unabated until the peroratio. 
The politics of the moment no doubt prompted his popularis pose. Since 70, the 
political environment had generally favored the popularis over the optimas. Cicero 
himself had taken advantage of it in the years leading up to this consulship, but he now 
1 The primary source for the law is de Lege Agraria. See also: Ferrary 1988; Mitchelll979: 177-97. 
2 Att. 2.1.3; Leg. Ag. 2.6. 
3 Leg. Ag. 2.1-4; Fin. 2.74. Pina Polo 2011: 319; Morstein-Marx 2004: 192; Mouritsen 2001: 54-5. 
4 Leg. Ag. 2.6- Ego aut em non solum hoc in loco dicam, ubi est id dictu facillimum, sed in ipso senatu, in 
quo esse locus huic voci non videbatur, popularem me futurum esse consul em prima ill a mea a ratione 
Kalendis Ianuariis dixi. See also: Leg. Ag. 1.23, 2.9, 15, 102. On Cicero's broader political sh·ategy: 
Duphi 2011: 290-3; Cape 2002: 124-8; Mitchell1979: 198-200. 
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found himself facing off against a popularis tribune. Rather than remaining above the 
fray, the second de Lege Agraria shows the consul willing to get into the gutter and 
employ "the 'popular' weapon of aggressive, invidious contional speech."5 Unlike his 
predecessors who, as consuls, were either reluctant to address the People or avoided the 
contio entirely, Cicero commits to engaging the People regularly.6 Given the ideological 
monotony of the contio in the late Republic, this required rhetoric that engaged popularis 
values, particularly libertas.7 But in the de Lege Agraria and, later, the pro Rabirio 
Perduellionis Reo, Cicero argues against efforts that have long been seen as promoting 
those values - agrarian laws and opposition to the senatus consultum ultimum, 
respectively. In light of this discrepancy, the consul defends himselfby maintaining that 
he is a popularis consul in fact rather than speech (consul re, non oratione popularis) and 
that, despite hoc populare legis agrariae nomen, the current proposal aims to satisfy the 
insatiable greed of certain men. 8 Cicero thereby challenges popular expectations about 
what it means to be a popularis and a consul. 
As we saw in the first chapter, collaboration in the form of mutual obligations 
characterized the relationship between the People and the governing class: the People 
elected magistrates whom they were expected to support; in return, magistrates were 
required to perform their duties in the interests of the community. But this did not always 
5 Morstein-Marx 2004: 193. 
6 Leg. Ag. 2.6- Accedit etiam ille mihi summus labor ac difficillima ratio consulatus gerendi, quod non 
eadem mihi qua superioribus consulibus lege et condicione utendum esse decrevi, qui aditum huius loci 
conspectumque vest rum par tim magnopere fugerunt, par tim non vehementer secuti sunt. 
7 Morstein-Marx 2004: 206-30. On libertas: Chapter 3, esp. Morstein-Marx 2004: 51-7, 84; Brunt 1988: 
330-4; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 542-65. 
8 Leg. Ag. 2.15 -ltaque hoc animo legem sumpsi in manus ... quam consul re, non oratione popularis et 
honeste et libenter posset defendere. §63 - Cognoscite nunc alios immensos atque intolerabiles quaestus, 
ut intellegatis ad certorum hominum importunam avaritiam hoc populare legis agrariae nomen esse 
quaesitum. See also: Leg. Ag. 1.14-5, 22, 2.46. 
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entail close collaboration. For most of the Republic, consuls- unlike tribunes- rarely 
participated in contiones.9 Though Cicero points out that his approach will involve 
greater difficulty (summus labor ac difficillima ratio consulatus gerendi), he claims that 
he owes it to the People, since their unanimous judgment rather than the influence of 
powerful men brought him victory over more distinguished candidates for the consulship 
- cum me intellegam non hominum potentium studio, non excellentibus gratiis paucorum, 
sed universi populi Romani iudicio consul em ita factum, ut nobilissimis hominibus Ionge 
praeponerer. 10 
Two details stand out in these lines, both of which reflect an attempt by Cicero to 
outflank his popularis opponent. First, he points to his margin of victory in the consular 
elections as evidence of his popularity. That he became consul universi populi Romani 
iudicio implies a consensus had formed in support of his candidacy .11 As we will see in 
both the pro Rabirio p erduellionis reo and the Catilinarians, Cicero appeals to popular 
consensus (whether real or not) as a way oflending legitimacy to otherwise controversial 
positions. At present, the controversy involves his standing as a popularis figure. 
Second, his rhetoric is marked by class antagonism. He makes use of popular 
catchwords, describing the nobility as potentes and pauci, while falsely suggesting that 
they failed to support his candidacy. 12 
9 Pina Polo 2011: 89-98, 276-84; Tan 2008. 
10 Leg. Ag. 2.7. 
11 See also: Bell 1997: 16-22 w. Leg. Ag. 2.4 - Jtaque me non extrema diribitio suffragiorum, sed primi illi 
vestri concursus, neque singulae voces praeconum, sed una vox universi populi Romani consul em 
declaravit. 
12 Mitchell1979: 170-5; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 442-3 . 
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Instead, Cicero credits the People with his victory, and so the People deserve his 
loyalty. At the same time, their support has apparently made them a target of resentment 
among certain members of the nobility. Cicero compares the consulship to a fortress, 
occupied by the nobility and defended in every way. 13 By electing Cicero, the People 
have broken it open, bypassing more noble candidates (nobilissimi homines) in favor of a 
"new man." For this reason, some elites stand ready to blame the entire populus if Cicero 
himself should stumble in any way as consul. 14 Such opposition from the nobility has 
produced a bond between himself and the electorate. With his trust in the People, Cicero 
has summoned a contio to consult with the People instead of the Senate, as was 
customary: he has urgent need of the People's wisdom concerning the meaning of the 
word popularis (Sed mihi ad huius verbi vim et interpretationem vehementer opus est 
vestra sapientia). The problem: while certain individuals deliver speeches in order to 
seem popularis, their positions are in fact detrimental to the welfare and interests of the 
People. 15 The question itself betrays his view of the matter, and indeed, he devotes much 
of the rest of the speech to arguing that his opponent should be considered among the 
false populares. 
His rhetoric suggests collaboration with his audience. Indeed, he later pledges 
that, if the People find themselves unconvinced by his arguments, he will yield to their 
13 Leg. Ag. 2.3 - Me p erlongo interval/a ... primum hominem novum consulem fecistis et eum locum, quem 
nobilitas praesidiis firmatum at que omni ratione obvallatum tenebat, me rescidistis virtutique in posterum 
patere voluistis. 
14 Leg. Ag. 2.5-6. Cicero returns to this theme in the final line of the speech: § 103 - Promitto, recipio, 
polliceor hoc vobis atque confirmo, me esse perfecturum, ut iam tandem illi, qui honori inviderunt meo, 
tam en vas universos in consule deligendo plurimum vidisse fateantur. 
15 Leg. Ag. 2.7- Versatur enim magnus error propter insidiosas non nullorum simulationes, qui cum populi 
non solum commoda, verum etiam salutem oppugnant et impediunt, oratione adsequi volunt, ut populares 
esse videantur. 
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auctoritas - a quality ordinarily associated with the Senate - and adopt their position 
(sequar auctoritatem vestram, mutabo meam sententiam ). 16 The theme of collaboration 
frames the speech as a whole. In the peroratio, Cicero declares that he has nothing to 
fear from his opponent, since the Roman People will support and protect him: 
Ego is consul, qui contionem metuam, qui tribunum plebis perhorrescam, qui saepe et 
sine causa tumultuer, qui timeam, ne mihi in carcere habitandam sit, si tribunus plebis 
duci iusserit? Ego cum vestris armis armatus insignibusque amplissimis omatus, 
imperio, auctoritate non horreo in hunc locum progredi posse vobisque auctoribus 
improbitati hominis resistere nee vereor, ne res publica tantis munita praesidiis ab istis 
vinci aut opprimi possit. 
Am I the sort of consul who fears a contio, who shudders at a tribune, who becomes upset 
often and without cause, who is afraid to be imprisoned if a tribtme has ordered it so? 
Armed with your arms and adorned with the most distinguished trappings of office, with 
power and auctoritas, I do not dread to be able to come to this place and, with your 
support, resist the depravity of the man, nor do I fear that the Republic is able to be 
overcome and crushed by such men as it is protected by such great defenses. 17 
Here, Cicero usurps the role of tribune and casts Rullus as the tyrannical magistrate. Up 
to this point in the speech, the consul has repeatedly accused his opponent of 
promulgating his law in an effort to secure extra-constitutional powers for himself and his 
allies.18 Building on the theme of a potential Rullan tyranny, Cicero suggests the 
unthinkable, that a tribune may actually attempt to lay hands on a consul. In the previous 
chapter, we saw how the inviolability of the tribune, which enabled him to intervene and 
protect a citizen from an abusive magistrate, ultimately rested on the threat of collective 
16 Leg. Ag. 2.16 - Quae cum, Quirites, exposuero, sifalsa vobis videbuntur esse, sequar auctoritatem 
vestram, mutabo meam sententiam . See also: Chapter 1; Jehne 2011 : 115-9. 
17 Leg. Ag. 2.101. 
18 Leg. Ag. 2.8, 15 , 17, 22, 24, 29, 32-5, 62, 74-5, 82, 87-9, 98-9. See also: Jehne 2011: 113-5; Vasaly 
1993: 222-43 . On the rhetoric of tyranny, generally: Hellegouarc'h 1972: 559-65; Dunkle 1967. 
160 
violence. Thus, an ideology of reciprocity characterized the relationship between tribune 
and populus. In this case, however, the roles are reversed. Cicero implies that the People 
will protect him physically (ego cum vestris armis armatus) because they have elected 
him consul (thus, he is insignibus amplissimis ornatus). As long as they continue to 
support him (vobis auctoribus), he will retain his imperium and auctoritas and have 
nothing to fear. 
Facing what he claims is a revolutionary threat from Rullus, Cicero engages the 
People and, in the process, suggests that he as consul (and, by extension, the Republic as 
a whole) cannot operate without the People's consent. Having elected him, the People 
must safeguard his legitimacy and, if necessary, his person. In the pro Rabirio 
Perduellionis Reo, Cicero points to the fact that the People themselves took up arms on 
behalf of the Senate against Saturninus; the consul does this in order to justify the 
otherwise controversial senatus consultum ultimum. 
Background to the pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo Oratio 
Though ostensibly forensic, the speech on behalf of C. Rabirius in 63 had 
significant political implications because of the victim and the ongoing controversy over 
the senatus consultum ultimum (SCU). Some thirty-seven years earlier in 100, Rabirius 
heeded Marius' call to arms, after Satuminus had arranged for the murder of C. 
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Memmius. 19 Memmius had been a candidate for the consulship of 99 along with both M. 
Antonius and C. Servilius Glaucia, a close ally of Saturninus. With Memmius out of the 
way, Saturninus hoped that the People would elect Glaucia, even though the latter was 
currently a praetor and so technically ineligible to stand for office. Reports of the 
murder, which had occurred in broad daylight in the middle of the Campus Martius, 
prompted the Senate to issue the SCU: it instructed the consuls to summon the 
appropriate tribunes and praetors and to take care that the power and maiestas of the 
Roman People be preserved.20 Marius complied and, with his colleague L. Valerius 
Flaccus, called upon the other magistrates and those who desired the wellbeing of the 
Republic to take up arms.21 C. Rabirius was among them. Saturninus, Glaucia, and their 
supporters retreated to the Capitol where they held out for some time. When their 
situation became desperate, the rebellious tribune hoped that his longstanding political 
alliance with Marius would allow him and the others to surrender on favorable terms. 
Marius obliged him to a point: he transferred Satuminus and Glaucia to the Curia, where 
it seems they were to be held until things cooled off and arrangements could be made for 
a trial. Instead, a mob that apparently included Rabirius attacked the House and lynched 
those inside. 
19 Sources: MRR 1.574-5, esp. App. B. Civ. 1.28, 32; Cic. Rab. Perd. 20, 22; Florus 2.4.1-5; Val. Max. 
3.2.18; Vir. Ill. 73.9-12. 
20 Rab. Perd. 20 - Fit senatus consultum ut C. Marius L. Valerius consules adhiberent tribunos pl. et 
praetores, quos eis viderentur, operamque darent ut imperium populi Romani maiestasque conservaretur. 
2 1 It was in Cicero's rhetorical interest to make it seem that the entire populus Romanus was armed (see 
below). Rab. Perd. 20, relates that the consuls bid the other magistrates (qui rem publicam salvam esse 
vellent) to take up arms and that arms were then distributed to the Roman People (arma populo Romano C. 
Mario consule distribuente dantur). Appian must be more accurate, when he relates that arms were not 
distributed to everyone but to "some" - presumably sympathetic- individuals (cl.m:A.L~E uva~, B. Civ. 1.32). 
See also: Nippell995: 57-60. 
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Over three and a half decades later, the tribune T. Labienus charged Rabirius with 
perduellio for the murder of Saturninus. Though Labienus enjoyed support from 
prominent men like Caesar and probably Crassus, the Senate itself opposed the tribune's 
efforts because it rightly perceived the actual target of the prosecution to be the SCU.22 
The last recorded prosecution for perduellio - commonly translated as "treason" - had 
taken place more than a century earlier in 169.23 Although he could easily have brought a 
more conventional charge like maiestas or vis, Labienus opted to create a stir by reviving 
the archaic duumviral procedure associated with the lex perduellionis. 
Unlike judges, the duumviri did not weigh evidence. Their exclusive role appears 
to have been to sentence the accused to death by scourging, with the body to be hung 
from a barren tree.24 Other than the case ofRabirius, history attests only one other clear 
example of the duumviral procedure - the legendary case of Horatius in the reign of 
Tullus Hostilius.25 Returning home after his victory over the Alban Curiatii, the Roman 
Horatius encountered his sister at the Porta Capena, mourning her betrothed who lay 
among the enemy dead. Enraged, he drew his sword and ran her through, proclaiming, 
"so let each Roman woman fare who mourns an enemy." Realizing that he had no choice 
but to condemn the youth, the king transferred the case to the duumviri so as to deflect 
22 Dio 37.26.1-27.1, 37.2; Suet. Jul. 12; Ward 1977: 162-7. On the SCU, see below. 
23 Despite the variety of activities prosecuted as perduellio , the common denominator was betrayal of one's 
country, which is the thrust of the author's comments at Rhet. Her. 4.15- qui p erduellionibus venditat 
patriam. Specific activities include infringing upon the tights of the king (Liv. 1.26.5-12), aiming at 
tyranny (Liv. 2.41.10-2, 6.20.4-12), dereliction of duty in war (Liv. 26.3.9; Schol. Bob. 90.4St), and 
infringing upon the rights of a tribune (Liv. 43.16.8-11 ). Prior to being exiled, p erduellio proceedings were 
commenced against Cicero (Cic. Mil. 36). 
24 Liv. 1.26.6- infelici arbori reste susp endito. The nature of the penalty and the perfunctory role of the 
duumviri suggest a primarily religious function. Watson 1979: 439-40; Tyrrelll978: 12-17,22-5. 
25 Liv. 1.26.5-12; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.21.1-22.8. Liv. 6.20.4-12, maintains that tribunes charged M. 
Manlius Capitolinus with p erduellio, though a variant tradition claims that he was sentenced by duumviri -
Sunt qui p er duumviros, qui de p erduellione anquirerent creatos, auctores sint damna tum. 
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the unpopularity he knew would follow. At the same time, he advised Horatius to appeal 
his sentence to the People. The assembly, after hearing testimony from the father, 
. dH . 26 acqmtte oratms. 
Assuming the episode happened at all, the right of appeal was probably not an 
original part of the duumviral process.27 Not only does the Horatius episode predate the 
institution of provocatio, the facts afforded little ground for an appeal: numerous 
witnesses had seen the hero kill his sister. Had there been any doubt, a different 
procedure probably would have been called for. 28 Labienus and his supporters likely 
advocated the duumviral procedure in the case of Rabirius because they contended that, 
like Horatius, his guilt was manifest. Indeed, an anecdote from the de Viris Illustribus 
implies that the accused had advertised his involvement in the killing by bringing the 
severed head of Satuminus around to dinner parties as a source of amusement.29 
Nonetheless, it seems that Rabirius won the right to appeal the duumviral verdict to an 
assembly of the People. 
The proceedings probably unfolded in the following way. One of the praetors-
perhaps, P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura- appointed C. Julius Caesar and his uncle, L. 
Caesar, as duumviri. Having been condemned, Rabirius appealed to the People. The 
tribune Labienus then brought a charge of perduellio before the comitia centuriata. 
26 The religious dimension of perduellio is underscored by the fact that father and son were subsequently 
required to conduct certain expiatory rites: Liv. 1.26.12-3; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.22.6-8. 
27 Drummond 1989: 220; Tyrrell1978: 19-22; 1973: 290-1; Bleicken 1959: 334-7. Also suggested by the 
ablative absolute at Liv. 1.26.8- Tum Horatius auctore Tullo, clemente legis interprete, "Provoco," inquit. 
28 Liou-Gille 1994: 19-20; Tyrre111978: 19; Bauman 1969: 5. Liv. 1.26.5-8 repeatedly makes reference to 
the fact that there was no choice but to condemn Horatius. In other instances of alleged p erduellio, 
quaestors or tribunes rather than duumviri investigate and prosecute cases: Cic. Rep. 2.60; Liv. 2.41.10-2, 
6.20.4-12, 26.3.9, 43 .16.11 ; Schol. Bob. 90.4St. 
29 Vir. Ill. 73.12- Caput eius Rabirius quidam senator per convivia in ludibrium circumtulit. 
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Prosecution and defense set forth their respective cases over a series of three contiones. 
Cicero probably delivered the pro Rabirio at a final contio prior to the vote, but the 
People never returned a verdict. With the centuries poised to convict, the praetor Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Celer himself resorted to an archaic practice in an effort to disrupt the 
proceedings: he arranged for the flag on the Janiculum to be lowered.30 Striking the flag 
traditionally signaled an enemy attack, in which case the presiding magistrate had no 
choice but to disband the comitia. Labienus chose not to renew his case, suggesting that 
his real aim was not to punish Rabirius so much as to score political points. 
To get a better sense of the political situation, we must look to Caesar, then one of 
the fifteen pontiffs. Sometime earlier, the pontifex maximus, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, 
had died.31 Caesar, who had probably already begun his canvass for the praetorship, 
decided to campaign simultaneously for the vacant post but soon found himself at a 
disadvantage. Two distinguished consulars were among his rivals for the position of 
pontifex maximus, and so Caesar turned to the street for support. The attack on Rabirius 
fit within a broader electoral strategy that entailed massive bribery and the promotion of 
popular initiatives. 32 The revival of a defunct religious-judicial procedure suited his aims 
perfectly, since it allowed him to draw on his resources as pontiff in a popular, high-
profile cause.33 His subsequent appointment as duumvir ensured that, in the public' s 
30 Dio 37.27.3-28.4. Suet. Jul. 12, indicates that the defendant would have been acquitted, but the politics 
of Caecilius Metellus Celer makes this unlikely: Tyrrell 1978: 45-6; contra Tyrrell 1973: 297-300. 
31 Dmmmond 1989: 150-1. Sources: Dio 37.37.1-3; Plut. Caes. 7.1-4; Suet. Jul. 13. 
32 Taylor 1942: 422-3 ; Dio 37.37.2- v£oc; xal, j.LrJOEnw EO"CQaL11YrJXW<; £m8UJ.U1Q£ , xal £v t<P n!-:tl8£L 
"CTJV £An(Oa a'inf]c;, ou'.t. "C£ "CaAAa xal em t<P "C£ i\a~Lf]vcp xma wiJ ' Pa~LQLO'U ouvrJywvLow xal "COV 
AEV"CC'UAOV ano8av£iv oux £'tjJf]cpww, A.a~wv "CCV"CO "(;£ EJtQas£, xal OQXlEQEW<; "CWV novucp(xwv' 
xaln£g aAAWV "(;£ tf]c; "Clj.Lf]c; JtOAAWV xal "COV KawiJA.ou j.LOAlota OV"ClJtOlO'U j.Lfvwv, an£0£LX81J. 
33 Liou-Gille 1994: 6-11, 30. Rab. Perd. 15, alludes to the pontifical records - isle omnis et suppliciorum et 
verborum acerbitates ... ex annalium monumentis atque ex regum commentariis. 
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mind, he would be closely associated with, if not seen as responsible for, the solemn 
spectacle. Of the two duumviri, he was also selected by lot to condemn Satuminus' 
alleged killer.34 His efforts evidently won popular favor, since the People later elected 
him pontifex maximus and praetor on separate occasions. 
For Caesar and his allies, the appeal of the Rabirius case had less to do with the 
defendant and more to do with the SCU, the pretext under which the killers had acted. 
Prior to the second century, the Senate's practice had been to establish special 
commissions (so-called quaestiones extraordinariae) to deal with alleged conspiracies.35 
Unlike the quaestiones perpetuae established by law, the senatorial commissions 
operated without the People's formal approval. Nonetheless, they at first seem to have 
been uncontroversial, even when sentencing Roman citizens to death.36 This changed in 
133, however, when a mob that included prominent senators attacked and killed Ti. 
Gracchus and a number of his followers. Beforehand, the consul and the Senate had been 
reluctant to support the attack, but afterward rallied to protect their own. The body issued 
a series of decrees defending the group, especially its distinguished leader P. Cornelius 
Scipio Nasica. It also established a special commission (quaestio nova) to investigate 
and punish those who had supported the renegade tribune.37 
When C. Gracchus became tribune a decade later, he sought to guard against the 
kind of senatorial vigilantism that had claimed the life of his older brother. He proposed 
34 In his delivery, however, he seems to have misjudged the public mood, reciting the formula with undue 
zeal. Suet. Jul. 12. See also: Cic. Rab. Perd. 13; Liv. 1.26.7. 
35 Cloud 1992: 504-5; Kunkel1962: 58-63 
36 Lintott 1972: 253-4 attributes this both to the public nature of the commissions and (less persuasively) to 
the fact that the accused enjoyed the right of provocatio. 
37 Gaughan 2010: 110-7. Sources: Cic. Arnie. 37; Dam. 91 ; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 19-20; Val. Max 4.7.1. 
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a law forbidding the execution of a citizen without the People's approval (ne de capite 
civium iniussu populi iudicaretur).38 The law almost certainly did not apply to the 
quaestiones perpetuae, which had been established by the People, instead targeting the 
use of special commissions. The law would be tested less than two years later, when a 
supporter of Gracchus killed an attendant of one of the consuls, and the situation quickly 
escalated.39 Gracchus and his supporters took up arms and positions on the Aventine, 
while the Senate passed the SCU, instructing the magistrates to see that the Republic not 
be harmed. The consul L. Opimius led an assault on the Aventine, and his force 
massacred some 3,000 Gracchan supporters. For the moment at least, force of arms had 
settled the issue: senatorial prerogative in the form of the SCU would take precedence 
over civil liberties in times of crisis. The following year, the People upheld the verdict of 
events. When a tribune of the plebs brought Opimius before the People on a charge of 
having violated the rights of citizens, the assembly acquitted him.40 Some twenty years 
later, the absence of any retaliatory prosecutions in the immediate aftermath of the 
Satuminus affair likewise suggested the matter was settled.41 
But politics not only produces law, it dictates its application over time. The issue 
of individual liberties and the spirit of the lex Sempronia returned with a vengeance in the 
years leading up to Cicero's consulship. In the three-year period between 66 and 64, 
38 MRR 1.513-4, esp. Cic. Rab. Perd. 12; Plut. C. Gracch. 4.1-2. Gaughan 2010: 117-21; Cloud 1992: 494; 
Jolowicz and Nicholas 1972: 315-7; Kunkel1962: 28n. 89, 58-9. 
39 MRR 1.520, esp. App. B. Civ. 1.24-6; Diod. 34.28-9; Plut. C. Gracch. 13-7. 
40 Gaughan 2010: 119-21. Cic. Bntt. 128; de Orat. 2.106, 132; Part. Orat. 106; Sest. 140; Liv. Per. 61. At 
about the same time, the Senate sent P. Cornelius Lentulus on a long-term mission to Sicily. Cornelius 
Lentulus had been involved in the attack on the Aventine, and the purpose for sending him on the mission 
was probably to protect him from prosecution. Val. Max. 5.3.2f. 
41 Dio 37.26.3 
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Caesar became one of several engaged in prosecuting beneficiaries of the Sullan 
proscriptions.42 Fifteen years earlier, Sulla had returned to Rome and routed the forces of 
Caesar's father-in-law, Cinna, whose forces were then in control of city. No doubt 
anxious to appease the victor, the People promptly voted to appoint Sulla as dictator, 
allowing him to dispatch his political enemies with impunity.43 He accomplished this by 
publishing a series of lists indicating who could be killed and whose property seized. 
Though at odds with the principle of provocatio, the proscriptions received legal sanction 
from the People, and many Sullani became quite rich. A decade and a half later, 
however, the political and judicial landscape had changed, and Caesar sought to take 
advantage. 
The Power of Consensus in the pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo Oratio 
Cicero begins the pro Rabirio by defending himself. The speech opens with three 
antitheses comparing the orator's personal and political motives for taking the case. Each 
moves from the personal to the political, the latter being more favorable ground on which 
to mount a defense. Rabirius, of course, had a reputation for having carried the severed 
head of Satuminus to dinner parties. Though a backbencher, it was his ignominy that 
probably made him the target of several prosecutions years later, including the present 
one.44 The repeated attacks almost certainly took a toll on his reputation so that, when 
42 Gruen 1974: 276-7. Sources: Asc. 73.1-20, 90.25-91.13C; Dio 37.10.1-2; Plut. Cato Min. 17.4-5. 
43 Gaughan 2010: 131-4. Sources: Cic. Leg. 1.42; Rose. Amer. 125-6. 
44 Rab. Perd. 7-9; Tyrrell1978 : 65-75 . 
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Cicero came before the People to defend him, the consul had to explain himself.45 The 
personal reasons given by Cicero are rather generic46 - their long-standing friendship 
(vetustas amicitiae), the defendant's dignitas, his own long-standing practice (meae vitae 
perpetua consuetudo), common decency (ratio human it a tis), the dangers facing any 
accused citizen, which the orator claims is always enough to justify a close friendship 
(cum omnibus civibus in eo rum periculis semper sa tis ius tam mihi causam necessitudinis 
esse duxi) . He makes no explicit claims about the character of the accused, suggesting -
along with the historical evidence- that the defendant's reputation was simply toxic . 
Even in the best of circumstances, Cicero probably would have received a less than 
sympathetic hearing. Labienus had summoned the contio and, as was custom, would 
have stacked it with his own supporters.47 The story of Caecilius Metellus Celer, 
probably an optimas, lowering the flag on the Janiculum in order to preempt the voting 
accords well with this view. 
In light of his client's ignominy, Cicero generalizes the case. He pivots via the 
introductory antitheses from personal to political motives, elevating his speech from that 
of an advocate to that of a consul. Indeed, he later declares that the issue of Saturninus' 
death demands not an orator's talent but the aid of a consul (non oratoris ingenium sed 
consulis auxilium implorat etflagitat).48 Even more than his relationship with Rabirius, 
the welfare of the Republic (salus rei publicae), his consular duty (consulare officium), 
and the consulship itself (consulatus ipse), which he says his audience- the People-
45 Thus, the speech's opening line - Etsi, Quirites, non est meae consuetudinis initio dicendi rationem 
reddere qua de causa quemque defendam ... 
46 Rab. Perd. 1-2. 
47 Rab. Perd. 6, 9, 38. On contiones: Chapter 1, esp. Morstein-Marx 2004: 160-203. 
48 Rab. Perd. 9, the conclusion of the priamel. 
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have committed to him along with the welfare of the Republic (mihi una a vobis cum 
salute rei publicae commendatus), compels him to defend the accused.49 Cicero thereby 
frames his defense in terms of republican ideology: the People have committed the 
consulship to him; he is obligated to act in their interest; the defense ofRabirius is in 
their interest. The case ultimately hangs on the last of these, and the orator's repetition of 
salus rei publicae signals the line he intends to take. 
It would be difficult, however. Not only was the crowd hostile, but opposition to 
what was seen as senatorial vigilantism had been tenet of popularis dogma since at least 
the time of the Gracchi. As he had done in the debate over the Rullan proposal, Cicero 
adopts the persona of a popularis consul, co-opting popularis rhetoric to promote the 
interests of the Senate. He exhibits mildness (lenitas), for example- a hallmark of the 
popularis - when he claims that his ratio humanitatis and willingness to aid those in 
danger have prompted him to defend Rabirius.50 Adopting the vocabulary ofprovocatio, 
he compares the case to a citizen in distress: it calls for the kind of auxilium ordinarily 
provided by tribunes (consulis auxilium implorat etjlagitat).51 
Casting himself as a tribune, Cicero leaves Labienus to play the part of a would-
be tyrant. Thus, the consul again challenges his audience about what it means to be a true 
popularis. He offers the duumviral procedure as a criterion and recalls how Labienus has 
49 Rab. Perd. 2, the second antithesis - Nam me cum amicitiae vetustas, cum dignitas hominis, cum ratio 
humanitatis, cum meae vitae p erpetua consuetudo ad C. Rabirium def endendum est adhortata, tum vera, ut 
id studiosissime face rem, sa/us rei publicae, consulare officium, consulatus denique ipse mihi una a vobis 
cum salute rei publicae commendatus coegit. 
50 See also: Rab. Perd. 13 . On lenitas : Hellegouarc 'h 1972: 261-3 
5 1 On vocabulary ofprovocatio: Chapter 3, esp. Lintott 1972: 228-31. 
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repeatedly accused him of abolishing it. 52 Rather than denying it, he embraces the 
charge. Indeed, Cicero wishes that he had been the one to banish the executioner from 
the Forum, the cross from the campus, and to do away with a procedure he later describes 
as non tribunicia sed regia. 53 But, he cannot take credit: those ancestors who drove out 
the kings and established the Republic deserve the glory, as well as those later who, 
during the Conflict of the Orders, desired that the People's libertas should not be attacked 
by harsh punishments but guarded by mild laws (deinde multorum virorumfortium qui 
vestram libertatem non acerbitate suppliciorum infestam sed lenitate legum munitam esse 
voluerunt).54 Nonetheless, Cicero boasts of his having used all of his resources, plans, 
words, and deeds to fight off and resist Labienus' cruelty (ego omnibus meis opibus, 
omnibus consiliis, omnibus dictis atquefactis repugnarim et restiterim crudelitati) .55 
The attribution of crudelitas again shows Cicero to be resorting to popularis 
commonplaces. In contrast with their own len it as and dementia, populares frequently 
accused their oligarchic opponents of crudelitas, a sweeping charge that could apply as 
52 Rab. Perd. 10 - Nam de perdue/lion is iudicio, quod a me sublatum esse criminari soles, meum crimen 
est, non Rabiri. 
53 Rab. Perd. 10 - Quid enim optari pot est quod ego mall em quam me in consulatu mea carnificem de foro , 
cntcem de campo sustulisse? § 17-prae me fero te ex ilia crud eli, importuna, non tribunicia actione sed 
regia, mea consilio, virtute, auctoritate esse depulsum . 
54 Rab. Perd. 10. 
55 Rab. Perd. 15. See also: §§10, 17. Dio 37.27.1 relates that the Senate debated two issues before the 
proceedings began, the first over whether or not the court should convene (nEg( l:E 1:0iJ OlXa01:YJQl01J) . On 
this issue, the Senate was split, but in the end, Caesar and his supporters prevailed. The duumviri would 
condemn Rabirius. But wrangling began anew, this time over the verdict (n:Ept Tfjc; Kpiaccoc;): the issue in 
this case seems to have been whether the verdict would be final or Rabirius would be allowed to appeal. 
On this, Cicero seems to have won the day and so is accused of abolishing the duurnviral procedure. 
Presumably on the basis of Rab. Perd. 11 (an ego quifimestari contionem contagione carnificiis veto), 
Tyrrell 1978: 44, 76-9; 1973: 292 maintains that Cicero used his potestas as consul to veto the proceedings. 
But § 15 and, to a lesser extent, § 17 suggest that the setting aside of the verdict involved the kind of debate 
and political maneuvering alluded to by Dio. As he does elsewhere in the excursus, Cicero's use of veto 
instead appears to be an appropriation of popu/aris-tribunician vocabulary. The upshot: both sides 
probably carne to an agreement in the Senate before the proceedings began. 
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easily to opponents of a grain law as to a heavy-handed magistrate. 56 At the same time, 
Cicero takes what must have been a standard popularis criticism of the SCU, that it was 
cruel, and applies it to the duumviral procedure. 57 By suggesting that harsh punishments 
threaten libertas, Cicero paints Labienus as a modem day Tarquinius,58 prompting him to 
ask the tribune, Quam ob rem uter nostrum tandem, Labiene, popularis est? 
Conversely, Cicero argues that the SCU is a bulwark of the Republic and of 
benefit to the People. The term res publica can denote the political community or the 
sum of public institutions that every citizen had either a claim to or stake in. 59 Both 
definitions imply a level of organization and a set of common practices - a consensus of 
governing principles - that Cicero accuses his opponents of seeking to undermine: 
Non enim C. Rabirium culpa delicti, non invidia vitae, Quirites, non denique veteres 
iustae gravesque inimicitiae civium in discrimen capitis vocaverunt, sed ut illud summum 
auxilium maiestatis atque imperi quod nobis a maioribus est traditum de re publica 
tolleretur, ut nihil posthac auctoritas serratus, nihil consulare imperium, nihil consensio 
bonorum contra pestem ac pemiciem civitatis valeret, idcirco in his rebus evertendis 
unius hominis senectus infirmitas solitudoque temptata est. 
For it is not the guilt owing to a crime, the moral outrage owing to his life, nor finally -
fellow citizens- the justified, longstanding, and serious enmities on the part of citizens 
that have landed C. Rabirius in danger of his life, but in order that that most distinguished 
bulwark of maiestas and imperium, which has been handed down to us by our ancestors, 
may be abolished from the Republic, in order that afterward no auctoritas of the Senate, 
no consular imperium, no consensus of good citizens may prevail against the plague and 
56 Dunkle 1967. 
57 Rab. Perd. 10-7. See also: Cape 2002: 134. For popularis criticisms of the SCU, see below. 
58 Cicero will soon explicitly make this comparison: Rab. Perd. 13- Tarquini, superbissimi atque 
crudelissimi regis, ista sunt cruciatus carmina quae tu, homo Ienis ac popularis, libentiss ime commemoras. 
59 Flower 2010: 10-12; DNP 10.927-9 (Galsterer) . In the latter sense of the word, res publica is like res 
militaris and res divina, referring to an "activity or practice in a specific field" OLD s.v. res 8. On the 
relationship of the term to populus : Cic. Rep. 1.39 - Est ig itur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi; 
populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris 
consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. 
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ruin of the citizenry; wherefore, in the process of overturning these institutions, one man 
-old, infirm, alone- has been attacked.60 
By returning to the theme of Rabirius and appealing to pathos at the end of the passage 
(unius hom in is senectus injirmitas solitudoque temptata est), the third antithesis of the 
speech turns out to be a chiasmus: the personal-Rabirius narrative (A) frames its political 
counterpart (B), set out over two purpose clauses. At the center of the prosecution, then-
literally and figuratively- Cicero locates an attack on the Republic. 
The initial purpose clause euphemistically refers to the SCU as the summum 
auxilium maiestatis atque imperi. As such, it reveals an attempt by Cicero to "rebrand" 
the measure in the face of criticism that seeks to characterize it as a revolutionary tool of 
the oligarchy.61 Cicero responds in two moves: first, he implies that the decree is a 
longstanding rather than a novel institution; he describes it as quod nobis a maioribus est 
traditum -a dubious claim- and declares that those behind the prosecution are seeking 
to undermine its normative standing (de republica tolleretur). Second and more 
significant, he characterizes the consul tum as a form of auxilium not unlike that provided 
by tribunes to citizens exercisingprovocatio. Traditionally, a tribune would interpose 
himself physically between the magistrate and the victim, a move that required the use of 
force. In the case of the SCU, the no biles render aid, and so Cicero applies the epithet 
60 Rab. Perd. 2. 
61 Such criticisms are variously referred to at App. B. Civ. 1.2.17; Caes. Civ. 1.7.5-6; Cic. Cat. 1.27-9; Sal. 
Cat. 51.18. 
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summum, a term associated with the upper class. 62 That the People are beneficiaries is 
implied by the objective genitives maiestatis atque imperi, both customary attributes of 
the populus. 63 What is more, the choice of these particular qualities likely references the 
specific wording of the SCU under which the defendant had acted. The decree had 
authorized the magistrates to take action against Saturninus ut imperium populi Romani 
maiestasque conservaretur. 64 Cicero thereby confounds the expectations of his audience, 
crediting the Senate with providing auxilium to the People via the SCU while accusing 
his opponent- a tribune- of seeking to abolish it. Such charges of hypocrisy allow 
Cicero (and, by extension, the Senate) to usurp the popularis role and challenge the tenets 
of popularis orthodoxy. 
While the first purpose clause links the SCU with the People, the second employs 
a tricolon to outline its implementation. The first colon refers to the Senate's enactment 
of the measure, whereby the body of former magistrates lends its moral authority 
(auctoritas senatus) to the proposal. The second refers to the power of the consuls 
( consulare imperium), whom the Senate designates as executors. Later in the speech, 
Cicero recounts how the SCU of 100 decreed that the consuls should summon the 
appropriate tribunes and praetors, and take the necessary steps so that the power and 
majesty of the Roman People be preserved. The consuls, in tum, summoned the tribunes 
62 On auxilium: Chapter 3. On summus: Achard 1981:47, 382; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 231. See also: Pis. 4, 
where Cicero similarly uses tribunician language when describing the auctoritas senatus (i .e. SCU) as 
having been "interposed" - ego in C. Rabirio perdue/lion is reo XL ann is ante me consul em interpositam 
senatus auctoritatem sustinui contra invidiam atque defendi. 
63 For example, Rome's treaty with the Aetolians in 189, recorded at Liv. 38 .11.2 - imperium maiestatem 
populi Romani gens Aetolorum conservato sine dolo malo. See also: Cic. Corn. 1.5Cr = 6P = Quint. Inst. 
Orat. 7.3 .35; Part. Orat. 105. 
64 Rab. Perd. 20. See also: Bauman 1967: 49-50. 
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and praetors, bidding them to take up arms and follow them. All obeyed, at which point, 
Marius oversaw the distribution of arms to the People.65 
The People prove to be the critical element. In terms of actually restoring order, 
the absence of both a police force and a standing army at Rome meant that enforcing the 
decree required the mobilization oflarge numbers of supporters.66 This made enlistment 
a political operation. By taking up arms in accordance with the decree, Cicero interprets 
their support for the Senate as an act of consent, to which consensio bonorum refers. As 
it does elsewhere, Cicero uses bani to refer to members of the community devoted to the 
Republic's existing social and political order.67 As such, their ideology reflects a 
consensus (consensio)68 about governing principles, one that emphasizes the mas 
maiorum and the Senate's preeminent role in society. Unlike the equites or nobiles, 
whose respective identities are a function of wealth and political status, the consensio 
bonorum transcends ordinary distinctions of class, locale, and family. 
This consensus was essential to the Republic. A general agreement on issues such 
as the need to share power and the means by which one could legitimately gain it lent 
stability to the ship of state as it traversed centuries of otherwise unprecedented social 
and political change.69 But by the time of the trial- if not earlier- this consensus was 
unraveling, and within twenty years, it no longer held.70 To endure, all communities 
65 Rab. Perd. 20- Adhibent omnis tribunos pl. praeter Saturninum, praetores praeter Glauciam; qui rem 
publicam salvam esse vellent, arma capere et se sequi iubent. Parent omnes; ex aedificiis 
armamentariisque publicis arma populo Romano C. Mario consule distribuente dantur. 
66 Nippell995 : 57. 
67 Achard 1981: 60-l; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 484-95; Lacey 1970: 10-6; Wirszubski 1961: 13-4. 
68 Rather than concordia, Cicero opts for the less politically charged consensio. This itself represents an 
attempt to foster consensus. Burckhardt 1988: 70-85; Achard 1981: 72-4. 
69 Flower 2010: 10-2; Meier 1966: 24-63 . 
70 Krasser 2006: esp. 9-12; Meier 1966: esp. 301-6. See also: Kunkel 1972: 42-8. 
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require consensus regarding governing principles, if not in fact, then at least in 
appearance. Maurice Duverger implies as much, when he writes: "There is consensus in 
a society when we can observe among its members a fairly general agreement on the 
form of government regarded as legitimate."71 As a psychological phenomenon, 
however, consensus is inherently opaque and requires communal acts to evince its 
presence.72 In times of peace, such public demonstrations can contribute to relieving 
social, political, and economic tensions while reinforcing communal solidarity. During 
the Republic, contiones, elections, the enactment of laws, comitial trials, religious 
festivals , and various spectacles were all occasions for affecting consensus.73 
In times of unrest, collective acts of consent can be critical to restoring order. By 
metonymy, consensio bonorum- "consensus of good citizens"- refers to this sort of act. 
In recounting the events of 100, Cicero says that Marius distributed arms to the Roman 
People (arma populo Romano C. Mario consule distribuente dantur), and he later claims 
that all who were in Rome at the time took up arms and followed the consuls.74 None 
dissented. Men from all classes gathered in the Forum to oppose Saturninus: the entire 
Senate ( cunctus senatus ), the equestrian order ( equester or do), and all men of every class 
who judged that their own welfare lay with the welfare of the Republic ( omnes omnium 
71 Duverger 1972: 102. Emphasis mine. 
72 Holkeskamp 2010: 98-106; Bell2004: 1-23; Flaig 1995 : 77-127. On "explicit" versus "tacit" acts of 
consent: Hampton 1998: 379-84, w. Locke Second Treatise of Government§ 122 - "submitting to the laws 
of any country, living quietly and enjoying the privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a 
member of society ... And thus we see foreigners, by living all their lives under another government and 
enjoying the privileges and protection of it . .. do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that 
commonwealth. Nothing can make any man so but his actually entering into it by positive engagement and 
express promise and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political societies, 
and that consent which makes anyone a member of any commonwealth." 
73 As such, they served on some level as "consensus rituals" (i.e. Konsensritual) in which the populus 
Romanus played the indispensible role. Flaig 1992: 84-6. 
74 Rab. Perd. 20, 31. 
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ordinum homines qui in salute rei publicae salutem suam repositam esse arbitrantur). 
With this, Cicero interprets their taking up of arms as an act of consent grounded in self-
interest. 
On the subject ofthe SCU,populares probably argued that the Senate had forced 
the measure upon the People in violation of the lex Sempronia ne de capite civium iniussu 
populi iudicaretur, but Cicero's version of events calls this narrative into question. 
Instead of an instrument of oppression, the SCU serves as a means of popular action, not 
unlike the assemblies or traditional provocatio. Thus, the tribuni aerarii and the men of 
all other classes took up arms in order to defend their common libertas - quid de tribunis 
aerariis ceterorumque ordinum omnium hominibus qui tum arma pro communi libertate 
ceperunt?75 
Cicero's narrative implicates the People in the death of Satuminus and, as such, it 
amounts to an argumentum ad populum.76 To this end, he conflates the initial taking up 
of arms with the subsequent lynching of Satuminus by means of a logical fallacy - si 
interfici Saturninum nefas fuit, arma sumpta esse contra Saturn inurn sine scelere non 
possunt.77 The lynching, he mentions only in passing78 and is thus able to avoid the 
difficult questions surrounding the actual death of Satuminus. At the same time, Cicero 
declares that virtually everyone over a certain age stands with Rabirius, accused of a 
75 Rab. Perd. 27. See also: §30. 
76 That is, an argument that something is right because it is popular. Though generally regarded as a logical 
fallacy, such appeals to majority opinion can be rhetorically effective, particularly on issues of morality, 
character, and aesthetics. In the case of Rome, its effectiveness stems from the fact that the populus 
Romanus constituted the honor group. See also: Chapter 1; P6schl1975 : 216-8; Oehler 1961; Arist. Pol. 
3.1281b1-10; Cic. Brut. 184-93; de Oral. 2.159; Hyp. Lye. 14; Tac. Dial. 32.2. 
77 Rab. Perd. 19. 
78 Rab. Perd. 18, 28. 
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capital crime.79 Having alienated Labienus from the People, Cicero seizes the open 
ground and (like a tribune) interposes himself between the People and those seeking to do 
them harm. He echoes a point made earlier by Labienus: with Rome's success overseas, 
only internal threats remain. Whereas his opponent almost certainly had the SCU in 
mind, Cicero instead warns the People about passions (a nostris cupiditatibus), 
demagogues desiring revolution (a turbulentis hominibus atque novarum rerum cupidis), 
internal evils (ab intestinis malis), and homegrown plots (a domesticis consiliis); in short, 
things that have the potential to destabilize the Republic.80 Not only does the consul 
point to the SCU as a defense against these threats, his subsequent claim that the decree 
has been passed down by the maio res suggests that it had been a longstanding part of the 
Republic's consensus. 
As a result, C. Marius - the original popularis consul- did not shrink from using 
it, and neither would Cicero. Indeed, the present consul professes a willingness to use it 
against Labienus, if he should follow the example of Saturninus. At the same time, he 
suggests that the validity and effectiveness of the decree ultimately lie with the People: 
Quid facerem, siT. Labienus caedem civium fecisset ut L. Satuminus, si carcerem 
refregisset, si Capitolium cum armatis occupavisset? Facerem idem quod C. Marins 
79 Rab. Perd. 31 - Neminem esse dico ex his omnibus, qui il/o die Romae fit erit, quem tu diem in iudicium 
vocas, pubesque tumjiterit, quin arma ceperit, quin consules secutus sit. Omnes ei quorum tu ex aetate 
coniecturam facere p ates quid tum f ecerint abs te capitis C. Rabiri nomine citantur. 
80 Rab. Perd. 33-4- Si immortalem hanc civitatem esse voltis, si aeternum hoc imperium, si gloriam 
sempiternam manere, nobis a nostris cupiditatibus, a turbulentis hominibus atque novarum rerum cupidis, 
ab intestinis malis, a domesticis consiliis est cavendum. Hisce autem mal is magnum praesidium vobis 
maiores vestri reliquerent. See also: §3, an earlier admonition that the People block all paths of civil 
discord (intercludere omnis seditionum vias) , strengthen the Republic's defenses (munire praesidia rei 
publicae), and respect the supremacy of the consuls in power and the Senate in deliberation (summum in 
consulibus imperium, summum in senatu consilium putare). See further: Cat. 2.11 ; Leg. Ag. 1.26; 2.101 -3. 
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fecit, ad senatum referrem, vos ad rem publicam defendendam cohortarer, armatus ipse 
vobiscum armato obsisterem. 
What should I do, ifT. Labienus had massacred citizens like L. Satuminus, if he had 
broken open the prison, if he had occupied the Capitol with armed men? I would do the 
same thing as C. Marius: I would refer the matter to the Senate; I would bid you all to 
defend the Republic; taking up arms myself, I would oppose with all of you the enemy-
. 81 m-arms. 
Unlike Sulla, Cicero would not resort to the regular army, nor amici or clientes 
exclusively. Rather, he will look to the People as Marius did. Success hinges on the 
People's willingness to collaborate with the consul: while the magistrate can refer the 
matter to the Senate, and bid the People to take up arms, and even take up arms himself, 
preserving the Republic proves impractical without popular consent. Little wonder then 
that, amid the upheaval of the mid-to-late 60s, Cicero chose to fashion himself a 
popularis consul. Though Labienus does not threaten violence, his prosecution 
nonetheless amounts to an attack by a tribune on the Republic (res tota a tribuna pl. 
suscepta contra rem publicam). Instead of calling on the People to take up arms, Cicero 
exhorts them to cast their ballots against the current assault on their maiestas (contra 
oppugnationem vestrae maiestatis). Just as Marius the soldier relied on the People to 
subdue Saturninus, so Cicero the orator must persuade the People to acquit the defendant. 
The crowd's partisan constituency made this a tall order, particularly when 
members of the crowd interrupted Cicero's speech to express their disapproval. One such 
instance seemingly occurred halfway through the speech. Though contending that 
Hortensius had already argued convincingly that the defendant was not involved in the 
81 Rab. Perd. 35. 
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actual murder,82 Cicero nonetheless feigns an eagerness to credit the defendant with the 
killing of Satuminus. The consul declares that, if he himself were to plead the case anew, 
he would admit Rabirius had killed Satuminus. Indeed, he refers to the killing as "a 
morally excellent crime" (/acinus pulcherrimum).83 Cicero's willingness to credit 
Rabirius with the killing apparently drew an angry response from at least part of the 
crowd, leaving the self-described popularis consul in an awkward position. 
In the years after his consulship, the rise of Clodius and his brand of thuggery 
would lead Cicero to downplay the significance of such contional outbursts 
(acclamationes). In his speeches on behalf ofP. Sestius and T. Annius Milo, both of 
whom had been allies in his struggle against Clodius, Cicero sought to discredit contional 
acclamationes as an indicator of the popular will. This required espousing a republican 
heresy, namely that the crowds who attended contiones did not constitute the Roman 
People, but instead represented a small minority whose sentiments did not reflect those of 
the majority.84 In the pro Sestio, Cicero contends that theatral and ludic acclamationes 
actually reflect the popular will, while manipulation by orators and their supporters 
render contional outbursts suspect. Though this version of "the classic majority-minority 
separation" strategy might have been suitable when the audience was composed mainly 
82 This remark coupled with the nature of Cicero's speech and the multiple references to the relatively short 
period oftime allotted to him (Rab. Perd. 6, 9, 38) suggests that each advocate devoted their limited time to 
a particular stasis: Hortensius disputed the facts(§ 18); Cicero made a qualitative argument related to the 
SCU. Though the priamel refers to a number of different charges, the orator intends to devote his time to 
speaking de nece Saturnini (§§6-9). 
83 Rab. Perd. 18-9 - At id C. Rabirius multorum testimoniis, Q. Hortensia copiosissime defendente, antea 
fa/sum docuit; ego autem, si mihi esset integrum, susciperem hoc crimen, agnoscerem, confiteor ... 
Libenter, inquam, confiterer, si vere possem aut etiam si mihi esset integrum, C. Rabiri manu L. 
Saturninum esse occisum; et idfacinus pulcherrimum esse arbitrarer; sed, quoniam idfacere non possum, 
confitebor id quod ad laudem minus valebit, ad crimen non minus. 
84 Mil. 3; Sest. 114-25. Jehne 2011: 113-5; Be112004: 236. 
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of jurors, some variation of the strategy was needed at the trial of Rabirius lest he alienate 
the assembled crowd. Rather than distinguishing between the crowd and the Roman 
People, Cicero draws a distinction within the crowd itself, between a vocal minority and a 
silent majority: 
Nihil me clamor iste commovet sed consolatur, cum indicat esse quosdam civis imperitos 
sed non multos. Numquam, mihi credite, populus Romanus hie qui silet consulem me 
fecisset, si vestro clamore perturbatum iri arbitraretur. Quanto iam levior est acclamatio: 
quin continetis vocem indicem stultiae vestrae, testem paucitatis! 
That uproar of yours does not disturb me at all but comforts me, since it shows that there 
are certain ignorant citizens but not many. Never, believe me, would the Roman People, 
who here stand in silence, have made me consul, if they judged that I would be unsettled 
by your uproar. How much less is the outcry now: indeed, you restrain the cry that both 
reveals your foolishness and testifies to your insignificant numbers. 85 
Earlier, we saw how the orator interpreted the People's actions as evidence of 
consent; here, it is their silence. His provocative statement, that he desires to admit 
Rabirius killed Satuminus, apparently fails to provoke a response from most of the 
crowd. This "silent majority" Cicero identifies as the (legitimate) populus Romanus.86 
Conversely, he marginalizes the opposition by characterizing it as ignorant and a 
minority- imperitos sed non multos.87 Their protests are thus quantitatively and 
qualitatively illegitimate: from the standpoint of numbers, they do not represent the body 
85 Rab. Perd. 18. 
86 Cape 2002: 135 . In his speech to the American People on November 3, 1969, President Richard Nixon 
sought to translate what he saw as the tacit consent of most Americans into explicit support for his policies 
in Vietnam: "And so tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your 
support." A little later on, Nixon underscored the importance of consensus to the American Republic by 
suggesting that, rather than North Vietnam, it was the absence of consensus that actually threatened the 
United States existentially: "Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us 
understand: Nmth Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that." 
87 On imperitus: KUhnert 1989: 435; Achard 1981: 133-4; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 514. 
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politic, and their ignorance prevents them from deliberating responsibly. The fmal 
comparative, levior, conveys the same message. As opposed to gravitas, which connotes 
dignity and the moral rigor traditionally associated with a patronus, levitas signifies the 
kind of fickleness that critics commonly attributed to the People (usually in the form of a 
crowd) and its leaders. 88 In the present context, levi or implies their position lacks 
seriousness and suggests that their already meager numbers are dwindling. 
Cicero thus takes what is an otherwise precarious situation and turns it to his 
advantage: the crowd may be hostile, but they are not all vocal. This allows him to 
divide the audience into two groups- a vocal minority and a silent majority. Whether or 
not an actual majority remained silent is irrelevant. Any judgment of the nature and 
volume of a crowd's clamoring is bound to be imprecise.89 What we can say is that that 
there were at least enough non-vocal members of the crowd to make the notion of a silent 
majority plausible. What is more, Cicero exploits the inherent ambiguity of silence and 
interprets it for his audience. Naturally, he does so to suit his rhetorical ends. 
Left unchecked, the outburst threatened to disrupt the communication situation 
and undermine his standing with the audience. Ordinarily, auctoritas- a function of 
status, education, and access to the Senate - lent the orators' cues a privileged status in 
the contio.90 But intentional and unintentional cues could originate from the crowd. 
These had the potential to enhance or diminish an orator's effectiveness. Quintilian, for 
one, notes the effect that audience reaction can have on other members of the audience: 
88 On levis-gravis : Cic. Amic. 95- Contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet, quid 
inters it inter popularem, id est assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem et verum et gravem. 
Hellegouarc'h 1972: 279-90, 538, 558 . 
89 Belll997: 18. 
9° Chapter 1; Morstein-Marx 2004: 20. See also: Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch 1992: 1002-4. 
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he writes that reading rather than listening to a speech makes for a more reliable 
judgment; cheers of the crowd often mislead the listener, since we think it shameful to 
disagree with others (pudet enim dissentire) , as if a certain silent modesty (verecundia) 
prevents us from placing more faith in our ownjudgment.91 
Quintilian seems to be referring to a phenomenon associated with what modern 
sociologists call a "behavioral cascade."92 Known alternatively as the "herding effect," a 
"behavioral cascade" tends to occur in large groups where a significant percentage lacks 
a strong commitment on a given issue. In this situation, those who are either 
uncommitted (or less committed, as evidenced in this case by their silence) may take their 
cues from others who appear both to have greater expertise, influence, and/or information 
and to have already reached a decision. This may not, in fact, be the case, but ultimately 
cascades operate on the basis of perception; it occurs "when it is optimal for an 
individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of 
the preceding individual without regard to his own information."93 Once this begins, it 
can have a snowball effect that amplifies the original signaVcue; others in the group take 
stock of the enhanced signal and revise their commitment, weighing the costs and 
benefits of following suit. Emotion, a desire to conform, and practical considerations can 
also enter in. As participation increases, each individual's calculus increasingly favors 
91 Quint. Inst. 10.1.17-8 - In lectione certius iudicium, quod audienti frequenter aut suus cuique favor aut 
ille laudantium clamor extorquet. Pudet enim dissentire, et velut tacita quadam verecundia inhibemur plus 
nobis credere ... On verecundia and its relationship to shame (pudor) : Kaster 2005 : 13-27, esp. 25-6. 
92 Lohmann 1994: 45-57; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch 1992: esp. 992-4; Granovetter 1978. On the 
related concept of"political momentum": Kenney and Rice 1994. 
93 Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch 1992: 992, 994. My emphasis. 
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conformity; this, in turn, can produce a cascade in which more and more individuals set 
aside their original commitment in favor of the emerging consensus. 
An orator, therefore, had an interest in shaping a crowd's perceptions by 
managing the expressions of his audience.94 In terms of tactics, he could rely on friends 
and clients in attendance to show their support.95 As Cicero does in the passage above, 
the orator could also use his words to manage an acclamatio, preventing or enhancing a 
potential cascade. To stem the possibility of a cascade caused by the outburst, Cicero 
attacks the credibility of those shouting, calling them imperiti and non multi. At the same 
time, Cicero translates the silence of the majority as evidence of an emerging consensus 
in support of the defense. The reality was almost certainly quite different. If there was 
any consensus, it was opposed to his position, but before it could manifest itself, Cicero 
took steps to disrupt the potential cascade by sowing division. He appreciated how 
powerful a perception of consensus could be. 
Consensus and Cascades: in Catilinam Orationes Prima et Quarta 
In 63, ongoing economic malaise coupled with a tense political situation 
threatened to dissolve the Republic's consensus.96 A landless and unemployed 
population was migrating to Rome in increasing numbers and threatening unrest. 
Portents were reported, rumors rampant. For a frustrated L. Sergius Catilina, the summer 
94 Aldrete 1999: 101-64. 
95 Though there is little evidence for the use of paid claques in the courts of the late Republic, their use in 
the theater and in the courts during the Empire means that they cannot be ruled out. App. B. Civ. 3.24; 
Plaut. Amph. 65-85 . On claques in the Imperial courts: Plin. Ep. 2.14.4-8; Bablitz 2007: 126-32. 
96 Mitchell 1979: 178-88. Sources: Cic. Mur. 48-52; Dio 37.22.1-32.2; Sal. Cat. 37.5-8. 
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months marked a turning point. Having lost his second consecutive bid for the 
consulship, the former henchman of Sulla conspired with a disgruntled former centurion, 
C. Manlius, to bring about a violent uprising.97 Though he no doubt heard rumors, 
Cicero seems to have received his first hard evidence of the plot from an unlikely source 
- M. Licinius Crassus. As populares, Crassus and Caesar had, until recently it seems, 
been allies of Catiline. Crassus produced letters from Catiline warning of an impending 
massacre of Roman nobles on October 28. The consul took these to the Senate. Shortly 
thereafter, further evidence surfaced of an uprising in Etruria that was being planned to 
coincide within a day of the aforementioned massacre, on October 27. This news 
prompted the Senate to enact the senatus consul tum ultimum on October 21, instructing 
the consuls to see that no harm come to the Republic. 98 
With this, the consul found himself on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, 
he had an obligation to safeguard the Republic; on the other, the trial of Rabirius some 
months earlier had been a reminder that, even with the Senate's support in the form of the 
SCU, Cicero could still be liable to prosecution for violating the rights of citizens.99 
Controversy loomed. The Senate had never before adopted the measure in anticipation 
of violence, and indeed when nothing happened in the days immediately following, some 
accused the consul of deceit (&cnc Kai £n:i m.>Ko<pavdg. -rov KtK£pova 8ta~A118flvm). 100 
97 On the plot: App. B. Civ. 2.2-4; Cic. Cat. 1.7-10; Dio 37.30.1-31.3; Sal. Cat. 27 .1-32.2, 43.1 -2. On the 
relationship between the two men: App. B. Civ. 2.2; Cic. Cat. 1.5; Sal. Cat. 24.2; Phillips 1976, contra 
Seager 1973 and Waters 1970. 
98 Dio 37.31.1-2; Sal. Cat. 29.1-2. 
99 Cat. 1.29- Etenim si summi viri et clarissimi cives Saturnini et Gracchorum et Flacci et superiorum 
complurimum sanguine non modo se non contaminarunt sed etiam honestarunt, certe verendum mihi non 
erat ne quid hoc parricida civium interfecto invidiae mihi in posteritatem redundaret. 
100 Hardy 1917: 192; Dio 37.31.3 . 
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When reports of Manlius' uprising finally reached Rome, they vindicated Cicero to a 
point. It remained, however, that no massacre had occurred, nor had there been any 
attempt to seize Praeneste on November 1, something the consul had also predicted. 
Without credible evidence, Cicero waited. The widespread rumors and speculation he 
was hearing about a plot might have been true, but they hardly sufficed to execute a 
citizen. The consul needed credible evidence, but after the attempt made on his own life 
in the early hours ofNovember 7, time seemed to be running out. 
The following day, Cicero delivered his First Catilinarian at a meeting of the 
Senate. His ostensible strategy was to duck both the legal and "constitutional" issues by 
forcing Catiline and his accomplices from the city and into the field. 101 If events 
unfolded as he supposed, Catiline would throw in with Manlius, already in open 
rebellion. Upon leaving the city and taking up arms, Catiline could be formally declared 
a hostis and killed with impunity.102 In this way, the consul would avoid controversy. 103 
Cicero thus used the First Catilinarian to effect Catiline's departure from the city. 
Prevalent in the address is the theme of information - about what Cicero, as the consul, 
knows. 104 He overwhelms Catiline with details of the plot; he bluffs, threatening him 
with death, and yet he offers him a way out. Catiline took it. Not all of his accomplices 
did. Though the speech primarily concerns itself with their leader, the other conspirators 
101 Seager 1973: 245-7 comes closest to my own interpretation, though I take issue with his extreme 
skepticism. See also: Dyck 2008 : 60-1; Stroh 2000: 67-70; Batstone 1994; Primmer 1977; Cary 1962: 498-
9; Meyer 1922: 30. 
102 The Senate generally enacted the hostis declaration, which seems to have applied only to those outside 
the city. Gaughan 2010: 127-31; Lintott Violence 1999: 155-6; Nippel1995: 66. 
103 So, Cicero declares after Catiline has left- Atque hunc quidem unum huius belli domestici ducem sine 
controversia vicimus (Cat. 2.1). Upon learning that Catiline had joined the camp ofManlius some days 
later, the Senate declared both hastes and a levy was held: Dio 37.33.3; Sal. Cat. 36.2-3. 
104 Cat. 1.1 , 6-1 0, 12, 15, 24. 
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could reasonably infer that Cicero knew of their involvement as well. He hoped, no 
doubt, that the substance of his remarks would be broadcast and that others involved 
would also decide to quit the city. 
On the other hand, his strategy had the potential to evoke criticism from 
hardliners who believed that Catiline should not be allowed to escape. In the speech, 
Cicero imagines the personified patria taking this position, interrogating him about his 
reasons for letting Catiline go, but it seems rather unlikely that these sentiments actually 
reflected anyone's position at all. This would explain why Cicero attributes them to an 
abstraction rather than a specific individual. Rehearsing such arguments not only made 
his own position seem more moderate, it also allowed the consul to defend himself 
preemptively against criticism that was bound to arise if (as it actually happened) Catiline 
left the city and took up arms. The patria indeed charges Cicero with being too 
concerned with criticism, only it accuses him of fearing a potential backlash ifhe should 
summarily execute the alleged conspirators: 
Quid tandem te impedit? Mosne maiorum? At persaepe etiam privati in hac re publica 
perniciosos civis morte multarunt. An leges quae de civium Romanorum supplicio 
rogatae sunt? At numquam in hac urbe qui are publica defecerunt civium iura tenuerunt. 
An invidiam posteritatis times? Praeclaram vero populo Romano refers gratiam qui te, 
hominem per te cognitum, nulla commendatione maiorum tam mature ad summum 
imperium per omnis honorum gradus extulit, si propter invidiam aut alcuius periculi 
metum salutem civium tuorum neglegis. 
What after all is stopping you? The tradition of our ancestors? Yet, very often in this 
Republic, even private individuals have punished dangerous citizens. Or is it the laws 
that have been passed regarding the punishment of Roman citizens? Yet, never in this 
city have those who rebelled against the Republic retained the rights of citizens. Or do 
you fear the indignation of posterity? To the Roman People, who elevated you to the 
heights of power so soon, a man known only by his own efforts and without a 
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distinguished pedigree, you render some thanks indeed, if you neglect the safety of your 
fellow citizens because of indignation or fear of some danger. 105 
Earlier, we saw how the failure of the Senate or a magistrate to satisfy their obligations to 
the People could provoke invidia- righteous indignation. 106 In this case, the patria 
rehearses the "constitutional" and legal arguments against summary execution, rejecting 
both. In the process, Cicero suggests that any invidia arising from the execution of 
Catiline would be unjustified. Rather, the decision not to execute Catiline promises to 
stir invidia, as the homeland accuses Cicero of failing to protect the sal us civium. Such 
dereliction rightly invites the invidia posteritatis, not the execution of a hostis. 
Cicero's claim that he is less concemed with his own political fortunes than his 
reputation among future generations is an obvious conceit, intended to show gravitas and 
a preoccupation with gloria before his aristocratic audience.1 07 Yet much of what follows 
belies his professed indifference. Concem over a potential backlash drives his strategy, 
specifically a fear that the People will perceive the execution of Catiline as unjust. 
Moreover, the accusations of auKo<pav-ria following the enactment of the SCU two weeks 
earlier suggest that merely forcing Catiline from the city without cause would result in a 
public outcry.108 In terms of his own political viability, Cicero realized that he could not 
act unless he could foster some measure of consensus among the People. To that end, he 
105 Cat. 1.28. 
106 On invidia: Chapter 2; Kaster 2005: 84-103 . 
107 Thus, several lines later, Cicero declares: hoc animo fiti semper ut invidiam virtute partam gloriam, non 
invidiam putarem (§29). In many ways, P. Scipio Nasica is the archetype for this attitude, having once 
responded to a hostile outburst: Tacete, quaeso, Quirites; plus ego enim quam vas quid rei publicae 
exf,ediat intellego. Val. Max. 3.7.3; Morstein-Marx 2004: 60-7; Hellegouarc'h 1972: 283-7. 
10 Dio 37.31.1. See also: Cat. 2.12-4. 
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had to see that the Senate and People knew what he did, so that none could deny the 
justice of his actions. He had to propagate a cascade in which everyone rushed to his 
side, including his critics: faced with seemingly universal agreement, the opposition 
would either convert or be made mute.109 
As the speech moves toward its conclusion, it becomes clear that a discrepancy 
exists between the knowledge of Cicero, who perceives the true nature of the threat, and 
certain senators who either do not see the things that threaten or ignore what they see (aut 
ea quae imminent non videant aut ea quae vident dissimulent). 110 By their ignorance, 
they raise Catiline's hopes. Among the unpatriotic and na'ive alike (improbi verum etiam 
imperiti), Cicero predicts that these senators will use their auctoritas to accuse him of 
acting tyrannically if he punishes Catiline. This will only perpetuate civil discord. To 
break the impasse and restore consensio requires, not just ridding the Republic of those 
plotting against it, but making their guilt manifest so that all can agree about how to 
proceed. Cicero, therefore, urges Catiline to depart from the city in hopes that he will 
take his followers with him. So will his guilt be apparent to all: the would-be 
revolutionary will find his way to the camp of Manlius, and at that point, no one will be 
so foolish as not to see that a conspiracy has been hatched, no one such a traitor as to 
deny it (neminem tam stultumfore qui non videat coniurationem essefactam, neminem 
tam improbum qui non fateatur). Cicero recapitulates his strategy in the final lines 
leading to the peroratio: 
109
_ So, Mitche111979: 235- "Cicero was content to post guards and to wait, while exercising his rhetorical 
skills on each new re~oX: to bolster belief in the existence of a dangerous and vicious plot, and thereby rally 
the great ?ody of bam, silence the improbi, and trim the fringes ofCatiline's support. The First Catilinarian 
was a maJor effort in this rhetorical offensive ... " 
11° Cat. 1.30. 
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Qua re secedant improbi, secernant se a bonis, unum in locum congregentur, muro 
denique, quod saepe iam dixi, secernantur a nobis; desinant insidiari domi suae consuli, 
circumstare tribunal praetoris urbani, obsidere cum gladiis curiam, malleolos et faces ad 
inflammandam urbem comparare; sit denique inscriptum in fronte unius cuiusque quid de 
re publica sentiat. Polliceor hoc vobis, patres conscripti, tantam in nobis consulibus fore 
diligentiam, tantam in vobis auctoritatem, tantam in omnibus bonis consensionem ut 
Catilinae profectione omnia patefacta, inlustrata, oppressa, vindicata esse videatis. 
Therefore, let the traitors withdraw, let them separate themselves from the good citizens, 
let them be gathered together in one place, and finally as I have already said often, let 
them be separated from us by a wall. Let them cease to attack the consul in his own 
home, to surround the tribunal of the urban praetor, to besiege the Curia with swords, to 
prepare flaming arrows and torches to set fire to the city; finally, let it be inscribed upon 
the brow of each one what he thinks about the Republic. I promise you this, conscript 
fathers, that there will be such great care taken among us consuls, that there will be 
such great auctoritas among all of you, that there will be such great consensus among all 
good citizens that, with the departure of Catiline, you will see everything exposed, 
brought to light, suppressed, punished. 111 
The passage begins with four positive exhortations (secedant, secernant, 
congregentur, secernantur), all intended to clarify the situation. A wall can serve as both 
a means of demarcation and defense, and so the final exhortation serves as a bridge to the 
subsequent prohibitions whose object is public safety (desinant insidiari, circumstare, 
obsidere, comparare ). Cicero certainly preferred the security that would come from 
having Catiline and his men outside the city walls, but as the passage unfolds, it becomes 
increasingly apparent that his overriding concern is the information vacuum and, in 
particular, the People's inability to distinguish friend from foe. To that end, he uses a 
metaphor to admonish those in attendance - sit denique inscriptum in fronte unius 
cuiusque quid de republica sentiat. The ambiguity of unus quisque suggests the appeal 
is not limited to the conspirators but directed at everyone, including those present; his 
111 Cat. 1.32. 
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purpose, to eliminate the middle ground by forcing those who are uncommitted to choose 
sides. His plea has a rhetorical dimension, as well. Addressed as it is to men who owe 
their elite status to the Republic, his implicit, rhetorical question- quid quisque de re 
publica sentitis- shames those who have so far failed to signal a strong commitment to 
preserving the Republic. 
Thus, through a combination of shame and information, Cicero aims to set in 
motion a behavioral cascade that will restore consensus. He promises that, with Catiline 
and his adherents gone (Catilinae profectione), the Republic will be restored. So, the 
anaphoric tricolon: the consuls will use their imperium with care (tantam in nobis 
consulibus fore diligentiam ), the Senate will enjoy its customary respect (tan tam in vobis 
auctoritatem ), and consensus will reign among the loyal citizens (tan tam in omnibus 
bonis consensionem). Though he assigns generic attributes to the consuls, Senate, and 
People- that is, the bani who remain in the city- the circumstances of the speech and the 
ensuing result clause suggest that Cicero is alluding to the implementation of the host is 
declaration. At the beginning of the pro Rabirio, Cicero makes a similar move, using 
auctoritas and consensio to refer respectively to the SCU and the collective action 
necessary to implement it. 112 Rather than imperium, the consul here pledges to use 
diligentia when executing the decree; instead of hastily executing Catiline, he promises 
that his careful planning will remove all doubt and danger- omnia patefacta, inlustrata, 
oppressa, vindicata esse videatis. 
11 2 Rab. Perd. 2. 
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It was a promise he could not fulfill. The following day, Cicero summoned a 
contio and delivered the Second Catilinarian. At the outset of the speech, the consul 
informs the People of Catiline's departure the night before. He claims victory, before 
again defending himself against those (strawmen) who would argue that he should have 
arrested Catiline when he had the chance. 1 13 Cicero replies by relating his strategy and its 
mixed results: 
Sed cum viderem, ne vobis quidem omnibus etiam tum re probata si ilium, ut erat 
meritus, morte multassem, fore ut eius socios invidia oppressus persequi non possem, 
rem hue deduxi ut tum palam pugnare possetis cum hostem aperte videretis. Quem 
quidem ego hostem, Quirites, quam vehementer foris esse timendum putem, licet hinc 
intellegatis, quod etiam illud moleste fero quod ex urbe parum comitatus exierit. 
But since I saw that the conspiracy was still not apparent even to all of you, and that if I 
had punished that man with death as he deserved, I, as a target of indignation, would be 
unable to pursue his allies, I exposed the affair in such a way that, once you clearly saw 
the enemy, you could fight openly. From this, my fellow citizens, you can see how 
greatly I believe this enemy ought to be feared outside the city walls, but I am also 
troubled that he left the city with too few companions. 11 4 
Cicero begins by reiterating his fear of unjustified invidia, which has prompted him to 
allow Catiline to leave. Yet in the lines leading up to this passage, he accuses some of 
willful ignorance, as he had done previously in the Senate: he argues that, on account of 
stupidity or depravity, many either did not believe the accusations against Catiline or 
defended him (quam multos qui propter stultitiam non putarent ... quam multos qui 
11 3 Cat. 2.1-3. 
11 4 Cat. 2.4. 
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propter improbitatemfaverent).l1 5 At the beginning of the passage above, however, the 
consul draws a distinction between this group and others who remain genuinely 
unconvinced. Upon learning that such uncertainty prevailed among some of the People-
ne vobis quidem omnibus etiam tum re probata- Cicero suggests that he changed course 
to expose the plot. 
Though armed with the SCU, his restraint and responsiveness to the People resist 
the standard popularis caricature of the consul-turned-tyrant who, with the support of the 
Senate, kills popular leaders without warrant. 116 Indeed, in the opening lines of the 
speech, Cicero at once takes credit for driving Catiline from the city (vel eiecimus vel 
emisimus vel ipsum egredientem verbis prosecuti sumus), while also suggesting that he 
left of his own accord (abiit, excess it, evasit, erupit). 117 Had the portrait of Cicero as a 
tyrant gained hold, the consul reasons that he would not have been able to pursue the 
other conspirators ( eius socios, invidia oppressus, persequi non possem ). Thus, he did 
not execute Catiline and instead set about forcing the conspiracy into the open so that the 
People could see the conspirators as hastes (cum host em aperte videretis) and fight them 
openly (tum pal am pugnare posse tis ). 118 In the final sentence, however, Cicero hints that 
his strategy has fallen short. Though Catiline has departed, a number of his fellow 
11 5 Cat. 2.3 -Sed quam multos fuisse putatis qui quae ego deferrem non crederent, quam multos qui 
propter stultitiam non putarent, quam multos qui etiam defenderent, quam multos qui propter improbitatem 
faverent ? 
116 See also: Cat. 1.30. Onpopularis rhetoric ofthe tyrant: Hellegouarc'h 1972: 559-65; Dunkle 1967. 
117 Cat. 2.1 - Tandem aliquando, Quirites, L. Catilinam furentem audacia, see/us anhelentem, pest em 
patriae nefarie molientem, vobis atque huic urbi ferro jlammaque minitantem ex urbe vel eiecimus vel 
emisimus vel ipsum egredientem verbis prosecuti sumus. Abiit, excess it, evasit, erupit. Further on, Cicero 
claims that Catiline was driven from the city without assigning agency - Loco ille motus est, cum est ex 
urbe depulsus. 
11 8 When Catiline and Manlius are declared hastes a few days later, the city itself was placed on a war 
footing : levies were held, and citizens donned military cloaks - saga sumi. Dio 37.33.3, Sal. Cat. 30.7-
31.3 ; Lintott Violence 1999: 154. 
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conspirators have not. Their status and, hence, the true nature of the threat in the city 
remain obscure. This leads Cicero to conclude, with some irony, that those who have not 
departed are, in fact, more dangerous than those who have taken up arms. 11 9 As a result, 
the consul tries to coax the remaining conspirators from Rome. 120 Though he insists that 
his offer will not last forever, he pledges clemency and safe passage for those who wish 
to leave. He later defends his offer as a way of revealing what previously lay hidden 
(Mea lenitas ... hoc exspectavit ut id quod latebat erumperet). 121 
Few, if any, additional conspirators left Rome after the speech. A lack of credible 
information about the plot persisted. Cicero waited. A breakthrough finally came in late 
November, when some of the conspirators who remained in the city approached an 
embassy of Allobroges, then in Rome on a mission.122 The envoys reported the matter to 
their patron, who in tum relayed the information to Cicero. Intent on obtaining 
documentary evidence, the consul instructed the ambassadors to feign interest and 
demand written oaths from the conspirators, ostensibly for the purpose of being shown to 
their compatriots in Gaul. On the night of December 2, the embassy departed Rome 
bearing letters from four of the conspirators - Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius, and 
Statilius. A fifth, Volturcius, accompanied the envoys, when a force led by two of the 
praetors intercepted them at the Milvian Bridge. 
119 Cat. 2.5, 17. 
12° Cat. 2.6, 11 , 27. 
121 Cat. 2.27. See also: §6 - Ne illi vehementer errant, si illam meam pristinam lenitatem p erpetuam 
sperantfitturam. Quod exspectavi, iam sum adsecutus ut vos omnesfactam esse aperte coniurationem 
contra rem publicam videretis. 
122 Sources: App. B. Civ. 2.4; Cic. Cat. 3.5-6; Dio 37.34.1-2; Plut. Cic. 18.4-7; SaL Cat. 40.1-41.5, 44.1-
45.4. 
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With Volturcius and the incriminating letters in hand, Cicero had the others 
arrested. The following morning, he convened the Senate to review the evidence. The 
consul produced the letters, questioned the Allobroges and the conspirators, and obtained 
multiple confessions. 123 To disseminate the information, he ordered a transcript of the 
proceedings to be produced and, that evening, summoned a contio. In the Third 
Catilinarian, which he delivered on that occasion, 124 Cicero summarizes the evidence and 
reports to the People that the Senate had passed a decree thanking himself, among others, 
and ordering those who had been implicated to be taken into custody. He makes no 
mention of executing the prisoners, perhaps suggesting that he initially intended to have 
them stand trial. 125 But this soon proved impractical, once Cicero received word that 
certain groups were plotting to free the conspirators by force. 126 In response, guards were 
posted, and the Senate convened to discuss the issue. 
Years later, Cicero claimed that he had made up his mind in advance of the 
meeting. 127 The Fourth Catilinarian, which he delivered in the Senate on that occasion, 
seems to bear this out. Though his status as consul and the conventions of the Senate 
prevented him from forcefully advocating a position, he argues obliquely for executing 
the conspirators.128 Cicero did not need the Senate's approval; it had enacted the SCU 
some time before. Here again, fear of potential recriminations drove the consul's 
123 Sources: App. B. Civ. 2.4-5; Dio 37.34.2; Cic. Cat. 3.8-15, 4.5; Sui. 41-2; Plut. Cic. 19.1-4; Sal. Cat. 
46.6-47.4. 
124 Cat. 3.3 - Quae quoniam in senatu inlustrata, patefacta, comperta sunt per me, vobis iam exponam 
breviter ut et quanta et quam manifesto et qua ratione investigata et comprehensa sint vas qui et ignoratis 
et exspectatis scire possitis. 
125 Cat. 3 .15, is suggestive. Having stripped Lentulus of his office, Cicero relates nos relig ione in privata 
P . Lentulo puniendo liberaremur. See also: Plut. Cic. 19.5-7. 
126 App. B. Civ. 2.5 ; Cic. Cat. 4.17; Sal. Cat. 50.1-3 . 
127 Att. 12.21.1 - ante quam consulerem ipse iudicaverim. 
128 See below w. Cape 1995 ; Strachan-Davidson 1925: 143 . 
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decision, though Sallust relates that disclosure of the plot's details had caused the People 
to rally in support, extolling Cicero and denouncing Catiline. The Third Catilinarian 
seems to have triggered a cascade, a dramatic shift in public opinion. 129 But having seen 
what happened to Rabirius and others, the consul did not entrust himself to the People. 
He knew the People. 
He also knew the Senate, specifically the effect such a cascade could have on its 
deliberations. Though he did not need to seek its approval, once solicited, propriety 
dictated he carry out its recommendations.130 Thus, his decision to go before the Senate 
entailed sacrificing his consular prerogative in exchange for enhanced auctoritas: a 
decree of the Senate sanctioning the execution of the conspirators would afford him 
greater protection in the event public opinion again shifted. 
Though the precise order of the speeches remains unclear, 131 M. Junius Silanus, 
the consul-elect, likely delivered the first speech, advocating execution. The consulars 
followed and voiced their support for the proposal, before Julius Caesar rose to speak as 
praetor designatus. He called for clemency: though their property was to be confiscated, 
and they were to be imprisoned for life in various municipia, the conspirators' lives 
would be spared. In so far as his proposal was feasible, it showed Caesar hedging on the 
issue of whether the conspirators were to be treated as hastes or cives. Like hastes, he 
proposed to strip them of their property; like cives, they could avoid execution by leaving 
Rome for a kind of exile. 132 Like the molles sententiae that had fostered Catiline's 
129 Sal. Cat. 48.1. See also: Dio 37.34.3-4; Plut. Cic. 19.4-7. 
130 Lintott 1999: 82-8. 
131 App. B. Civ. 2.5-6; Dio 37 .35.4-36.3; Plut. Cat. Min. 22.3-23.3; Cic. 20.3-21.4; Sal. Cat. 50.3-53.1. 
132 Cic. Cat. 4.7-8; Sal. Cat. 51.43. On confiscating hastes' property: Nippe\1995: 66. 
196 
hopes, 133 Caesar's equivocation appealed to both the popularis and timid alike. If it did 
not win the Senate over entirely, Caesar's speech succeeded in sowing division. Indeed, 
it was so effective that, according to Plutarch, Silanus backed away from his own 
proposal. It would take a forceful speech from M. Cato, then tribune-elect, to sway the 
chamber back in favor of execution. Assuming what survives of the Fourth Catilinarian 
more or less reflects the actual speech delivered on that occasion, Cicero likely addressed 
the Senate sometime between Caesar and Cato. 134 
In his speech, Cicero identifies fear as the primary impediment to action. It 
figures prominently in the oration, originating as it does from two main sources: first, the 
conspiracy itself; second, the recriminations that might occur should the conspirators be 
executed. 135 In light of recent reports that slaves and freedmen were planning to force 
their way to rescue the conspirators, the latter danger appeared more likely. Faced with 
the possibility of violence, Caesar sought to appease the mob, though Cato repmiedly 
133 Cat. 1.30 - Quamquam non nulli sunt in hoc ordine qui aut ea quae imminent non videant aut ea quae 
vident dissimulent; qui spem Catilinae mollibus sententiis aluenmt coniurationemque nascentem non 
credendo conroboravenmt. 
134 Strachan-Davidson 1925: 143-7; Hardy 1917: 212-8. While it refers to the proposals of Silanus and 
Caesar, the Fourth Catilinarian does not mention Cato's speech, and given the unanimity with which the 
ancients credit Cato for determining the outcome of the debate, Cicero's silence strongly suggests he spoke 
before the tribune-elect. Moreover, Att. 12.21.1, a letter written a few years before his death seems to 
corroborate this view, suggesting that Cato delivered his speech just prior to the actual vote. In the letter, 
an aggrieved Cicero complains to his friend that Brutus ' recent panegyric ofCato exaggerates the role 
played by the younger tribune-elect in convincing the Senate to execute the conspirators. Cicero criticizes 
Brutus because he only praises the former consul for referring the matter to the Senate (quod rettulerim), 
not because he exposed the plot (non quod patefecerim), encouraged his fellow senators (cohortatus sim), 
or made up his own mind before he sought the advice of the Senate (antequam consulerem ipse 
iudicaverim ). According to Cicero, Cato actually gave high-praise to all these actions and judged that the 
consul's deeds should be recorded in the minutes. Because of this, Cato's proposal to execute the 
conspirators was put to a vote (quae omnia quia Cato laudibus extulerat in caelum perscribendaque 
censuerat, idcirco in eius sententiam est facta discessio. 
135 Dio 37.35.4 - ain:os; o£ £v Toin:cp TTJV ~ouA.Tjv f]8gowe, xa( cr¢as; cruvwga1;as; TE xal £xcpo(3f]cras; 
£:nacre 8ava1:ov Tci>v cruvHATII.lf.l.EVwv xaTayvwvm. 
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saw his proposal as part of an effort to intimidate the Senate. 136 In his own speech, 
Cicero pushes for execution and looks to the People for protection from any fallout. He 
assumes that he will be the exclusive target of any reprisals, 137 and as the individual with 
the most to fear, he further assumes that his audience is more anxious for his safety than 
for their own. Both claims are ridiculous, the second remarkably so, but they allow 
Cicero to avoid suggesting that his audience is timid. 
The opening lines present the speech's main theme: the Senate must think of the 
danger to themselves rather than the possible recriminations that might follow from the 
executions: 
Video, patres conscripti, in me omnium vestrum ora atque oculos esse conversos, video 
vos non solum de vestro ac rei publicae verum etiam, si id depulsum sit, de meo periculo 
esse sollicitos. Est mihi iucunda in malis et grata in do lore vestra erga me voluntas, sed 
earn - per deos immortalis - deponite atque obliti salutis meae de vobis ac de vestris 
liberis cogitate! 
I see, conscript fathers , that the faces and eyes of all of you have turned to me, I see that 
you are unsettled not only about your own danger and that of the Republic, but also, if 
that should be removed, my own. Your goodwill toward me is pleasant amid adversities, 
welcome amid pain, but- by the immortal gods -lay it aside and, forgetting my safety, 
think of yourselves and your children! 138 
The first sentence establishes a causal relationship between the twin dangers facing the 
Senate and consul: eliminating the threat from the conspiracy- si id depulsum sit-
would imperil the consul. It is assumed that executing the conspirators will free the 
136 Plut. Cat. Min. 23 .1. 
137 Hence, the anaphora (omnis) at Cat. 4.1 - Mihi si haec condicio consulatus data est ut omnis 
acerbitates, omnis dolores cruciatusque perferrem, f eram non solum fortiter verum etiam libenter ... 
138 Cat. 4.1. See also: §3. 
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Republic and Senate from danger, though Cicero does not explicitly advocate for 
execution here or anywhere else in the speech. Convention bid the consul to refer his 
question to the Senate and refrain from expressing his own opinion. 139 To maintain 
decorum and still get his point across, Robert Cape has observed that the speech "poses 
as a neutral representation and clarification of part of the debate but also functions as an 
oblique political maneuver."140 In other words, while appearing impartial, Cicero argues 
for execution. 
The consul assumes that executing the conspirators will eliminate the threat and, 
in much of what follows, that he alone will face any fallout that occurs. Though dubious, 
both assumptions are rhetorically effective as they allow for the kind of simple, 
straightforward narrative that is well suited to such "crisis rhetoric." 141 True, executing 
the conspirators would eliminate them as a threat; true, the consul would be the focus of 
recriminations; but Cicero's narrative fails to admit other potential consequences or 
solutions.142 The first sentence of the speech outlines the situation; the second weighs the 
risks involved and presents the consul's opinion in the form of encouragement. By 
pleading for his audience to forget about him and to think of their families, Cicero 
legitimizes their fear of the conspiracy, relief from which can come only through 
139 Cape 1995: 260-2; Bonnefond-Coudry 1989: 514-20, 581-9. The consul could intervene in the debate 
by providing information, encouraging the senators, or summarizing what had already been said. Cicero 
does all of these in the course of the Fourth Catilinarian, but his proper role remained one of consultation 
rather than advocacy. 
14° Cape 1995: 255 and passim. 
14 1 Cape 2002: 142-3, Wooten 1984: 168-75. For a summary of scholarship on presidential crisis rhetoric: 
Aune and Medhurst 2008: 355-7. Among other things, this rhetoric tends to convey a sense of urgency -
e.g. Cat. 4.6- and to be disjunctive. Hence, George W. Bush's address to Congress on September 20, 
2001: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists ." 
142 Cat. 4.7, suggests that Caesar's proposal is not viable - Habere videtur isla res iniquitatem, si imperare 
velis, difficultatem, si rogare. Cape 1995 : 266; Strachan-Davidson 1925: 147. 
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executing the conspirators. 143 On the other hand, having already assumed that he alone 
will be the target of any reprisals, he dismisses the audience's fear for his safety. As he 
later puts it, the interests of the Republic must trump consideration of the dangers facing 
him (sed tamen meorum periculorum rationes utilitas rei publicae vincat.)144 Coming as 
it does at the beginning of the speech, these lines lend the consul an ethos that is well 
suited to the crisis. 145 In them, he gives the impression of the kind of fearlessness and 
selflessness associated with virtus, though the fact that he calls attention to himself and 
his predicament suggests altogether different qualities. This instance of praeteritio 
notwithstanding, the ethos he presents serves as a model for the senators who, despite 
Cicero's failure to acknowledge their anxiety anymore than his own, fear the 
repercussions that could follow from having the conspirators executed. 
The first hint of this anxiety occurs after the consul's summary of the proposals 
before the Senate. 146 Cicero reasons that ifthe motion ofCaesar, apopularis, is adopted, 
he as consul will perhaps have less to fear from popularis attacks (jortasse minus erunt 
hoc auctore et cognitore huiusce sententiae mihi populares impetus pertimescendi). 147 
Fortasse proves to be an important word, since it conveys uncertainty about Caesar's 
actual "popularity." As he did earlier in the year against both Rullus and Labienus, 
Cicero casts doubt concerning Caesar's popularis credentials. He implicates him in the 
143 Cat. 4.4, an a fortiori argument in which the present threat is compared with those posed by the Gracchi 
and Satuminus. Also: §§6, 13. 
144 Cat. 4.9. 
145 Cape 1995 : 263-4. On consular ethos in the First Catilinarian: Batstone 1994. 
146 Cat. 4.7-8. 
147 Cat. 4.9- Nunc, patres conscripti, ego mea video quid inters it. Si eritis secuti sententiam C. Caesaris, 
quoniam hanc is in re publica viam quae popularis habetur secutus est, fortasse minus erunt hoc auctore et 
cognitore huiusce sententiae mihi populares impetus pertimescendi. 
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Senate's deliberations, while "writing him out" of his popularis position. 148 The consul 
begins by offering faint praise, contrasting the fickleness of demagogues with Caesar's 
true popularis spirit, before observing that Caesar, unlike the unnamed Crassus, has 
chosen to collaborate and debate the execution of Roman citizens in the Senate. Indeed, 
Cicero interprets the attendance of the praetor designatus as an admission that the lex 
Sempronia applies only to citizens, that an enemy of the Republic is not a citizen, and 
that Gracchus himself was (legitimately) killed without the People's approval. 149 
In his fmal move, he turns Caesar's own Epicurean rhetoric against him. Seizing 
on the latter's assertion that the gods have ordained death as a relief from toil and woe, 150 
Cicero suggests that imprisoning the conspirators for the rest of their lives would be more 
cruel than having them executed. The significance of crudelitas as a charge lies in the 
fact that populares, while touting their own lenitas and dementia, routinely accused their 
oligarchic opponents of crudelitas.151 By voting to execute the conspirators, many in the 
Senate feared they would make themselves a target, and given his record, Caesar might 
well be the one to accuse them. So Cicero observes with some irony that this gentlest and 
mildest of men (homo mitissimus atque lenissimus) does not hesitate to cast Lentulus into 
148 Cat. 4.9-11. Cape 1995: 270- "By redefining Caesar's position and privilegingpopularis vocabulary, 
Cicero rewrites Caesar out of his popularis position." See also: Dyck 2008: 221-2. 
149 Cat. 4.10 - At vera C. Caesar intellegit legem Semproniam esse de civibus Roman is constitutam; qui 
autem rei publicae sit hostis eum civem esse nullo modo posse: denique ipsum latorem Semproniae legis 
<in>iussu populi poenas rei publicae dependisse. I follow the emendation of Bucher and Ernesti- iniussu 
instead of iussu - not only because the younger Gracchus did not die by order of the People, but also 
because iniussu seems to invoke the actual wording of the law, paraphrased at Rab. Perd. 12- ne de capite 
civium Romanontm iniussu vestro iudicaretur. contra Dyck 2008: 224. 
15° Cat. 4.7. See also: Sal. Cat. 51.20. 
15 1 Dunkle 1967. A generic charge that could as easily be leveled against heavy-handed magistrates as 
opponents of a grain law. 
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unending darkness and chains (non dubitat P. Lentulum aeternis tenebris vinculisque 
mandare).152 He concludes: 
Quam ob rem, sive hoc statueritis, dederitis mihi comitem ad contionem populo carum 
atque iucundum, sive Silani sententiam sequi malueritis, facile me atque vos crudelitatis 
vituperatione populus Romanus liberabit, atque obtinebo earn multo leniorem fuisse . 
Therefore, if you approve this, you will give me a companion for the contio who is 
beloved and pleasing to the People; or if you prefer to follow the recommendation of 
Silanus, certainly the Roman People will spare me and all of you from condemnation for 
cruelty, and I will maintain that this proposal was by far more mild. 153 
Almost halfway through the speech, Cicero acknowledges the proverbial elephant in the 
room, the possibility that the Roman People might accuse the Senate of cruelty 
(vituperatio crudelitatis) if it endorses the executions. Granted, he raises the possibility 
in order to reject it as part of an a fortiori argument: Caesar's punishment is more severe; 
Caesar is a friend of the People; therefore, Cicero and the Senate have nothing to fear. 
Indeed, he says the People should prefer the proposal of Silanus since it is far more mild 
(multo leniorem). Cicero's argument assumes the Senate was concerned with potential 
fallout, though to this point, he had probably failed to allay his audience's concerns. The 
speciousness of his argument suggests his primary motivation was to undermine Caesar's 
credibility as opposed to making a positive claim about popular support. 
This would come, however, but not before Cicero argued for execution on the 
merits. The final clause in the passage above- obtinebo earn multo leniorem fu isse-
152 Cat. 4.10 -ltaque homo mitissimus atque lenissimus non dub it at P. Lentulum aeternis tenebris 
vinculisque man dare .. . 
153 Cat. 4.11. 
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signals the beginning of an effort to recast the qualities of lenitas and crudelitas in 
relation to the Republic rather than the accused. Having reminded his audience in 
emotional terms of the slaughter and destruction planned by the conspirators, the consul 
argues that sparing the conspirators would cause a disaster that would, in turn, earn all of 
them a reputation for extreme cruelty (summae nobis crudelitatis in patriae civiumque 
pernicie fama subeunda est). 154 As Cicero argues in the passage below, the Senate must 
beware of seeming cruel toward the People who are otherwise willing to defend them. 
V ereamini minus censeo ne in hoc scelere tam immani ac nefando ali quid severius 
statuisse videamini: multo magis est verendum ne remissione poenae crudeles in patriam 
quam ne severitate animadversionis nimis vehementes in acerbissimos hostis fuisse 
videamur. Sed ea quae exaudio, patres conscripti, dissimulare non possum. Iaciuntur 
enim voces quae perveniunt ad auris meas eorum qui vereri videntur ut habeam satis 
praesidi ad ea quae vos statueritis hodiemo die transigenda. Omnia et provisa et parata et 
constituta sunt, patres conscripti, cum mea summa cura atque diligentia tum multo etiam 
maiore populi Romani ad summum imperium retinendum et ad communis fortunas 
conservandas voluntate. Omnes adsunt, omnium ordinum homines, omnium generum, 
omnium denique aetatum; plenum est forum , plena templa circum forum, pleni omnes 
aditus huius templi ac loci. Causa est enim post urbem conditam haec inventa sola in qua 
omnes sentirent unum atque idem praeter eos qui, cum sibi viderent esse pereundum, cum 
omnibus potius quam soli perire voluerunt. 
I am of the opinion that you are less afraid your verdict will seem too harsh for so 
monstrous and abominable a crime: far more must we fear that, having imposed a lesser 
penalty, we appear to have been cruel to our homeland rather than too severe toward our 
bitterest enemies because of the harshness of our punishment. But I cannot, conscript 
fathers, ignore what I hear. For words reach my ears, made by those who seem to fear 
that I do not have enough supporters for carrying out the things that you decide upon 
today. Everything has been provided for, prepared, and arranged, conscript fathers, with 
my utmost care and attention along with an even greater desire of the Roman People both 
to retain supreme power and preserve their general prosperity. Everyone is here, men or 
every order, origin, and age; the Forum is full, the temples around the Forum are full, all 
of the approaches to this temple and place are full. Indeed, this has been the only case 
known since the foundation ofthe city on which everyone was of the same opinion 
except those who, since seeing they must die, preferred to perish with everyone instead of 
alone. 155 
154 Cat. 4.12. 
155 Cat. 4 .13-4. 
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This lengthy passage begins with the optimistic and self-serving assumption that 
the audience shares Cicero's estimation of the relative dangers facing them. This cannot 
have been the case - at least, not entirely - but it allows him to avoid seeming 
overbearing. Indeed, concern over appearances predominates in the first part of the 
passage, specifically the fear of appearing cruel (Vereamini ne videamini; est verendum 
ne videamur). In earlier chapters, we saw how power depends on seeming worthy of it, 
and here Cicero plays to his audience's anxiety about it. Another cause for concern 
emerges halfway through the passage: some apparently fear that the consul lacks enough 
support to carry out the Senate's recommendations- ea quae vas statueritis hodierno die 
- no doubt a veiled reference to executions. Without a police force or standing army in 
the city, it fell to supporters of the Senate and magistrates to protect them from those who 
would otherwise do them harm. Thus, anxiety about insufficient praesidium necessarily 
reflects doubts about the consul's political strength. 
In response, Cicero points to the spectacle of the crowds assembled in the Forum 
below, a move for which the Third Catilinarian had set the stage. The earlier speech had 
turned public opinion against the conspirators, so that, as the Senate was now deliberating 
in the Temple of Concord, large crowds had gathered outside in support. The final line of 
the passage strongly suggests that the crowds want the conspirators to be put to death. 156 
As opposed to the rumors that Cicero has heard (voces quae perveniunt ad auris meas) of 
those who seem to fear (qui vereri videntur) that he does not have enough support to 
156 This seems likely, considering the crowds' favorable reaction to news of the executions that evening: 
Plut. Cic. 22.3-4. Following the meeting of the Senate, a group of equites is said to have assaulted Caesar 
as he was departing. Suet. Jul. 14.2; Plut. Caes. 8.2. See also: Sal. Cat. 49.4, who relates that the incident 
occurred after an earlier meeting of the Senate. 
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carry out the executions, the crowds provide clear evidence to the contrary. Moreover, 
their presence also signals a desire to maintain their place in the Republic, specifically 
their supremacy (summum imperium) and general prosperity (communisfortunas) .157 In 
other words, their presence is an indication of consent. While the debate over how to 
deal with the conspirators and the conspiracy itself threaten the Republic's consensus, 
Cicero reassures the senators of its viability by pointing to his collaboration with the 
People. Through a combination of his own diligence as consul (mea summa cura atque 
diligentia) and the People's extraordinary desire to preserve the Republic, there is 
nothing to fear; nothing has been left to chance- omnia et provisa et parata et constituta 
sunt. 
On the other hand, allowing the conspirators to live now carries with it a political 
risk. As previously suggested, reciprocity characterized the Republic's governing 
ideology; a set of mutual obligations bound the People with the Senate and magistrates. 
For the latter in particular, failure to live up to their obligations occasioned shame. At the 
moment, amid the political crisis facing the Republic, the People have demonstrated their 
commitment, and the Senate seems to have balked. Hence, the danger referred to in the 
opening lines of the passage, of seeming cruel toward the homeland - multo magis est 
verendum ne remissione poenae crudeles in patriam ... fitisse videamur. Apart from the 
Senate, there appears unprecedented unanimity about what ought to be done - causa est 
enim post urbem conditam haec inventa sola in qua omnes sentirent unum atque idem. 
157 For summum imperium populi Romani: Liv. 4.5.1; Cic. de Rege Alexandrino 4Cr =F. Scholl, ed. M 
Tullius Ciceronis Scripta quae Mansuerunt Omnia. vol. 8, Fasc. 29, XVI.4 (p. 462) Teubner. 
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Though the claim admits of hyperbole, it remains that strife had been going on for as long 
as anyone could remember. 
The crowds offer a rare sight- consensus. Their size and constituency imply the 
entire body politic, the Roman People. They fill the Forum and temples (plenum est 
forum, plena temp/a circum forum, pleni omnes aditus huius templi ac loci); they come 
from all classes, races, and ages (omnium ordinum homines, omnium generum, omnium 
denique aetatum). Cicero catalogs the orders in attendance- equites, tribuni aerarii, 
scribae, freeborn citizens, freedmen, and even slaves. Among the last of these who are 
treated well by their masters, the consul contends that there is none who does not shudder 
at the recklessness of the citizens-turned-traitors, who does not wish Rome to remain 
standing, who does not devote himselfto its welfare as much as he dares and is able. 158 
The recent past had revealed this to be more than wishful thinking. The consul goes on to 
report that one of Lentulus' operatives had made rounds of the shopkeepers, most of 
whom were slaves and freedmen. 159 His objective was to bribe the tabernarii into 
helping free Lentulus, but his efforts proved unsuccessful. Commerce requires stability, 
and so Cicero concludes that the entire class of shopkeepers and artisans are the most 
d d ( h . . . ") 160 evote to peace genus oc unzversum amantlSSlmum est otl . 
158 Cat. 4.16- Servus est nemo, qui modo tolerabili condicione sit servitutis, qui 11011 audaciam civium 
p erhorrescat, qui non haec stare cupiat, qui non quantum audet et quantum potest conferat ad salutem 
voluntatis. 
159 Sources: App. B. Civ. 2.5; Cic. Cat. 4.17; SaL Cat. 50.1-3. Appian relates that the operative was able to 
assemble a band of freedmen and slaves but that they proved unable to rescue Lentulus. Cicero makes no 
mention of this, creating the impression of consensus. On freedmen and slaves among the opifices and 
tabernarii: Lintott Violence 1999: 77; Vanderbroeck 1987: 69, 86-92; Treggiari 1980: 52-6. 
16° Cat. 4.17- Multo vera maxima pars eorum qui in tabernis sunt, immo vera- id enim potius est 
dicendum- genus hoc universum amantissimum est oti. 
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Though the episode of the anonymous operative could be cause for some 
concern, 161 Cicero uses it as evidence of the conspiracy's failure to gain support. 
Evidence of the conspirators' rhetoric suggests they deliberately portrayed themselves as 
disenfranchised and impoverished so as to appeal to the lower classes. For example, 
Catiline claimed that only a miser like himself could be a loyal defender of miseri; a 
delegation from Manlius contended that he and his followers were miseri and egentes on 
account of the cruelty and violence of moneylenders. 162 The episode of the operative 
reveals the conspiracy had failed to win over those most likely to support it. Had the 
canvass of the shopkeepers happened just days earlier, it might well have turned out 
differently. As I have suggested, the delivery of the Third Catilinarian probably initiated 
a behavioral cascade that swung public opinion against the conspiracy. Such a cascade 
would have begun by turning those undecided against the conspiracy and galvanizing 
those already opposed to it. With the balance of political support shifting, a positive 
feedback loop or "bandwagon effect" would have taken over. Those tepid in their 
support of the conspiracy would have backed away as public sympathy collapsed and the 
risks associated with supporting the conspiracy increased. This, in tum, would have 
induced others to follow suit so that, in the end, only a corps of devoted partisans 
remained. 
The spectacle of the crowds suggests the cascade ended in consensus, but the 
Senate remained aloof. Those with the most to gain from the conspiracy- the slaves and 
freedmen - had proven loyal to the Republic while senators, who owed their elite status 
161 As Cicero admits, Cat. 4.17 - Quare si quem vestrumforte commove! hoc quod auditum est, lenonem 
quondam Lentuli concursare circum tabernas .. . 
162 Vanderbroeck 1987: 118-9. Sources: Cic. Mur. 50; Sal. Cat. 21.2, 33 .1. 
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to the Republic, wavered. Appealing to the senators' political interests and their sense of 
shame, Cicero seeks to bring the cascade to completion. Having just remarked that the 
conspirators ought to be considered bitterest enemies (acerbissimi hastes) rather than 
unpatriotic citizens (improbi cives), Cicero looks to the crowds: ceteri vero, di 
immortales I qua frequentia, quo studio, qua virtute ad communem salutem 
dignitatemque consentiunt/163 These lines provide an emotional introduction to the 
catalog of the orders. After the initial apostrophe, a tricolon highlights the positive 
qualities of the crowds, while the rest of the sentence establishes their motives; despite 
the participation of various classes, consensus prevails (consentiunt). Indeed, Cicero 
claims during his subsequent treatment of the equites that their present support has 
brought an end to many years of strife; it has produced an alliance between them and the 
Senate (ad societatem concordiamque) that has the potential to purge the Republic of 
d . ·1164 every omestlc ev1 . 
Moreover, the crowds appear devoted to their common welfare and honor (ad 
communem salutem dignitatemque), something that is ordinarily the purview of the 
governing class.165 Since dignitas distinguishes a senator from an ordinary Roman 
citizen, the implication is that the People seem more zealous of preserving the Senate's 
honor than the Senate itself. The tricolon reinforces the point, calling attention not just to 
the numbers of people (jrequentia) but their zeal and courage as well. These twin 
163 Cat. 4.15. 
164 Cat. 4.15- [sc. equites] quos ex multorum annorum dissensione huius ordinis ad societatem 
concordiamque revocatos hodiernus dies vobiscum atque haec causa coniung it. Quam si coniunctionem in 
consulatu confirmatam mea pe1petuam in republica tenuerimus, confirmo vobis nullum post hac malum 
civile ac domesticum ad ullam rei publicae partem esse venturwn. 
165 On dignitas: Posch11989; Piscitelli 1979; Drexler 1966; Wirszubski 1950: 12-7, 36-7. 
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qualities of studium and virtus recall the attributes of industria and virtus, commonly 
found in the rhetoric of novi homines. With these qualities, aspiring politicians from the 
equestrian class argued that they themselves were worthy of office, while suggesting that 
their elite opponents, who had gained their status on the basis of pedigree, did not. 166 
By rehearsing this rhetorical commonplace, Cicero appeals to the senators' shame 
as a means of rousing them from their inertia. While they have supposedly allowed their 
fear to prevent them from executing the conspirators and protecting the Republic, the 
crowds have revealed these fears to be without merit. Indeed, the People's reaction 
suggests that the real danger for the Senate is if they do not execute the conspirators. The 
People have so far shown greater courage and devotion to the Republic. Thus, Cicero 
describes the tribuni aerarii asfortissimi viri.167 Similarly, he observes that the freedmen 
- like no vi homines- have achieved their status by means of virtus (sua virtute fortunam 
huius civitati consecuti).168 With the People in the Forum looking up to the Senate 
gathered in the Temple of Concord, Cicero tells his audience what should be immediately 
apparent: the Roman People have not failed to support them (vobis populi Romani 
praesidia non desunt); he then warns the senators not to be seen failing the Roman 
People (vas ne populo Romano desse videamini providete). 169 
166 Hellegouarc'h 1972: 476-8; Wiseman 1971: 109-11; Earl1967: 44-6. 
167 Cat. 4.15 -Pari studio defendendae rei publicae convenisse video tribunos aerarios,fortissimos viros . 
168 Cat. 4.16 - Operae pretium est, patres conscripti, libertinorum hominum studia cognoscere qui, sua 
virtute fortunam huius civitatis consecuti, vere hanc suam patriam esse iudicant quam sed urbem hostium 
esse iudicaverunt. 
169 Cat. 4.18- Quae cum ita sint, patres conscripti, vobis populi Romani praesidia non desunt: vas ne 
populo Romano desse videamini providete. See also: Verr. 1.47. 
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Cicero as Consul Popularis 
Societies require some level of consensus, whether about underlying principles or 
their application. The res publica was no exception. Consensus enabled the exercise of 
power, investing institutions and magistrates with the authority to act on behalf of the 
community. An orator could bring this force of consensus to bear in his rhetoric. If a 
magistrate could convince an audience that he and/or his position on a given issue 
enjoyed universal support, then, as a practical matter, it made little sense to oppose 
him.170 Even in meetings of the Senate from which they were largely barred, the Fourth 
Catilinarian demonstrates how the People could exert influence by appearing united. 
A behavioral cascade, triggered by an acclamatio, could produce consensus or its 
semblance. For this reason, Cicero had to manage instances of acclamatio in the course 
of the pro Rabirio and also the Fourth Catilinarian, where he cited the crowds as 
evidence of overwhelming support for the execution of the conspirators. The latter was a 
product of Cicero's earlier decision to expose the conspiracy rather than aggressively 
move against it. The First Catilinarian illustrates this strategy, which set the stage for 
the spectacle of the crowds almost a month later. Like the affair of Saturninus earlier, the 
Catilinarian conspiracy posed a dilemma for the consul and Republic alike: no strong 
consensus obtained on whether to treat citizens suspected of treason as enemies (hastes) 
or citizens (cives). With the Third Catilinarian, Cicero broadcast the evidence of the 
conspiracy and succeeded in galvanizing public opinion. With the People now squarely 
against the conspirators, the consul delivered his Fourth Catilinarian in an effort to 
170 On consensus omnium as acclamatio (i.e. the perceptually expressed will of a majority) and its role in 
rhetoric and philosophy: Bell2004: 230-6; Vasaly 1993: 35; Poschl1975: 216-8 ; Oehler 1961. 
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persuade the Senate to endorse executions. Just as he was seeking to insulate himself 
politically by referring the matter to the Senate, the Senate hesitated in view of the 
political risks associated with putting citizens to death. To persuade the reluctant 
senators, Cicero pointed to the assembled crowds as evidence of universal support for the 
executions. 
This evidence of popular opinion would be important to Cicero's self-defense in 
the months and years to come. The first recriminations came within days of the 
conspirators being executed. Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos and L. Calpumius Bestia, two 
of the tribunes who assumed office on December 10, attacked Cicero over the executions, 
and Metellus vetoed the customary oration that the consul was to deliver at the end of the 
year. 171 The attacks only increased, and four and a half years later, he departed for exile. 
Given the events of the last half-century, the backlash came as no surprise to Cicero, who 
published his consular orations in short order.172 Robert Cape, expanding upon the 
earlier work of William Batstone, has suggested the primary motivation behind Cicero's 
decision to publish his consular speeches was self-fashioning. 173 His references to the 
People contribute to this effort. In the ensuing struggle to defme the memoria of his 
consulship, Cicero had to push back against his popularis critics who argued that he had 
acted like a tyrant. The Fourth Catilinarian, specifically the spectacle of the crowds, 
belies this narrative as it shows the People unanimous in their support of the executions. 
171 Sources: Cic. Fam. 5.1, 2; Pis. 6-7; Plut. Cic. 23 .1. 
172 Cape 2002: 114-5 ; McDermott 1972. Despite the belief, long held, that the heavily revised speeches 
were not published until60, most scholars now hold the position put forward by William McDermott, that 
the speeches were published soon after delivery. 
173 Cape 2002; Batstone 1994. 
It portrays Cicero as a consul popularis, one whose actions accorded with the popular 
will, who preserved their interests and depended on their support. 
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Such was the praesidium that certain senators were rumored to believe Cicero 
lacked at the time of the conspiracy. He, of course, pointed to the crowds, thereby 
bringing the earlier cascade to a successful conclusion and producing, for a short time, 
the kind of consensus that lent the Republic stability and for which the consul himself 
was ultimately responsible. It was precisely the fleeting nature of political consensus in 
the late Republic that prompted Cicero to pose as a tribune-consul, a magistrate who 
regularly consults with the People and relies on them for protection. This approach to the 
consulship defied expectations, both about what it meant to be consul and about what it 
meant to be popularis. By mediating the two dominant political ideologies, Cicero aimed 
at consensus, and he used rhetoric to create the impression that it existed even on issues 
and in situations where it clearly did not. Perceptions were critical, since behavioral 
cascades had the potential to translate an appearance of consensus into reality. But a 
cascade-induced consensus could be a fragile thing/ 74 something Cicero was shortly to 
find out. 
174 Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch 1992: 1004-9. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Populus and the End of the Republic 
Of the consulship in the late Republic, Sir Ronald Syme observed, "The 
consulate, gained by the successful in the forty-third year, marked the acme of a man's 
life and often changed the tone of his political professions." 1 The general nature of his 
comments notwithstanding, their context reveals that Syme had Cicero specifically in 
mind. The historian's pronouncement reflects a common view of the orator as "a shaky 
conservative who curried popular favor in his youth, then drifted toward the bani as 
success increased his stake in the preservation of the status quo."2 The foregoing study 
has shown that, despite the variety of situations in which he spoke between 70 and 63, 
Cicero's rhetoric consistently identifies the People as the ultimate source of power and its 
interest as the end for which the Republic exists. 
This is not to say that the statesman's positions were always consistent regarding 
the normative scope of the People's power. With his support of the lex Manilia, Cicero 
signaled that the Senate's traditional prerogative in managing the empire did not always 
obtain and that the People could appropriate that role for themselves. On the other hand, 
his response as consul to the Catilinarian conspiracy suggested a more expansive view of 
senatorial authority vis-a-vis the ius populi. In so far as these positions were actually 
exclusive of one another, we must bear in mind that an abstract concern for the People's 
1 Syme 2002: 24 . 
2 Mitchell1979: 10, regarding L. Licinius Crassus. See also: Brunt 1988: 377, 478; Sal. Cat. 38.1. 
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place in the Republic rarely, if ever, provided Cicero's primary motivation for speaking. 
The specific needs of the occasion, in addition to his own self-promotion and self-
preservation, were more pressing. 
Still, Cicero's rhetoric related to the People reveals a significant amount of 
consistency. While the generally popularis quality of his rhetoric between 70 and 63 has 
long been recognized, critics have frequently accused Cicero the consul of being 
disingenuous, of concealing his true, optimas ends beneath a popularis fas;ade. 3 Such 
criticism, however, imagines the ideological conflict of the late Republic as a zero-sum 
game, in which Cicero (or any other politician) could not defend the traditional 
prerogatives of the Senate and believe that he was doing so in the best interests of the 
People. In terms of contional rhetoric, Robert Morstein-Marx has claimed that all 
contional speakers claimed to be champions of the People.4 We should not automatically 
assume that so-called optimates were lying: regardless of whether speakers sought to 
enhance the power of the People or to preserve the traditional prerogatives of the Senate, 
all seemingly agreed that the People ought to enjoy certain rights while playing a central 
role in the Republic. In terms of ideology, the issue distinguishingpopulares from 
optimates was what those rights and powers ought to be. 
Just over four years after Cicero's term as consul had ended, the infamous P. 
Clodius Pulcher accused him of having put citizens to death without a trial. The tribune 
convinced the Roman People to exile the former consul and to confiscate his property.5 
Even in the wake of this public humiliation, the evidence suggests that Cicero did not 
3 Cape 1995:270-1. 
4 Though, in terms of their ends, not necessarily populares. Morstein-Marx 2004: 204-40. 
5 Kaster 2006: 8-9, 395-7. Sources: Att. 3.2, 4 ; Sest. 53-4, 65. 
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abandon his belief that that the People ought to play a prominent role in the Republic. In 
his philosophical treatises, de RePublica and de Legibus, which he composed in the mid-
late 50s, the orator-turned-philosopher contends that the People should possess libertas, 
that they should have certain rights, and that as a free people (fiber populus) they should 
elect their own leaders, including tribunes.6 At the same time, he rejects democracy, 
contending that a civitas popularis, in which the People hold supreme power and 
everything is managed by their decisions, is the least commendable of the three basic 
forms of government. 7 Though Cicero prescribes a deliberative council to oversee his 
ideal republic, he also acknowledges (through his main character in the de RePublica, 
Scipio Aemilianus) what is otherwise self-evident: a republic cannot exist without people. 
Indeed, a republic requires a populus united by mutual advantage (utilitatis communione) 
and a common understanding of what is right (iuris consensu). Having declared that "a 
republic is the property of the People" (est ... res publica res populi), Scipio concludes 
that, "above all, the ruling council must always be accountable to that cause which 
produced the city-state" (id autem cons ilium primum semper ad eam causam referendum 
est, quae causa genuit civitatem).8 
The idea that the Senate and magistrates are accountable to the People serves as a 
kind of first principle in Cicero's rhetoric, and it further suggests that popular 
accountability was a mainstay of the Republic's consensus ideology. The principle of 
6 Rep. 1.51, 65-8, 2.57, 4.8f; Leg. 3.23. 
7 Rep. 1.42- illa autem est civitas popularis (sic enim appellant), in qua in populo sunt omnia. Rep. 3.23-
si vera populus plurimum potest omniaque eius arbitrio reguntur, dicitur ilia libertas, est vera licentia. 
8 Rep. 1.41 , 39- Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum 
coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. 
See also: Po1yb. 6.14.4. 
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reciprocity governed the relationship between electors and the elected. As electors, the 
Roman People were tasked with evaluating the conduct of would-be magistrates and 
bestowing honor and power on those they deemed worthy. Having received popular 
approval, a magistrate was expected to serve in office for the benefit of the People. Not 
surprisingly, this theme figures prominently in Cicero's first speech as a magistrate 
before the People. In the exordium of the pro Lege Man ilia, the orator credits the 
assembled People with his election and the enhancement of his auctoritas- the 
(recognition) respect he commands from others.9 He also pledges to employ his talents 
before those who elected him. 
On the other hand, Cicero proceeds to argue that the auctoritates of his 
opponents, including Hortensius, ought to be ignored. They and other leading members 
of the Senate previously opposed a similar law, the lex Gabinia, which enabled Pompey 
to clear the Mediterranean of pirates within a matter of months. Prior to the Gabinian 
promulgation, the senatorial class had shown itself unable to deal effectively with the 
threat of piracy. Cicero characterizes the Senate's bungling, its subsequent opposition to 
the lex Gabinia, and the present opposition of some to the lex Man ilia as a failure by 
certain senators to meet their obligations to the People. For having opposed the lex 
Gabinia, Cicero charges Hortensius with neglecting the "true cause and welfare of the 
Roman People."10 In so doing, he sets out to inflame the emotions of his audience by 
accusing his opponent of betraying the public trust. The implication that Hortensius 
merits shame supplies the spark. If the orator could convince the People to see 
9 Leg. Man. 1-2. 
10 Leg. Man. 53- plus apud populum Romanum auctoritas tua quam ips ius populi Romani salus et vera 
causa valuisset, hodie hanc gloriam atque hoc orbis terrae imperium teneremus? 
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Hortensius' conduct as disgraceful, their own moral sense would provide the fuel. For 
Cicero, rhetorical success entails cultivating indignation (invidia) and then capitalizing on 
the "unpleasant psychophysical response" that accompanies it (dolor). 11 
The perception that one party has breached the social contract inevitably prompts 
the other (in this case, the People) to reconsider the terms. Such was the effect of 
popularis rhetoric: though many, perhaps most, populares might have used such rhetoric 
for their own particular ends, their words and deeds nonetheless produced substantive 
changes in both the process of government and the ideological landscape. In the case of 
the pro Lege Manilia, Cicero urges the People to take matters into their own hands and 
follow the precedent of the lex Gabinia. Rather than deferring to the Senate and the 
auctoritas of its leading members, as was customary in foreign affairs, Cicero argues that 
the People themselves should appoint Pompey to a special command. Popular invidia, 
therefore, produces a change in institutional practice and a corresponding decline in the 
Senate's power. 
The jury in the V errines faced a similar prospect. Cicero claims in the first actio 
that the public has become convinced of both V erres' guilt and the rampant nature of 
judicial corruption. Faced with losing their monopoly over the courts, Cicero frames 
Verres' conviction as the only remedy available to the jurors by which they can restore 
their honor in the eyes of the People. As part of his strategy, Cicero appeals to the People 
in the form of the attending crowd - corona. He reminds the jury that men are watching 
to see whether they will uphold the law. If the jurors fail to meet their obligations to the 
11 Kaster 2005: 86. See also: Sal. Jug. 31.1-29, 85.1-50, where the respective speeches of Memmius and 
Marius evince a similar strategy. 
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People, Cicero suggests some of the ways in which the populus Romanus could set 
matters aright: they might (as they, in fact, did) enact a law altering the composition of 
juries; Cicero himself might retry the defendant before the People in contione; the crowd 
itself might simply decide to lynch the defendant. 
With regard to the last of these, the tribunate and the courts had originally been 
established, along with the citizen's right of appeal (provocatio), to obviate such acts of 
collective violence. A perception that these institutions were failing to administer justice, 
to grant what is owed to every citizen, inevitably produced mass indignation. By its 
nature, indignation includes an emotional aspect- dolor- which, when left unchecked, 
produces violence. Cicero recalls how, in the first actio of the Verrines, testimony 
regarding the defendant's abuse of citizens caused those in the corona to threaten 
violence. In the end, the onlookers checked their emotions: they allowed the judicial 
process to run its course, but not before their hostile outbursts had likely influenced the 
jurors' deliberations. 
In the first actio of the pro Cornelio, the orator blames an obstructionist tribune 
for an outbreak of violence. As Cicero reminds his audience toward the end of the 
speech, the tribunate was originally established to protect the rights of the People. As 
tribune, the defendant - C. Cornelius - had proposed a law affirming the exclusive right 
of the People to grant legal exemptions. Though the bill enjoyed popular support, the 
Senate enlisted the aid of a fellow tribune to interpose his veto. A riot ensued. When 
Cornelius was subsequently prosecuted for diminishing the maiestas ·Of the Roman 
People, Cicero defended him by deploying a strategy that had been used effectively by C. 
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Antonius decades earlier in the case of another tribune accused de maiestate - C. 
Norbanus.12 Cicero not only argued that the defendant had sought to promote the 
People's maiestas, but also that the crowd had been justified in lashing out. A tribune 
had frustrated the popular will, and in doing so, a popular institution had failed to serve 
the People's interests. The crowd was justified in taking matters into their own hands: 
their seditio was iusta. 
Yet the People's sword cut both ways. As consul, Cicero defended the abrogation 
of civil liberties under the SCUby pointing to the People's willingness to use the force of 
arms to maintain order. To defend the SCU in the mid-60s was to invite controversy, 
particularly from populares who were intent on assailing the Senate's prerogatives while 
portraying themselves as champions of the People. In both the pro Rabirio perduellionis 
reo and the Fourth Catilinarian, Cicero asserts that the willingness of the People to take 
up arms on behalf of the Senate amounted to explicit consent for the SCU. 13 During the 
Catilinarian affair, the consul publicized evidence seized from the Allobroges in an effort 
to gain support for moving against the conspirators. The evidence swung public opinion, 
and when a crowd gathered in the Forum as the Senate was deliberating about what to do 
with the conspirators who were in custody, Cicero pointed to the gathering as evidence of 
a broad-based consensus in support of the Senate and consuls. In the crowd were equites, 
tribuni aerarii, scribae, freeborn citizens, freedmen, and slaves; its size and constituency 
suggested the Roman People. 14 
12 Sources: de Oral. 2.107-9, 164, 167, 197-204; Part. Oral. 105. 
13 Cat. 4.13-5; Rab. Perd. 2, 20, 27, 30-31. 
14 Cat. 4.14-6. See also: Sest. 97, where Cicero describes the optimates as innumberabiles and who include 
senators, equestrians, municipales rusticique, businessmen, and freedmen. 
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As they had done during the Satuminian tumultus, the People rallied to preserve 
the institutions ofthe Republic. Cicero hints at their reasons for doing so in the Fourth 
Catilinarian, when he relates how Lentulus' operative tried unsuccessfully to recruit a 
mob of shopkeepers to free the conspirators from prison. He explains, "By far, the 
majority of those who work in the shops ... indeed, the whole class is the most devoted to 
peace" (amantissimum oti). 15 Indeed, Cicero had begun his consulship by informing the 
People in the second de Lege Agraria that, as a consul popularis, he would bring forth 
what is most popularis- peace, calm, and quiet (adfero pacem, tranquillitatem, otium). 16 
Similarly in the pro Sestio, which he delivered after his return from exile, Cicero claims 
that a dedication to "domestic peace with honor" (otium cum dignitate)- a harmonious 
Republic overseen by the Senate - is what unites optimates whose numbers and diverse 
constituency suggest the "true" Roman People. 17 In each case, Cicero insists that in the 
great ideological debate between, on the one hand, an antagonistic popularis ideology 
promising greater rights and benefits and, on the other, a harmonious Republic 
administered by the Senate in the service of the People, the Roman People would 
(continue to) choose the latter. 
They did in 63 , though in a short while, they would suffer a new order in which 
Caesar reigned supreme. One could argue that force of arms brought this about, that 
15 Cat. 4.17- Multo vera maxima pars eorum qui in tabernis sunt, immo vera- id enim potius est dicendum 
- genus hoc universum amantissimum est oti. 
16 Leg. Ag. 2.102 - Ex quo intellegi, Quirites, potest nihil esse tam populare quam id, quod ego vobis in 
hunc annum consul popularis adfero - pacem, tranquillitatem, otium. See also : 2.77. 
17 Seen. 14 above w. Sest. 98- Quid est igiturpropositum his rei publicae gubernatoribus, quod intueri et 
quo cursum suum derigere debeant? Jd quod est praestantissimum maximeque optabile omnibus sanis et 
bonis et beatis, cum dignitate otium. This theme and the speech as a whole require a fuller treatment. In 
addition to violence, one of the themes running through the speech is the distinction between the "true" 
voice of the People and those emanating from mobs-for-hire that attend contiones (esp. §§ 114-31). See 
Kaster 2006: esp. 22-37. 
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Caesar himself was the author of the new monarchy, but it remained for the People to 
give their consent. Weary from war, they acquiesced and, in so doing, vindicated the 
earlier judgment of Cicero. In the end, the People opted to exchange their rights for the 
sweetness of peace. 18 
18 
So, Tac. Ann. 1.2.1 - .. . ubi militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii [sc. Caesar dux] 
p el/exit, insurgere paulatim, munia senatus, magistratuum, legum in se trahere, nullo adversante ... 
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